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INTRODUCTION 
This Article is the first of what is intended to be an annual discussion 
of cases decided by American Courts regarding Federal Indian Law. This 
collected work was inspired by the work of Symeon Symeonides and the 
American Journal of Comparative Law, who have produced a summary of 
cases discussing choice of law and conflict of laws for the last thirty years,1 
as well as Steve Wise and Stephen Sepinuck’s coauthored survey of 
personal property secured transactions published annually by The Business 
Lawyer.2 
The law changes. To keep current on the law and to avoid the dangers 
of malpractice, most states require licensed attorneys to complete 
Continuing Legal Education (CLE) courses. However, no amount of CLEs 
can perfectly capture all of the changes in an area of law in a given year. 
Moreover, there is a benefit to everyone involved in the field (scholars, 
practitioners, students, judges, and even interested observers) having a 
collected compendium of recently decided cases. 
To ensure that the project identified all eligible cases, the author has 
searched Lexis for all cases containing the words “Indian” or “Tribe” 
published between January 1, 2017, and December 31, 2017. Invariably, 
this search produced thousands of false-positives: cases involving Indian 
Harbor Insurance, the city of Indian Springs, Nevada, and persons from 
the country of India, as well as cases citing to noted Harvard law professor 
Laurence Tribe. Admittedly, the project misses the hundreds of cases that 
may involve aspects of Indian law that are settled and then dismissed, in 
which a plea agreement is reached or where the judge decides the relevant 
                                                     
 1. Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2016: Thirtieth Annual 
Survey, 65 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (2017). 
 2. Steve Wise & Stephen L. Sepinuck, Personal Property Secured Transactions, 71 BUS. LAW. 
1323 (2016). The author is personally indebted to Stephen Sepinuck, who presented on the importance 
to legal scholars of maintaining an active reading list of cases in their given subject area during the 
2016 Central States Law School Association annual conference held at the University of North Dakota 
in September 2016. 
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issue(s) from the bench without a written opinion.3 The project also misses 
opinions issued by tribal courts.4 However, this collection is otherwise an 
excellent representation of the written opinions by state and federal courts 
in 2017 and thus captures the fact patterns and legal reasoning that have 
precedential value. While there is admittedly a risk of missing a relevant 
case that does not use either “Indian” or “Tribe” anywhere in the opinion, 
the risk is acceptably small. 
Such a broad search contains many cases that apply existing law to a 
very similar set of facts and therefore do not add anything to the current 
canons of Indian law. It also includes many unpublished opinions. These 
cases were selectively included based on the author’s understanding of 
how helpful their inclusion might be to an annual collection of the law. 
Invariably, such search terms also yield court orders, summary dismissals, 
interlocutory rulings, and other court decisions that may not be opinions 
on the merits but, if given sufficient discussion, speak to important aspects 
of federal Indian law. These were included based on the author’s judgment 
of their usefulness to the intended audience. 
The end result is a comprehensive review of Indian law for 2017 that 
necessarily makes some judgment calls about the inclusion of material. It 
does not include a citation to every case related to Indian law issued by the 
courts but tries to incorporate the majority of opinions into its catalog to 
provide a robust discussion of the changes in Indian law over the course 
of 2017. The discussion here is provided as objectively as possible. It is 
intended to be a faithful summary of the relevant cases without judgment 
on whether the court got the law right or whether the case is consistent 
with previous authority. 
Part I of this Article provides some general statistics about Indian 
law in 2017. Part II focuses on activity at the U.S. Supreme Court, which 
is the most watched forum for Indian law cases for obvious reasons. Part 
III groups cases by subject area and arranges those subject areas 
alphabetically. The goal of such an organization is to provide easier access 
to new, relevant materials for readers who may be specifically interested 
in a certain area of Indian law. Part IV covers some other developments 
                                                     
 3. Capturing these cases is literally impossible. When a judge rules from the bench or a settlement 
agreement is shared only between the parties, the decisions are not written and therefore cannot be 
captured through any method of case collection. 
 4. There are also cases published by tribal courts, which are certainly relevant to Indian law but 
are not collected and indexed by Lexis. These cases are not included in this survey given the difficulty 
of obtaining and organizing all of their important insights. This would be an excellent project for future 
scholars but is outside the scope of this undertaking. The Indian Law Reporter does publish some 
decisions from tribal courts—but not all. Other tribes have their own reporters (for example, the 
Navajo Nation and the Muscogee (Creek) Nation). However, no effort to read and report all of these 
cases has been made here. 
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often touched on by just one or two cases the entire year, but they are 
included in this Article for purposes of completeness. Finally, the 
Conclusion provides just a few short concluding remarks. Given that this 
is the first year the author has collected and published a list of cases, the 
author encourages and welcomes feedback from every reader with 
suggestions for how future iterations of this catalog could be edited to be 
more useful. 
I. SOME STATISTICS 
A thorough search of the literature shows there has been almost no 
attention paid to an annualized survey of Indian law cases—the two 
notable exceptions being Nell Jessup Newton’s One Year in the Life of 
Twenty Tribal Courts, in which Professor (now Dean) Newton provides 
her insights from reading the eighty-five tribal court opinions published in 
the Indian Law Reporter in 1996,5 and Professor Kathryn Fort’s The 
Cherokee Conundrum: California Courts and the Indian Child Welfare 
Act, in which Professor Fort uses Westlaw to survey the Indian Child 
Welfare Act (ICWA) opinions decided by courts between January 1, 2007, 
and February 29, 2008.6 
Having carefully searched and read all of the cases in Lexis using the 
terms “Indian” or “Tribe,” I can provide some interesting statistics about 
the landscape of Indian law in 2017. There were 646 written opinions in 
cases that substantively addressed Indian law issues. This omits many 
cases in which an Indian was a party to the proceedings but the case did 
not involve questions of Indian law. Among the most common omitted 
scenarios were criminal appeals where Indians were convicted and then 
appealed for ineffective assistance of counsel, where individuals claimed 
employment discrimination on the basis of their Indian status, or 
procedural cases against the Bureau of Indian Affairs or the Indian Health 
Service that raised purely administrative or procedural questions but did 
not require the interpretation of Indian law. 
Of the 646 opinions, 252 of them involved the ICWA, and 176 of 
those came out of California. This is in keeping with Professor Fort’s 
analysis on ICWA from 2007, both in terms of the large number of cases 
and California’s disproportionate share of those cases.7 Of the 646 
opinions, 74 of them were issued by federal appellate courts, and only two 
                                                     
 5. Nell Jessup Newton, Tribal Court Praxis: One Year in the Life of Twenty Indian Tribal Courts, 
22 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 285, 290 (1998). 
 6. Kathryn E. Fort, The Cherokee Conundrum: California Courts and the Indian Child Welfare 
Act 18 (Mich. State Univ. Coll. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 07-
07, 2009), https://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2012/12/ssrn-id13922931.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
2Y7N-V7TB]. 
 7. Id. at 18–19. 
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were decided by the U.S. Supreme Court.8 The following charts provide a 
catalog of the number of Indian law opinions decided by each federal 
appellate court and the ten federal district courts that decided seven or 
more substantive Indian law opinions. Generally the charts provide few 
surprises, with the Ninth and Tenth Circuits having the busiest Indian law 
caseloads from an appellate perspective and federal district courts in 
California, Washington, South Dakota, New Mexico, and Arizona, which 
all have large Indian populations,9 carrying the largest Indian law 
caseloads among district courts in the country. 
 
Federal Circuit Ct. # Cases  Federal District Ct. # Cases 
First 2 E.D. Cal. 32 
Second 1 W.D. Wash. 27 
Third 0 D.S.D. 22 
Fourth 1 D.N.M. 21 
Fifth 0 D. Ariz. 18 
Sixth 0 D.D.C. 16 
Seventh 1 N.D. Cal. 8 
Eighth 4 S.D. Cal. 7 
Ninth 36 D. Mont. 7 
Tenth 22 Fed. Cl. 7 
Eleventh 0  
D.C. 2  
Federal 5  
 
The number of Indian law cases decided in state courts is skewed 
substantially by the large number of ICWA cases. In addition to 
                                                     
 8. Infra Part II. The Supreme Court issued one full length opinion on an Indian law question in 
2017: Lewis v. Clarke, 137 S. Ct. 1285 (2017) (discussing the ability of a tribal employee to raise 
sovereign immunity as a defense to a suit brought against him in his personal capacity). The other 
opinion is actually a denial from certiorari: Upstate Citizens for Equal. v. United States, 199 L. Ed. 2d 
372 (2017). Justice Thomas wrote a dissent from the denial of certiorari on the basis that the Indian 
Commerce Clause should not be read to give Interior the broad power to take land into trust. His 
dissent was not joined by any other Justice. 
 9. See TINA NORRIS, PAULA L. VINES & ELIZABETH M. HOEFFEL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE 
AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE POPULATION: 2010, at 7 (Jan. 2012), https://www.census. 
gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-10.pdf [https://perma.cc/876D-M3DU] (noting the total and 
comparatively large relative numbers of American Indians in states like California, Washington, South 
Dakota, New Mexico, and Arizona). While states like New York and Texas also have large Indian 
populations, they do not have as many reservations and so their native populations are much less likely 
to get involved in questions of Indian law, which are inherently tied to tribal governments and 
reservation or allotted lands. 
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California’s 176 decisions, state courts in Alaska issued 11 ICWA 
opinions, Arizona issued 8, Michigan issued 6, and Washington, Kansas, 
and Colorado all issued 5. While most of Indian law raises federal 
questions due to the unique and complicated nature of the relationship 
between tribes, the several states, and the federal government, state courts 
also decided a number of tax cases, jurisdictional questions in Public Law 
280 cases, and cases where the tribe invoked sovereign immunity as a 
defense to litigation. 
The statistics presented here are offered only to present an overview 
of Indian law in the year 2017. The following Parts provide more detailed 
discussion on the evolution of the various Indian law doctrines across state 
and federal courts during the calendar year. 
II. THE SUPREME COURT 
Since 1953, the U.S. Supreme Court has heard an average of between 
two and three Indian law cases a year.10 However, during the 2016–2017 
term the Supreme Court decided a single Indian law case, Lewis v. Clarke, 
in the spring of 2017.11 The 2017–2018 term has proved more fruitful. As 
of December 31, 2017, the Supreme Court had granted certiorari in two 
Indian law cases,12 and Justice Thomas had issued a lone dissent from 
denial of certiorari in a third.13 
A. The 2016–2017 Term 
The sole Indian law case decided by the Supreme Court in 2017 was 
an appeal from the Connecticut Supreme Court that raised the question of 
when a tribal employee can assert sovereign immunity to avoid liability in 
civil litigation. In Lewis v. Clarke, non-Indian petitioners were driving on 
a Connecticut highway when they were struck from behind by a vehicle 
driven by the respondent, an employee of the Mohegan Sun Casino, while 
he was transporting casino patrons.14 Petitioners brought a negligence 
action in Connecticut state court against the respondent in his personal 
                                                     
 10. Grant Christensen, Judging Indian Law: What Factors Influence Individual Justice’s Votes 
on Indian Law in the Modern Era, 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 267, 290 n.121 (2012). Professor Matthew 
Fletcher has an excellent piece discussing the Supreme Court’s behavior concerning accepting cases 
for review. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Factbound and Splitless: The Certiorari Process as Barrier 
to Justice for Indian Tribes, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 933 (2009). 
 11. Lewis, 137 S. Ct. 1285. 
 12. Patchak v. Jewell, 828 F.3d 995 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Lundgren v. Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, 
187 Wn.2d 857, 389 P.3d 569 (Wash. 2017). On January 12, 2018, just after the first draft of this 
Article was submitted, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to a third case to be decided during the 
2017–2018 term: United States v. Washington, 853 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 
735 (2018). For a discussion of this case, see infra Part III.S. 
 13. Upstate Citizens for Equal., 199 L. Ed. 2d 372. 
 14. Lewis, 137 S. Ct. at 1286. 
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capacity.15 The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the defendant could 
assert sovereign immunity because he was acting within the scope of his 
employment when the accident occurred.16 Moreover, the petitioners had 
an available forum in tribal court where the tribe had waived immunity 
from suit.17 
Justice Sotomayor wrote the majority opinion, which reversed the 
decision of the Connecticut Supreme Court and limited the scope of tribal 
sovereign immunity by focusing on the real party in interest.18 The Court 
clarified that in tort cases where plaintiffs seek liability not from the tribe 
but against the tribal employee in their personal capacity, sovereign 
immunity is not designed to shield that defendant for liability for what is, 
essentially, their own personal negligence.19 
However, the Court cautioned that not all cases that name the 
individual employee as the defendant are necessarily cases that are seeking 
to recover against the employee in their personal capacity. The Court 
reasoned that a proper inquiry needs to be made into who is the real party 
in interest.20 The Court explained that while sovereign immunity is a 
defense in official capacity suits, it is not available when a defendant is 
sued in their personal capacity.21 Applying those principles to this case, 
Justice Sotomayor reasoned that here, a claim was made against the driver 
in his personal capacity for his personal negligence while operating an 
                                                     
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 1290–91 (“The Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed, holding that tribal sovereign 
immunity did bar the suit. 320 Conn. 706, 135 A. 3d 677 (2016). The court agreed with Clarke that 
‘because he was acting within the scope of his employment for the Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority 
and the Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority is an arm of the Mohegan Tribe, tribal sovereign immunity 
bars the plaintiffs’ claims against him.’”). 
 17. See id. at 1290 (“Of particular relevance here, Mohegan law sets out sovereign immunity and 
indemnification policies applicable to disputes arising from gaming activities. The Gaming Authority 
has waived its sovereign immunity and consented to be sued in the Mohegan Gaming Disputes Court. 
Mohegan Const., Art. XIII, § 1; Mohegan Tribe Code § 3-250(b).”) 
 18. Id. at 1288–94 (“We hold that, in a suit brought against a tribal employee in his individual 
capacity, the employee, not the tribe, is the real party in interest and the tribe’s sovereign immunity is 
not implicated. That an employee was acting within the scope of his employment at the time the tort 
was committed is not, on its own, sufficient to bar a suit against that employee on the basis of tribal 
sovereign immunity.”). 
 19. Id. at 1292 (“This is a negligence action arising from a tort committed by Clarke on an 
interstate highway within the State of Connecticut. The suit is brought against a tribal employee 
operating a vehicle within the scope of his employment but on state lands, and the judgment will not 
operate against the Tribe. This is not a suit against Clarke in his official capacity. It is simply a suit 
against Clarke to recover for his personal actions . . . .”). 
 20. Id. at 1291–93 (“In an official-capacity claim, the relief sought is only nominally against the 
official and in fact is against the official’s office and thus the sovereign itself. . . . Personal-capacity 
suits, on the other hand, seek to impose individual liability upon a government officer for actions taken 
under color of state law. . . . [A]nd the real party in interest is the individual, not the sovereign.”). 
 21. Id. at 1292. 
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automobile, and therefore, he was the real party in interest.22 Accordingly, 
the Court found that the defendant was not able to avail himself of the 
tribe’s sovereign immunity.23 
The Court further held that, although tribal law required the tribe to 
indemnify the defendant, indemnification does not change either the real 
party in interest or the ability of the driver to claim sovereign immunity.24 
Essentially, the court suggested that when determining who is the real 
party in interest, the question is not who ultimately pays but rather whose 
liability the plaintiff is seeking to recover under. When the plaintiff 
assumes the liability regardless of any pre-arranged indemnification, the 
plaintiff—not the tribe—is the real party in interest. While the tribe may 
indemnify Clarke for any negligence that occurred as a result of his driving 
a vehicle on Connecticut roads as a part of his employment, that 
indemnification does not convert a claim against him in his personal 
capacity to an official capacity case. 
Justices Thomas and Ginsburg each contributed a short concurrence 
expressing their views that tribal sovereign immunity should be more 
narrowly construed than the Court’s current jurisprudence allows, but 
because they agreed with the outcome as applied to an employee of a tribal 
enterprise, they each concurred in the judgment. Justice Thomas wrote to 
express his view that “tribal immunity does not extend ‘to suits arising out 
of a tribe’s commercial activities conducted beyond its territory.’”25 
Justice Ginsburg added that “tribes, interacting with nontribal members 
outside reservation boundaries, should be subject to nondiscriminatory 
state laws of general application.”26 Despite the separate concurrences, the 
ultimate decision was an 8–0 victory for the appellant.27 
 Application of Lewis v. Clarke in 2017 
Although it was only decided on April 25, 2017, the Lewis v. Clarke 
opinion has already been cited in written opinions by many lower courts.28 
                                                     
 22. Id. at 1291–93 (“[H]ere, that immunity is simply not in play. Clarke, not the Gaming 
Authority, is the real party in interest.”). 
 23. Id. at 1295. 
 24. Id. at 1293–94 (“The Tribe’s indemnification provision does not somehow convert the suit 
against Clarke into a suit against the sovereign; when Clarke is sued in his individual capacity, he is 
held responsible only for his individual wrongdoing.”). 
 25. Id. at 1294. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 1287–88. The case was argued on January 9, 2017, and so Justice Gorsuch had not yet 
been nominated, let alone confirmed, to his seat on the Supreme Court. In accordance with Supreme 
Court practice, because he did not participate in the argument, he did not vote on the final issued 
opinion. 
 28. See Pennachietti v. Mansfield, No. 17-02582, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 203005 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 
11, 2017); Stanko v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, No. CIV. 16-5105-JLV, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149120 
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In Pennachietti v. Mansfield, the plaintiff, who had borrowed money from 
a payday lender owned by the Lac Vieu Desert Band of Lake Superior 
Chippewa Indians, brought suit against the manager of the lender in his 
personal capacity for a series of tortious claims under state and federal 
law.29 The Eastern District of Pennsylvania cited to Lewis v. Clarke as part 
of its refusal to grant the defendant summary judgment on the basis of 
sovereign immunity.30 
The federal court in South Dakota applied Lewis v. Clarke to a 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 action brought by an Indian against several officers of the 
Oglala Sioux Tribe, including a former tribal judge, related to his detention 
after he was arrested pursuant to two different tribal warrants issued for 
failing to appear in tribal court to address speeding tickets.31 In Stanko v. 
Oglala Sioux Tribe, the federal court dismissed claims against the 
individuals acting in their official capacity because “[t]he Tribe’s 
immunity extends to its officers acting in their official capacities.”32 To 
justify its conclusion the court cited directly to Lewis v. Clarke: 
“‘Defendants in an official-capacity action may assert sovereign 
immunity.’”33 The court dismissed the claims for failure to state a claim 
against the tribal officers in their individual capacity because the alleged 
violations of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights by the individual 
defendants were not conducted under color of “state” law as required in a 
§ 1983 action but instead under “tribal” law.34 One week later the court 
dismissed a nearly identical set of claims against employees of the Kyle 
jail and tribal employees in the criminal justice system.35 
                                                     
(D.S.D. Sept. 14, 2017); Alexander v. New York, No. 6:17-CV-725 (GTS/ATB), 2017 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 108745 (N.D.N.Y. July 12, 2017); Harvey v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray 
Reservation, 2017 UT 75, 851 Utah Adv. Rep. 19 (Utah 2017); Harrison v. PCI Gaming Authority, 
No. 1130168, 2017 Ala. LEXIS 98 (Ala. Sept. 29, 2017). 
 29. Pennachietti, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 203005, at *1–3. 
 30. Id. at *4–11. The defendant argued that he was acting within the scope of his employment 
and therefore this is really a suit against him in his official capacity, but the district court disagreed: 
This is a personal capacity suit to recover money damages solely from Mansfield for his 
personal actions, and extending tribal sovereign immunity to him simply because he was 
acting within the scope of his employment would extend that immunity beyond what 
common-law sovereign immunity principles would recognize for government employees. 
Id. at *8. 
 31. Stanko, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149120, at *1–3. 
 32. Id. at *8. 
 33. Id. (citing Lewis v. Clarke, 137 S. Ct. 1285, 1291 (2017)). 
 34. Id. at *12 (“There is no allegation in the complaint that the Individual Tribal Defendants 
were acting under color of state law. It is also improper for the court to infer from the complaint that 
the Individual Tribal Defendants were acting under color of state law. Section 1983 does not provide 
jurisdiction for plaintiff’s claims against the Individual Tribal Defendants.”). 
 35. See Stanko v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, No. CIV. 17-5008-JLV, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152933 
(D.S.D. Sept. 20, 2017). 
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The effects of Lewis v. Clarke are already prolonging litigation. In 
Harvey v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray Reservation, the Utah 
Supreme Court partially reversed a state appellate court opinion that had 
dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against tribal officials related to 
interference with contract and extortion. The Utah Supreme Court 
affirmed the dismissal of the claims against the tribe on the basis of 
sovereign immunity but remanded the claims against the tribal officials in 
their individual capacities.36 It cited Lewis v. Clarke: “We do not hold that 
Harvey has valid claims against the tribal officials in their individual 
capacities, merely that they do not enjoy sovereign immunity at this stage 
of the litigation.”37 
Similarly, in Alexander v. New York, the Northern District of New 
York dismissed claims against the Oneida Indian Nation, its police 
department, and its officers in their official capacity but allowed the claims 
against the officers in their individual capacity to continue.38 The court 
reasoned: 
The Supreme Court has recently held that sovereign immunity 
does not apply to individual capacity suits. . . . In Lewis, the Court 
used the general principles of sovereign immunity, taken from 
lawsuits against state and federal employees or entities. . . . Thus, 
a suit against the individual officers in this case would not be 
barred by tribal immunity.39 
The federal district court affirmed the decision of the magistrate and 
ordered that summonses be sent to the tribal officers for claims alleged 
against them in their individual capacities.40 
Finally, the Alabama Supreme Court has used Lewis v. Clarke and 
other recent Supreme Court cases on sovereign immunity to conclude that 
tribal sovereign immunity does not exist at all in cases of tort where the 
defendant did not have an opportunity to negotiate for a waiver of that 
immunity.41 
                                                     
 36. Harvey v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray Reservation, 2017 UT 75, 851 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 19 (Utah 2017). 
 37. Id. ¶ 33. 
 38. Alexander v. New York, 6:17-CV-725 (GTS/ATB), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108745, at *11–
14 (N.D.N.Y. July 12, 2017). 
 39. Id. at *13. 
 40. Id. at *17. 
 41. See Harrison v. PCI Gaming Authority, No. 130168, 2017 Ala. LEXIS 98 (Ala. Sept. 29, 
2017). For a more complete discussion on a series of three Alabama Supreme Court cases all decided 
after Lewis v. Clarke and each questioning the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity, see infra Part 
III.Q.4. 
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B. The 2017–2018 Term 
By December 31, 2017, the Court was halfway through its 2017–
2018 term and had granted certiorari in two more Indian law cases: 
Patchak v. Zinke42 and Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren.43 On 
January 12, 2018, the Court added one additional Indian law case to its 
2017–2018 docket, United States v. Washington.44 In addition, in 
November 2017 Justice Thomas issued a lone dissent from denial of 
certiorari of the Second Circuit’s opinion in Upstate Citizens for Equality 
v. United States.45 
1. Cases Docketed for the 2017–2018 Term 
Patchak v. Zinke was decided in 2016 by the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals46 and argued in front of the Supreme Court on November 7, 
2017.47 It is actually the second time petitioner Patchak has been heard by 
the Supreme Court. In 2012, Patchak prevailed in Match-E-Be-Nash-She-
Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, when the Supreme Court 
recognized48 his ability as a local resident to challenge the decision by the 
Department of the Interior (Interior) to take land into trust for the Band.49 
After the Supreme Court’s decision, in 2014, Congress enacted the Gun 
Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act, which removed the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts to hear challenges to the decision of Interior to take land into 
trust for the Band and ordered any pending litigation dismissed.50 Patchak 
challenged the ability of Congress to order his suit dismissed and the D.C. 
Circuit unanimously affirmed Congress’s power to alter the jurisdiction of 
                                                     
 42. Patchak v. Jewell, 828 F.3d 995 (D.C. Cir. 2016). The respondent was replaced with the 
change in administrations. Sally Jewell, the Secretary of Interior, was replaced with Ryan Zinke, and 
the parties were appropriately substituted in accordance with Court rules. 
 43. Lundgren v. Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, 389 P.3d 569 (Wash. 2017). 
 44. United States v. Washington, 864 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2017). This opinion was a denial of 
rehearing en banc with a strong dissent against granting the rehearing; for a discussion, see infra Part 
III.S. 
 45. Upstate Citizens for Equal. v. United States, 199 L. Ed. 2d 372 (2017). 
 46. See Patchak, 828 F.3d 995. 
 47. For a thorough discussion of the argument, see Ronald Mann, Argument Analysis: Justices 
Struggle to Find the “Beef” in Challenge to Congressional Authority to Resolve Pending Litigation, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 7, 2017, 8:15 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/11/argument-analysis-
justices-struggle-find-beef-challenge-congressional-authority-resolve-pending-litigation/ 
[https://perma.cc/64L6-6XE6]. 
 48. The decision was 8–1 with Justice Sotomayor dissenting on the basis that the United States 
did not waive immunity to suit to challenge the land-to-trust decision under the Quiet Title Act. Match-
E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 567 U.S. 209, 228–38 (2012). 
 49. Id. at 228 (“The QTA’s reservation of sovereign immunity does not bar Patchak’s suit. 
Neither does the doctrine of prudential standing. We therefore affirm the judgment of the D.C. Circuit, 
and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”). 
 50. See Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act, Pub. L. No. 113-179, 128 Stat. 1913 (2014). 
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the federal courts.51 The Supreme Court agreed to review the case with a 
decision expected by June 2018.52 
Unlike Patchak, the second Indian law case the Court has docketed 
in 2017 is making its first appearance before the bench and, like Lewis v. 
Clarke, is an appeal from a state supreme court. In Lundgren v. Upper 
Skagit Indian Tribe, the tribe purchased title to real property.53 During a 
survey preparatory to taking the land into trust, the tribe learned of a fence 
on the property that the adjoining landowner had long treated as the 
boundary line between their property and the property purchased by the 
tribe.54 The tribe contested the fence as the boundary line, asserting rights 
to the full property it purchased as established by the survey.55 The 
adjoining landowner filed suit to assert a right in the disputed property by 
adverse possession.56 The tribe asked the court to dismiss the case on the 
basis of sovereign immunity, either for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
or for failure to join an indispensable party.57 
 The majority of the Washington Supreme Court (5–4) affirmed 
the lower court’s conclusion that sovereign immunity is irrelevant when 
the court has jurisdiction over the property in rem. It cited the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and 
Bands of the Yakima Nation, for the proposition that the county had 
jurisdiction to impose an ad valorem tax over Indian lands “on the basis of 
alienability of the allotted lands, and not on the basis of jurisdiction over 
tribal owners.”58 Accordingly, the Washington Supreme Court concluded 
that state courts “have subject matter jurisdiction over in rem proceedings 
in certain situations where claims of sovereign immunity are asserted.”59 
Additionally, the majority reasoned that because the adverse possession 
                                                     
 51. Patchak, 828 F.3d at 1003 (“In passing the Gun Lake Act, Congress exercised its ‘broad 
general powers to legislate in respect to Indian tribes, powers that [the Supreme Court] ha[s] 
consistently described as ‘plenary and exclusive.’’ United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200, 124 S. 
Ct. 1628, 158 L.Ed.2d. 420 (2004). Accordingly, we ought to defer to the policy judgment reflected 
therein. Such is our role. Indeed, ‘[a]pplying laws implementing Congress’ policy judgments, with 
fidelity to those judgments, is commonplace for the Judiciary.’”). 
 52. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on May 1, 2017. Patchak v. Zinke, 137 S. Ct. 2091 
(Mem) (2017). 
 53. Lundgren v. Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, 187 Wn.2d 857, 861–62, 389 P.3d 569 (Wash. 2017). 
 54. Id. at 862. 
 55. Id. (“In September 2014, the Tribe notified the Lundgrens in a letter that the fence did not 
represent the boundary and that they were asserting ownership rights to the entire property deeded to 
them in 2013. The Lundgrens initiated this lawsuit in March 2015. They asked the court to quiet title 
in the disputed property to them and sought injunctive relief.”). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 862–63. 
 58. Id. at 866 (internal citations omitted) (citing Cty. of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and 
Bands of the Yakima Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992)). 
 59. Id. at 868. 
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occurred long before the tribe took title to the property, the tribe was not a 
necessary party, and so the lawsuit could not be dismissed for failure to 
join an indispensable party under Washington’s Rule of Civil Procedure 
19.60 
Four members of the court dissented: “While the existence of in rem 
jurisdiction gives a court authority to quiet title to real property without 
obtaining personal jurisdiction over affected parties, Civil Rule (CR) 
19 counsels against exercising this authority in the face of a valid assertion 
of sovereign immunity.”61 The dissent reasoned that since the tribe claims 
to own a recorded interest in the property, it has a legally protected 
property interest in the quiet title action decided after it purchased the 
disputed property.62 The dissent would have held that in a proceeding to 
quiet title to land over which the court admittedly has personal jurisdiction, 
the claim should not have been able to survive a Rule 19 motion because 
the tribe’s property interest makes it a necessary party, and it has not 
waived its sovereign immunity.63 On December 8, 2017, the U.S. Supreme 
Court granted the tribe’s petition for certiorari.64 
2. Dissent from Denial of Certiorari 
In addition to the two cases docketed by the Court, there was one 
notable lone dissent from denial of certiorari in an Indian law case in 2017. 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals decided Upstate Citizens for 
Equality v. United States in 2016.65 The case involved a challenge by the 
petitioner to a decision by Interior to take 13,000 acres of land into trust 
for the Oneida Nation of New York.66 The Second Circuit had upheld the 
power of Interior under the Indian Reorganization Act.67 
Appellants, a group of towns and residents in the area near the trust 
acquisition, appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court refused to grant 
their petition for an appeal but Justice Thomas issued a lone dissent from 
the denial of certiorari.68 Justice Thomas would have granted certiorari as 
an opportunity to revisit the ability of the United States to take land into 
                                                     
 60. Id. at 871–73. 
 61. Id. at 874. 
 62. Id. at 880. 
 63. Id. at 880–81. 
 64. Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren, 138 S. Ct. 543 (2017). 
 65. See Upstate Citizens for Equal., Inc. v. United States , 841 F.3d 556 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 66. Id. at 560. 
 67. Id. at 577 (“[W]e conclude that the federal government’s plenary power over Indian affairs 
extends to taking historic reservation land into trust for a tribe. That the entrustment deprives state 
government of certain aspects of jurisdiction over that land does not run afoul of general principles of 
state sovereignty, the Indian Commerce Clause, or the specific guarantees of the Enclave Clause.”). 
 68. Upstate Citizens for Equal. v. United States, 199 L. Ed. 2d 372 (2017). 
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trust.69 His dissent argues that such power may be outside the power 
imposed by the Indian Commerce Clause because the acquisition of land 
by Interior of land already owned by the tribe cannot properly be 
understood as “commerce” within the meaning of the Indian Commerce 
Clause.70 
Justice Thomas further argued that such an interpretation would have 
been against the intent of the founders when they wrote the Indian 
Commerce Clause.71 The Justice looked at the broad language of the 
Indian Reorganization Act’s authorization, holding “[u]nder our 
precedents, Congress has thus obtained the power to take any state land 
and strip the State of almost all sovereign power over it ‘for the purpose 
of providing land for Indians.’”72 Justice Thomas expressed concern at the 
breadth of this language. 
This means Congress could reduce a State to near nonexistence by 
taking all land within its borders and declaring it sovereign Indian 
territory. It is highly implausible that the Founders understood the Indian 
Commerce Clause, which was virtually unopposed at the founding, as 
giving Congress the power to destroy the States’ territorial integrity.73 
Accordingly, Justice Thomas would have granted certiorari to 
reconsider the ability of Interior to take land into trust. 
III. IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS IN 2017 
While the Supreme Court’s developments in Indian law are likely to 
be those that capture the largest headlines and that students, practitioners, 
and scholars are certainly the most familiar with, there are more than 600 
unrelated cases decided in 2017 that are slowly changing the landscape of 
Indian law. This third and longest Part of the annual year in review 
attempts to capture some of the most important and most interesting 
developments in Indian law during 2017. 
                                                     
 69. Id. at 373–74. 
 70. Id. at 373 (“Understood this way, the Indian Commerce Clause does not appear to give 
Congress the power to authorize the taking of land into trust under the IRA. Even assuming that land 
transactions are ‘Commerce’ within the scope of the Clause . . . many applications of the IRA do not 
involve trade of any kind. . . . [I]n cases like these, where the tribe already owns the land, neither 
money nor property changes hands. Instead, title is slightly modified by adding ‘the United States in 
trust for’ in front of the name of ‘the Indian tribe or individual Indian’ who owns the land. . . . In short, 
because no exchange takes place, these trust arrangements do not resemble ‘trade with Indians.’”). 
 71. Id. at 373–74 (“Applying our precedents, the Second Circuit concluded that the Indian 
Commerce Clause empowered the Federal Government to take into trust the land at issue here. In so 
doing, it showed how far our precedents interpreting the Indian Commerce Clause have strayed from 
the original understanding, and how much Congress’ power has grown as a result.”). 
 72. Id. at 373 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 5108 (2012)). 
 73. Id. 
820 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 41:805 
Among the more interesting observations, 2017 saw Leonard Peltier 
return to the federal courts.74 A powerful opinion on choice of law and 
tribal exhaustion was issued from the Honorable Diane Humetewa, the 
first Native American woman appointed to the federal bench.75 The year 
included continuing challenges to the allocation of the $99 million in 
attorney’s fees under the Cobell settlement related to the mismanagement 
of Individual Indian Money Accounts,76 and yet another reaffirmation that 
prosecution by a tribe and by the United States does not violate the Double 
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.77 
The remainder of this Part is divided up around constituent themes, 
attempting to provide a concise discussion and thorough set of citations to 
the Indian law developments of 2017. 
                                                     
 74. See Peltier v. Sacks, No. C17-5209-RBL, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116434 (W.D. Wash. July 
25, 2017). Leonard Peltier, an American Indian actively involved in the American Indian Movement 
and convicted of the murder of two FBI agents on the Pine Ridge Reservation in 1975, brought suit 
against the Washington State Department of Labor and Industries, which had removed some of his 
artwork from a display commemorating Native American Heritage month after objections from the 
public. In addition to the Department of Labor, Peltier sued two former FBI agents who had written 
letters expressing their concerns that Peltier’s artwork was prominently displayed for defamation. The 
FBI agents asked the court to dismiss, arguing that their letters were protected speech under the 
Washington anti-SLAPP statute. The court agreed: 
The letters Woods and Langberg wrote to Saks and Inslee regarded a matter of public 
concern to the State and to the L&I department specifically. Each communicated his 
displeasure with L&I’s public display of Peltier’s artwork, as it seemed to condone his 
murderous past. How the public receives a state-sanctioned public display is a matter 
reasonably of concern to the State and to its agency housing the display. . . . Under the anti-
SLAPP statute, Woods and Langberg are immune from suit for these communications, 
which regarded L&I’s public display of Peltier’s paintings. 
Id. at *8. The Court dismissed the claims against the individual FBI agents. 
 75. See Progressive Advanced Ins. Co. v. Worker, No. CV-16-08107-PCT-DJH, 2017 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 19283 (D. Ariz. Feb. 8, 2017). 
 76. See Cobell v. Jewell, 234 F. Supp. 3d 126 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (holding that withdrawal of 
counsel before the litigation ends in settlement does not prevent that counsel from being compensated 
for the time actually spent on the litigation—counsel in the case was awarded $2,878,612.52); Cobell 
v. Jewell, 260 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2017) (holding that the same counsel was entitled to an additional 
six percent in prejudgment interest to fully compensate him for waiting more than four years to be 
paid for his work); Lannan Foundation v. Gingold, No. 13-01090 (TFH), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
176671 (D.D.C. Oct. 25, 2017) (refusing to grant summary judgment and ordering supplemental 
pleadings where the plaintiff sought recovery on several reimbursable grants it had extended to Eloise 
Cobell to cover costs during the litigation). 
 77. See United States v. Bearcomesout, 696 F. App’x 241 (9th Cir. 2017). Defendant argued that 
the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution prevented the United States from prosecuting her for 
involuntary manslaughter after she had been previously prosecuted by the Northern Cheyenne Tribe 
for the same offense. The Ninth Circuit held that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar a 
prosecution by different sovereigns and dismissed her appeal. 
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A. Civil Jurisdiction Over Nonmembers: Developments in Montana 
and Its Progeny 
The question of a tribal court’s jurisdiction has long occupied federal 
courts. The Supreme Court decided a pair of cases in 1981 and 1982 that 
established the modern tests for tribal authority. In 1981, the Supreme 
Court announced a presumptive rule that a tribe lacked authority over 
nonmembers when the activity occurred within the outer boundary of the 
reservation but on land held in fee by the state or by nonmembers.78 
However, the Court also announced a pair of exceptions permitting tribal 
jurisdiction when there existed a “consensual relationship” between the 
tribe and the nonmember, or when the conduct would have a “direct effect” 
on the tribe’s political integrity, economic security, health, or welfare.79 
The following year, in 1982, the Court clarified that when the activity 
occurred on tribal land, even when the offending party was non-Indian, the 
tribe retained inherent authority to regulate the conduct of the nonmember 
unless Congress were to explicitly divest the tribe from its jurisdiction.80 
Thus, for years the status of the land seemed to control which of two 
Supreme Court cases controlled the outcome of a challenge to the tribe’s 
jurisdiction. But in 2001 the Supreme Court decided Nevada v. Hicks, 
which prohibited tribal jurisdiction over a state police officer who entered 
the reservation pursuant to a tribal warrant to investigate a crime that had 
occurred outside the reservation.81 The Court questioned the previously 
presumptive role of the status of land.82 Hicks was very unusual in that it 
was both unanimous and sharply divided. The vote was 9–0 that the tribe 
lacked jurisdiction but with five separate written opinions.83 Ever since, 
                                                     
 78. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981) (“[E]xercise of tribal power beyond 
what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with 
the dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without express congressional delegation.”). 
 79. Id. at 565–66 (“Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil 
jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands. A tribe may regulate, 
through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual 
relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other 
arrangements. . . . A tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct 
of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect 
on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.”). 
 80. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 141–42 (1982) (“[T]he . . . authority that a 
tribe may exercise over nonmembers does not arise until the nonmember enters the tribal jurisdiction. 
We do not question that there is a significant territorial component to tribal power: a tribe has no 
authority over a nonmember until the nonmember enters tribal lands or conducts business with the 
tribe.”). 
 81. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001). 
 82. Id. at 358–60 (“The ownership status of land, in other words, is only one factor to consider 
in determining whether regulation of the activities of nonmembers is ‘necessary to protect tribal self-
government or to control internal relations.’ It may sometimes be a dispositive factor.”). 
 83. Id. at 375–404. Justices Scalia, Souter, Ginsburg, O’Connor, and Stevens all wrote separate 
opinions. 
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lower federal courts have struggled to reconcile how Hicks effects the 
framework first established by Montana/Merrion. 
1. Montana and Its Exceptions 
In 2017, a number of courts continued to try to reconcile these 
conflicting opinions, with a consensus emerging that Hicks is generally 
intended to be limited to its facts. In Knighton v. Cedarville Rancheria of 
N. Paiute Indians, the Eastern District of California, citing a prior Ninth 
Circuit case, held that “Montana’s exceptions ‘do[ ] not apply to 
jurisdictional questions’ over nonmembers for claims arising on tribal land 
within a reservation, except ‘where a state has a competing interest in 
executing a warrant for an off-reservation crime.’”84 Instead, the district 
court otherwise affirmed the importance of the status of the land, 
concluding that the tribe had jurisdiction over nonmembers for activity 
that occurred on tribal land without needing to reference the Montana 
exceptions.85 The court reasoned that the tribe has regulatory authority 
over nonmembers for events that occur on tribal land whenever the 
nonmembers’ conduct might “intrude on the internal relations of the tribe 
or threaten tribal self-rule.”86 The petitioner admitted that the tribe had 
regulatory authority over tribal employees and that her alleged conduct 
“directly interfered” with the tribe’s power to control internal relations or 
protect its members.87 
In the context of exhaustion, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed the 
principle that the status of the land gives tribes at least “plausible” or 
“colorable” jurisdiction over nonmembers and, in so doing, also rejected 
the broader suggestion that Hicks has changed the jurisdictional analysis.88 
In Window Rock Unified School District v. Reeves, the Ninth Circuit 
suggested that Hicks should be read narrowly and “is limited to the 
                                                     
 84. Knighton v. Cedarville Rancheria of N. Paiute Indians, 234 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1051 (E.D. 
Cal. Feb. 15, 2017) (citing Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc. v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 802, 813 
(9th Cir. 2011)). 
 85. Id. at 1053 (“This record demonstrates that Knighton’s activities in question did not occur 
on non-Indian fee lands within the Tribe’s reservation, and thus under Water Wheel, the Montana 
exceptions do not apply.”). 
 86. Id. at 1054 (citing Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 
335 (2008)). 
 87. Id. at 1055. 
 88. See Window Rock Unified Sch. Dist. v. Reeves, 861 F.3d 894, 896 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Because 
the claims arise from conduct on tribal land and implicate no state criminal law enforcement interests, 
we conclude that tribal jurisdiction is colorable or plausible under our court’s interpretation of Nevada 
v. Hicks.”(internal citation omitted)). 
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question of tribal-court jurisdiction over state officers enforcing state 
law.”89 
The Tenth Circuit similarly limited the Hicks exception. In Norton v. 
Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray Reservation, state law 
enforcement officers argued that even if tribal jurisdiction was plausible 
on the tribe’s trespass claim, exhaustion should not be required because 
they are law enforcement officers like in Hicks.90 The Tenth Circuit 
disagreed, and like the Ninth Circuit above, limited Hicks to cases where 
state law enforcement investigated off-reservation conduct or were cross-
deputized.91 
The District of Idaho had occasion to articulate different standards 
for the appropriate award of damages in a review of the application of 
Montana’s two exceptions. In FMC Corporation v. Shoshone-Bannock 
Tribes, the plaintiff objected to the enforcement of a tribal appellate court 
judgment imposing a $1.5 million annual permit fee on the plaintiff.92 The 
plaintiff had operated a phosphorous production plant on land owned in 
fee mostly located within the Shoshone-Bannock Reservation.93 The 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) declared the site a superfund 
cleanup site.94 To avoid extensive litigation, the plaintiff sought a Consent 
Decree with the EPA.95 As a condition of the Consent Decree, the EPA 
required the plaintiff to obtain permits from the tribe for the work done on 
the reservation.96 The tribe demanded $100 million for the permits or, 
alternatively, $1.5 million a year and a consent to tribal jurisdiction.97 The 
plaintiff consented to jurisdiction and then challenged the $1.5 million fee 
in tribal court, arguing that the waste was contained and posed no health 
                                                     
 89. Id. at 902. For a more thorough discussion of Reeves, see infra Part III.B.2 dealing with tribal 
exhaustion. 
 90. Norton v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray Reservation, 862 F.3d 1236 (10th Cir. 
2017). For a more thorough discussion of Norton, see infra Part III.B.2 dealing with tribal exhaustion. 
 91. Id. at 1248–49 (“Given that the chief concern driving the Court in Hicks was the state’s 
paramount interest in investigating off-reservation crimes, we cannot say that a similar state interest 
is implicated when state officers pursue a tribal member on tribal land for an on-reservation offense 
over which they lack authority.”). 
 92. FMC Corp. v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, No. 4:14-CV-489-BLW, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
161387, at *2–3 (D. Idaho Sept. 28, 2017). 
 93. Id. at *2 (“FMC’s operations produced 22 million tons of waste products stored on the 
Reservation in 23 ponds. This waste is radioactive, carcinogenic, and poisonous. It will persist for 
decades, generations even, and is so toxic that there is no safe method to move it off-site.”). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at *2–3 (“As a condition of agreeing to that Consent Decree, the EPA insisted that FMC 
obtain Tribal permits for work FMC would do under the Consent Decree on the Reservation. The 
Tribes, however, were demanding $100 million for those permits, although they would drop the fee to 
$1.5 million a year if FMC consented to Tribal jurisdiction. To get the lower permit fee, and to satisfy 
the EPA’s condition that they obtain Tribal permits, FMC consented to Tribal jurisdiction.”). 
 97. Id. 
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problems to the tribe.98 The tribal appellate court affirmed the $1.5 million 
annual fee given the highly dangerous nature of the waste and the inability 
of the waste to be moved.99 The plaintiff challenged the tribal appellate 
court’s decision in federal court. 
The federal court looked first at whether the tribal court had 
jurisdiction over the plaintiff when it imposed the $1.5 million annual fee. 
The court recognized that for activity located on privately owned fee land 
on the Reservation, the tribe lacks jurisdiction except for the two Montana 
exceptions.100 The plaintiff argued that the agreement it entered into with 
the tribe was the product of duress, but the court disagreed.101 It held that 
the consensual relationship entered into between the plaintiff and the tribe 
confers jurisdiction upon the tribe and was simply the price of settlement 
and not the product of duress.102 
While the first Montana exception provided sufficient jurisdiction 
for the tribal court, the federal court continued to discuss the second 
exception: whether the conduct of non-Indians would have some direct 
effect on the political integrity, economic security, health, or welfare of 
the tribe. Here, while the EPA had taken steps to contain the waste, the 
EPA itself concluded that the toxic waste “may constitute an imminent and 
substantial endangerment to public health or welfare or the 
environment.”103 The court concluded that the waste poses a direct effect 
on the tribe of exactly the kind that falls within Montana’s second 
exception.104 
                                                     
 98. Id. at *3. 
 99. Id. at *4. 
 100. Id. at *28 (“The first exception provides that ‘a tribe may regulate through taxation, 
licensing, or other means, the activities of non-members who enter into consensual relationships with 
the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements.’”). 
 101. Id. at *30. 
 102. Id. (“FMC complains that this agreement was a product of duress, but the Tribes only took 
advantage of their bargaining leverage, a long-standing practice in the sharp-elbowed corporate world 
in which FMC does business every day. FMC had a strong desire to obtain a Consent Decree from the 
EPA, but the EPA was insisting that FMC obtain Tribal permits. The Tribes, recognizing their superior 
bargaining position, used that leverage to extract a high price for the permits. FMC paid the price 
because the Tribal permit was a key component to obtaining the Consent Decree, which in turn was 
worth the price of the Tribal permit. This was a simple business deal, not the product of illegal duress 
or coercion. FMC cites no case law holding that Montana’s exception does not apply when the 
consensual relationship is formed begrudgingly or by one party taking advantage of bargaining 
leverage.”). 
 103. Id. at *32. 
 104. Id. at *34–37 (“[T]hese sites are generating lethal gases that accumulate under pressure 
beneath the pond covers. In other words, they pose a constant and deadly threat to the Tribes, a real 
risk of catastrophic consequences should containment fail. And despite the best efforts of the EPA, 
there have been releases of these lethal gases. . . . the record shows conclusively that a failure by the 
EPA to contain the massive amount of highly toxic FMC waste would be catastrophic for the health 
and welfare of the Tribes. This is the type of threat that falls within Montana’s second exception.”). 
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The court then proceeded to discuss how the source of the 
jurisdiction relates to the possible award that a tribal court may 
legitimately impose. The court reasoned that when jurisdiction is premised 
on consent, the amount agreed between the parties must be fair because it 
was the result of the consensual relationship.105 However, the court warned 
that if the jurisdiction of the tribal court is premised on the second 
exception, then the damages awarded must have some relation to the 
amount of risk or effect that the tribe will experience.106 “The scope of the 
Tribes jurisdiction depends on its source. If the source is the second 
Montana exception, the permit fee must have some relationship to the 
Tribe’s obligation to protect the health and safety of Tribal members.”107 
Because the tribes have never explained how the $1.5 million is related to 
tribal action to supplement efforts by the EPA to keep the tribe safe, the 
$1.5 million figure would be improper under the direct effects 
exception.108 However, because the tribe can also assert jurisdiction under 
the consensual relationship exception, and the parties have agreed to a $1.5 
million annual fee, the district court held that the tribal court had 
jurisdiction to impose such a fee.109 
2. Forum Selection Clauses 
In 2017, a couple courts had to remind parties that the jurisdiction of 
tribal courts is subject to forum selection clauses or other agreements 
between the parties that may make an otherwise proper assertion of 
jurisdiction unlawful. In Enerplus Resources (U.S.) v. Wilkinson, the 
Eighth Circuit reaffirmed that the exhaustion requirement, and tribal 
jurisdiction in general, may be waived through a forum selection clause.110 
“It is well-established in the Eighth Circuit that parties may waive tribal 
court jurisdiction and compliance with the tribal exhaustion doctrine 
through a forum selection agreement. . . . The tribal exhaustion doctrine 
                                                     
 105. Id. at *39–41 (“The scope of the Tribes jurisdiction depends on its source. . . . Under 
Montana’s first exception, Tribal jurisdiction is based on the consensual relationship between FMC 
and the Tribes. FMC agreed to obtain a use permit under the Amendments to Chapter V of the Fort 
Hall Land Use Operative Policy Guidelines, and pay a $1.5 million annual fee for that 
permit. . . . Thus, FMC agreed to pay the annual permit fee for as long as it stored the waste on the 
site.”). 
 106. Id. at *39–40. 
 107. Id. at *39. 
 108. Id. at *40 (“There may be legitimate reasons justifying the Judgment amount, but they have 
never been explained, and FMC has never had an opportunity to address them. Under Marchington’s 
comity analysis, it would be unfairly prejudicial to enforce the permit fee imposed by the Tribal 
Appellate Court under the second Montana exception.”). 
 109. Id. at *43. 
 110. Enerplus Res. (U.S.) Corp. v. Wilkinson, No. 1:16-cv-103, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181579, 
at *9-11 (D.N.D. Nov. 2, 2017). 
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does not apply when the contracting parties have included a forum 
selection clause in their agreement.”111 In Amerind Risk Management 
Corporation v. Blackfeet Housing, the District of New Mexico held that 
when the parties agreed in a contract to litigate any disputes in New 
Mexico, the assertion of jurisdiction by the Blackfeet Tribal Court was 
improper.112 
3. State Interference with Tribal Jurisdiction 
Finally, there were several cases where the state was alleged to have 
interfered with the jurisdiction of the tribe. In Bishop Paiute Tribe v. Inyo 
County, the tribe brought a complaint against Inyo County, alleging that 
the county’s threat to criminally prosecute tribal police who are enforcing 
tribal ordinances and protection orders interferes with the tribe’s inherent 
right to operate a police department on its reservation, and it sought an 
order clarifying that the tribe has an inherent right to enforce its laws. 113 
The district court dismissed the complaint sua sponte for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction,114 and the tribe appealed. 
The Ninth Circuit reversed. “The Tribe alleges that federal common 
law grants the Tribe the authority to ‘investigate violations of tribal, state, 
and federal law, detain, and transport or deliver a non-Indian violator to 
the proper authorities.’”115 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the tribe’s 
request raises a federal question because it alleges that the state has 
violated federal common law.116 The Ninth Circuit further confirmed that 
the case was ripe for judicial review and remanded the case to the district 
court for further proceedings on the merits of the tribe’s claim.117 
In Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray Reservation v. Lawrence, 
a nonmember former contractor with the tribe brought suit in state court 
                                                     
 111. Id. at *10–11. 
 112. Amerind Risk Mgmt. Corp. v. Blackfeet Hous., No. 16 CV 1093 JAP/KK, 2017 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 172764, at *12–21 (D.N.M. Oct. 17, 2017). “When consent to be sued is given, the terms of 
the consent establish the bounds of a court’s jurisdiction.” Id. at *13. 
 113. Bishop Paiute Tribe v. Inyo Cty., 863 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 114. Bishop Paiute Tribe v. Inyo Cty., No. 1:15-CV-00367-GEB-JLT, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
90684 (E.D. Cal. July 10, 2015). 
 115. Bishop Paiute Tribe, 863 F.3d at 1152. 
 116. Id. (“Because the Tribe has alleged violations of federal common law, the Tribe has 
adequately pleaded a federal question that provides federal courts with subject matter jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.”). 
 117. Id. at 1153–54 (“The Tribe has already seen one of its officers arrested and prosecuted based 
on Defendants’ interpretation of the Tribe’s lawful authority. Since the Tribe covers the legal costs of 
defending its Tribal PD officers from prosecution, this dispute has cost the Tribe money. And 
Defendants’ interference with the Tribe’s alleged inherent authority has, according to Tribe, interfered 
with the Tribe’s ability to maintain peace and security on the reservation.”). 
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to enforce the contractual terms of their agreement.118 The tribe responded 
by filing suit in federal court seeking a determination that the state has no 
jurisdiction over the tribe.119 The federal district court held that it lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction over the tribe’s challenge to the jurisdiction of 
the state court.120 The Tenth Circuit reversed.121 The Tenth Circuit 
reasoned that the Supreme Court has long held that states have only limited 
jurisdiction over Indians.122 The Court relied on National Farmers123 as 
definitive evidence that whether a tribal court may assert jurisdiction over 
a nonmember of the tribe is a question that “arises under” federal law for 
the purposes of § 1331124 and remanded the case for further proceedings. 
B. Civil Jurisdiction: Exhaustion and Its Exceptions 
In a pair of U.S. Supreme Court cases decided during the 1980s,125 
the Court articulated a common law rule that requires parties contesting 
the jurisdiction of the tribal court to first exhaust their tribal remedies.126 
The court reasoned that such a policy will encourage tribal court 
development and provide a record for federal courts to review.127 
                                                     
 118. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray Reservation v. Lawrence, 875 F.3d 539 (10th Cir. 
2017). 
 119. Id. at 540. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. (“We hold that the Tribe’s claim—that federal law precludes state-court jurisdiction over 
a claim against Indians arising on the reservation—presents a federal question that sustains federal 
jurisdiction.”). 
 122. Id. at 542–44 (citing Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959)) (“[T]he Supreme Court has 
made clear that state adjudicative authority over Indians for on-reservation conduct is greatly limited 
by federal law. . . . If a suit to enjoin a tribe from exercising jurisdiction contrary to federal law is an 
action ‘arising under’ federal law, then so is a suit to enjoin a State from exercising jurisdiction 
contrary to federal law.”). 
 123. Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985). 
 124. Ute Indian Tribe, 875 F.3d at 543–48 (“Because petitioners contend that federal law has 
divested the Tribe of this aspect of sovereignty, it is federal law on which they rely as a basis for the 
asserted right of freedom from Tribal Court interference. They have, therefore, filed an action ‘arising 
under’ federal law within the meaning of § 1331. . . . Here, the Tribe likewise relies on federal law ‘as 
a basis for the asserted right of freedom from [state-court] interference.’”). 
 125. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987); Nat’l Farmers, 471 U.S. 845. 
 126. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 480 U.S. at 19 (“Although petitioner must exhaust available tribal 
remedies before instituting suit in federal court, the Blackfeet Tribal Courts’ determination of tribal 
jurisdiction is ultimately subject to review. If the Tribal Appeals Court upholds the lower court’s 
determination that the tribal courts have jurisdiction, petitioner may challenge that ruling in the District 
Court.”). 
 127. Nat’l Farmers, 471 U.S. at 856 (“We believe that examination should be conducted in the 
first instance in the Tribal Court itself. Our cases have often recognized that Congress is committed to 
a policy of supporting tribal self-government and self-determination. That policy favors a rule that will 
provide the forum whose jurisdiction is being challenged the first opportunity to evaluate the factual 
and legal bases for the challenge. Moreover the orderly administration of justice in the federal court 
will be served by allowing a full record to be developed in the Tribal Court before either the merits or 
any question concerning appropriate relief is addressed.”). 
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In a textbook example of why exhaustion of tribal remedies is 
important, in Board of Education for the Gallup-Mckinley County School 
v. Henderson, the Tenth Circuit heard a case where terminated employees 
of a school district located on the Navajo Reservation brought suit in 
Navajo tribal court alleging a violation of the Navajo Preference in 
Employment Act.128 The Navajo Supreme Court had dismissed the case 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but the school district appealed 
anyway, seeking a declaratory judgment from the federal courts that as a 
matter of law, the Navajo court system lacked jurisdiction over the school 
board.129 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal; because the school 
district won, there was no reason to consider the Navajo Supreme Court’s 
conclusion that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the defendant school 
district.130 Henderson illustrates that tribal courts are not always protective 
of the tribal parties that appear before them, to the detriment of 
nonmembers, but instead are thoughtful about the constraints on their own 
jurisdiction. By exhausting its tribal remedies, the Gallup-McKinley 
County School District won the outcome that it was seeking, the dismissal 
of claims against it, without needing to resort to federal courts. 
1. Cases Dismissed Based on Comity 
Judge Diane Humetewa decided another well-reasoned Indian law 
case on the basis of exhaustion. In Progressive Advanced Insurance Co. v. 
Worker, an insurance company filed for a declaratory judgment that 
having paid the policy’s maximum limit, it owed no further money to the 
defendant. 131 The defendant, a Navajo tribal member with cars garaged on 
the reservation, argued that he was entitled to stack the underinsured 
motorist coverage on three other vehicles covered under the policy and 
recover additional funds.132 The contract says disputes will be governed 
by Arizona law, which the plaintiff argued is a forum selection clause and 
the defendant argued is a choice of law clause.133 The defendant moved to 
have the case dismissed because the plaintiff had not exhausted its tribal 
                                                     
 128. Bd. of Educ. for the Gallup-McKinley Cty. Sch. v. Henderson, 696 F. App’x 355 (10th Cir. 
June 19, 2017). 
 129. Id. at 357. 
 130. Id. at 359 (“[T]here is no ‘substantial controversy . . . of sufficient immediacy and reality’ 
to warrant a court issuing a declaratory judgment. The school district will suffer no legal or financial 
penalty from the dismissal of its suit. Its legal victory will stand, and it will be where it was before 
Henderson sought recourse in the Navajo legal system. And if the school district thinks it is improperly 
subjected to Navajo jurisdiction in the future, it can pursue its legal remedies then.”). 
 131. Progressive Advanced Ins. Co. v. Worker, No. CV-16-08107-PCT-DJH, 2017 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 19283 (D. Ariz. Feb. 8, 2017). 
 132. Id. at *3. 
 133. Id. at *2–3. 
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remedies.134 The plaintiff argued no exhaustion was required because 
under Nevada v. Hicks, there is an exception to the exhaustion doctrine if 
a proceeding in federal court would serve no purpose other than delay.135 
Judge Humetewa’s opinion recognized that generally a tribal court 
has no civil jurisdiction over a non-Indian defendant but that there are two 
exceptions created by Montana that may give the tribe jurisdiction: (1) 
whether there is a consensual relationship between the plaintiff and the 
tribe or its members, or (2) whether there is a direct effect on the health or 
welfare of the tribe.136 Judge Humetewa cited LaPlante for the proposition 
that legal and factual questions relating to jurisdiction should be decided 
in the first instance by the tribal court.137 “[T]he parties in this case entered 
into a contractual agreement. Whether this contract created a consensual 
relationship between Plaintiff and a member of the tribe such that tribal 
courts have jurisdiction under Montana’s consensual relationship 
exception is not clear.”138 Because the court could not conclude that the 
tribal court plainly lacked jurisdiction, comity required the plaintiff’s 
action be dismissed until it has exhausted Navajo tribal court remedies.139 
2. Exceptions to Exhaustion 
In National Farmers, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that there are 
several exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine: when jurisdiction is 
motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted in bad faith, where 
jurisdiction is patently violative of express jurisdictional provisions, or 
where jurisdiction would be futile.140 The Supreme Court has subsequently 
added a fourth exception: where nonmember activity occurred on land not 
controlled by the tribe and under Montana, neither exception could apply 
such that exhaustion would serve no purpose other than delay.141 In 2017, 
                                                     
 134. Id. at *1. 
 135. Id. at *9 (“The question for this Court is whether jurisdiction is plainly lacking in the tribal 
court such that exhaustion ‘would serve no purpose other than delay.’”). 
 136. Id. at *4. 
 137. Id.  
Progressive issued an insurance policy that listed a tribal member as a named insured and 
covered vehicles that were kept on tribal lands. . . . however, Progressive never mailed 
anything to an address on tribal lands. To the extent that factor is dispositive, it may be that 
the tribal court lacks jurisdiction. But this is a question that must be answered first by the 
tribal courts of the Navajo Nation. 
Id. at *9. 
 138. Id. at *10. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 856 n.21 (1985). 
 141. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 369 (2001) (“[I]t is plain that no federal grant provides for 
tribal governance of nonmembers’ conduct on land covered by Montana’s main rule, so the exhaustion 
requirement ‘would serve no purpose other than delay.’”) (internal citations omitted). 
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a number of cases were decided on the basis of whether the exceptions to 
exhaustion applied. 
a. Bad Faith 
In Acres v. Blue Lake Rancheria, the tribe brought suit in tribal court 
against the plaintiff for breach of contract.142 The tribal judge failed to 
disclose that he had an attorney–client relationship with the tribe, and so 
the plaintiff filed in federal court seeking a declaration that the tribe was 
acting in bad faith, and therefore an exhaustion of his tribal remedies was 
not required.143 Subsequently, the tribal judge recused himself and named 
a retired California appellate judge with no previous ties to the tribe to hear 
the case.144 The court noted that “no court has ever found that the bad faith 
exception applies”145 and recognized that the tribe took “real effort” to 
address the plaintiff’s concern by appointing an outside judge with no 
tribal connection and not one of the other tribal judges.146 It held that the 
actions of the tribe cured any errors related to its bad faith and accordingly 
dismissed the case with instructions for the plaintiff to exhaust his tribal 
remedies.147 The Ninth Circuit subsequently affirmed the decision.148 
b. Futility 
In Rabang v. Kelly, a group of allegedly disenrolled members of the 
Nooksack Nation brought suit against the acting tribal council, contesting 
their disenrollment.149 Interior had made three separate determinations that 
the actions of the tribal council after March 24, 2016 were not to be 
recognized by the United States because tribal elections had been canceled 
and the remnant council lacked a quorum.150 The remnant council had 
attempted to appoint itself as a new Nooksack Supreme Court to overturn 
decisions of the tribe’s existing appellate court.151 The federal district court 
recognized that ordinarily tribal plaintiffs are required to exhaust their 
tribal court remedies, but that in some cases “exhaustion would be futile 
because of the lack of adequate opportunity to challenge the [tribal] court’s 
                                                     
 142. Acres v. Blue Lake Rancheria, No. 16-cv-05391-WHO, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26447 
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2017). 
 143. Id. at *2. 
 144. Id. at *4. 
 145. Id. at *7. 
 146. Id. at *9. 
 147. Id. at *8–9. 
 148. Acres v. Blue Lake Rancheria, 692 F. App’x 894 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 149. Rabang v. Kelly, No. C17-0088-JCC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63515 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 26, 
2017). 
 150. Id. at *6–7. 
 151. Id. at *14–15. 
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jurisdiction.”152 The court gave great deference to the decision of Interior 
not to recognize the tribal council.153 It held that where Interior does not 
recognize the tribal council’s ability to create a new tribal court, there is 
no adequate opportunity to challenge the court’s jurisdiction, and so the 
federal court can assert subject matter jurisdiction over the claims.154 
c. Serve No Purpose Other than Delay 
In Window Rock Unified School District v. Reeves, the Ninth Circuit 
was asked whether it was “colorable” or “plausible” that the tribe would 
have jurisdiction over employment-related claims against two public 
school districts who operate schools on land leased from the tribe.155 A 
group of current and former employees of the Window Rock and Pinon 
Unified School District had filed claims with the Navajo Labor 
Commission.156 The school districts filed in federal court, seeking a 
declaratory judgment that the Commission lacks jurisdiction over their 
employment decisions at schools located on the reservation.157 The district 
court held that jurisdiction was so plainly lacking that no exhaustion was 
required.158 
The Ninth Circuit, in a divided opinion, reversed. It reasoned that 
jurisdiction was “colorable” or “plausible” because the schools were 
operated on lands leased from the tribe: “Tribal jurisdiction is plausible in 
this case because (a) the schools operated by the Districts are located on 
tribal land over which the Navajo Nation maintains the right to exclude, 
and (b) state criminal law enforcement interests are not present here.”159 
The majority opinion started with the proposition that the status of the land 
controls questions of tribal jurisdiction because if the activity occurs on 
tribal land, the tribe retains the absolute right to exclude even nonmembers 
from their land.160 The school district asked the Court to read Hicks 
broadly as not requiring exhaustion when nonmember activity occurs on 
tribal land, but the court expressly refused to do so. It held that Hicks 
should be read narrowly and “is limited to the question of tribal-court 
                                                     
 152. Id. at *13. 
 153. Id. at *16–17 (“Although the sovereign nature of American Indian tribes cautions the 
Secretary of the Interior not to exercise freestanding authority to interfere with a tribe’s internal 
governance, the Secretary has the power to manage ‘all Indian affairs and [ ] all matters arising out 
of Indian relations.’”). 
 154. Id. at *18–19. 
 155. Window Rock Unified Sch. Dist. v. Reeves, 861 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 156. Id. at 896. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 897. 
 159. Id. at 904. 
 160. Id. at 899 (“We begin with the general principle that a tribe’s right to exclude non-tribal 
members from its land imparts regulatory and adjudicative jurisdiction over conduct on that land.”). 
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jurisdiction over state officers enforcing state law. Because ‘the specific 
concerns at issue in that case,’ are not present here, it is at least plausible 
that tribal jurisdiction exists. Exhaustion is therefore required.”161 
In dissent, Judge Christen would have affirmed the district court. She 
would have read Hicks to say that the general presumption is that tribal 
jurisdiction does not extend to nonmembers even if their activity occurs 
on tribal land.162 Essentially, Judge Christen reasoned that absent the 
Montana exceptions, there is no tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers.163 
Her opinion emphasized the status of the parties (nonmembers of the tribe) 
and not the status of the land (tribally controlled) as the relevant lens 
through which to view the question of jurisdiction.164 Her opinion also 
ignored the alternate source of plausible/colorable jurisdiction provided by 
the right to exclude in Merrion, arguing that the Navajo Nation ceded its 
right to exclude nonmembers from its territory in the Treaty of 1868.165 
Because she would conclude that there is no plausible tribal jurisdiction 
under either of the Montana exceptions, the dissent would not require 
exhaustion but instead would affirm the district court and grant a 
declaratory judgment that the Navajo Labor Commission lacks jurisdiction 
over the school districts.166 
The Tenth Circuit reached a similar conclusion on a very different 
set of facts. In Norton v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray 
Reservation, the Ute Tribe, the estate of a deceased member, and his 
parents, brought suit in tribal court against state police officers involved 
in a police chase that started just outside the reservation, continued for 
almost twenty miles into the reservation, and ended with the passenger 
being fatally shot.167 The passenger died of a bullet to the head.168 The 
                                                     
 161. Id. at 906. 
 162. Id. at 910 (“Supreme Court precedent and our own case law makes clear that at least where 
there are competing state interests, tribes generally lack jurisdiction over the conduct of non-tribal 
members within the boundaries of a reservation, regardless of the status of the land on which 
nonmember conduct occurs.”). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 910–14. 
 165. Id. at 916 (“[T]he Navajo Nation has ceded the right to exclude the school districts from the 
Navajo Reservation by: (1) expressly agreeing that the federal government must enter to provide a 
system of compulsory education for Navajo children; and (2) consenting to state enforcement of 
compulsory education on the Navajo Reservation.”). 
 166. Id. at 919–21. 
 167. Norton v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray Reservation, 862 F.3d 1236, 1242 (10th 
Cir. 2017) (“After finding Murray, Norton ordered him to the ground but Murray did not obey. Norton 
fired two shots toward Murray. Murray died from a gunshot wound to the head. The parties disagree 
whether Murray shot himself or was shot by officers. Raymond Wissiup, a Ute tribal member and 
certified law enforcement officer, arrived shortly thereafter, but the officers prevented him from 
accessing the scene.”). 
 168. Id. 
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parties dispute whether police fired that bullet or whether the tribal 
member shot himself.169 The tribe asserted that the officers prevented a 
tribal law enforcement officer from accessing the scene of the shooting or 
providing medical assistance.170 The tribal court claims included (1) 
trespass and (2) other torts related to the conduct including false arrest, 
wrongful death, spoliation of evidence, and conspiracy.171 The officers 
then filed in federal court seeking a preliminary injunction to halt the tribal 
court action claiming that because they were state law enforcement 
officers the tribal court had no jurisdiction over their conduct.172 The 
federal district court enjoined the tribal court action on the basis that 
Nevada v. Hicks bars tribal civil jurisdiction, making exhaustion 
unnecessary.173 
The Tenth Circuit reversed in part. On the trespass claim, it held that 
tribal court exhaustion was required unless it was automatically foreclosed 
by a federal statute or a decision of the Supreme Court.174 As long as tribal 
jurisdiction is “colorable” or “plausible,” the federal court should require 
exhaustion.175 The Tenth Circuit reiterated that tribes have long had the 
right to exclude non-Indians from their land.176 The court cited Montana 
and its second exception, noting that the tribe’s jurisdiction needs to 
implicate its political integrity, economic security, health, or welfare, but 
found it “colorable” that the state’s action in this case did so through 
allegations of trespass and interference with a tribal law enforcement 
officer on the reservation.177 The court thus required tribal court 
exhaustion of the trespass claim.178 
The state law enforcement officers also argued that exhaustion in 
tribal court was unnecessary due to either the “bad faith” or “intent to 
                                                     
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. (“[T]he officers’ motion for a preliminary injunction was granted by the district court. 
It concluded that the Tribal Court clearly lacked civil jurisdiction over the officers, and thus exhaustion 
of tribal court remedies was not required.”). 
 174. Id. at 1243. 
 175. Id. (“Exceptions typically will not apply so long as tribal courts can ‘make a colorable claim 
that they have jurisdiction.’”). 
 176. Id. at 1245 (“In light of these repeated confirmations of tribes’ right to exclude nonmembers 
from tribal lands, we think it plausible that the Tribal Court possesses jurisdiction over the trespass 
claim. . . . ‘[W]here tribes possess authority to regulate the activities of nonmembers, civil jurisdiction 
over disputes arising out of such activities presumptively lies in the tribal courts.’”). 
 177. Id. at 1246 (“[The tribe] asserts that the officers prevented Wissiup, a tribal member and 
certified law enforcement officer, from accessing the site of the shooting or attending to Murray as he 
bled to death. Thus, in addition to impinging upon a ‘hallmark of Indian sovereignty’ by trespassing, 
the officers colorably threatened the ‘political integrity’ of the tribe, by improperly asserting their own 
authority as superior to that of a tribal official on tribal lands.”). 
 178. Id. 
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harass” exceptions.179 The Tenth Circuit disagreed. It explained that the 
bad faith exception applies to the actions of a tribal court’s misconduct, 
not to the actions of any party in tribal court proceedings, and since the 
defendants had not alleged that the tribal court had acted improperly, the 
bad faith exception was inapplicable.180 The court also rejected the 
harassment claim, suggesting that the defendant’s claim substantially 
amounted to an “attack” on the general premise that tribal courts can hear 
claims involving non-Indians, which was contrary to Tenth Circuit 
precedent.181 
On the other claims, the Tenth Circuit held that the alleged injuries 
occurred to a single tribal member and did not arise to a level that would 
threaten the tribe itself, as required by Montana’s section exception.182 The 
Tenth Circuit therefore did not require exhaustion of the other claims. 
Like both the Ninth and Tenth Circuits this year, district courts also 
refused to find that non-Indian plaintiffs were excused from exhausting 
their tribal remedies on the basis of the Montana exceptions. In Rincon 
Mushroom Corporation of America v. Mazzetti, plaintiff corporation 
RMCA sued tribal officials to stop them from asserting tribal 
environmental regulation over non-Indian-owned fee lands located on the 
reservation of the Rincon Band of Luiseno Mission Indians.183 After the 
tribal court determined that it had jurisdiction, RMCA appealed to the 
federal district court.184 The district court concluded that the tribe had not 
exhausted its tribal remedies because exhaustion includes proceedings at 
the appellate level.185 
                                                     
 179. Id. at 1249. 
 180. Id. (“[W]e agree with the Ninth Circuit that ‘the interpretation most faithful to National 
Farmers is that it must be the tribal court that acts in bad faith to exempt the party from exhausting 
available tribal court remedies.’”). 
 181. Id. (“We also reject the officers’ arguments that they will suffer undue bias and a lack of 
due process if subjected to tribal jurisdiction. The officers offer little support for their allegations, 
which boil down to baseless ‘attacks’ on the competence and fairness of the Ute Tribal Court. . . . The 
Court has also ‘repeatedly’ recognized tribal courts ‘as appropriate forums for the exclusive 
adjudication of disputes affecting important personal and property interests of both Indians and non-
Indians.’”). 
 182. Id. at 1246–47 (“[W]e are bound by our prior precedent holding that Montana governs both 
Indian and non-Indian lands. . . . [W]hen a tribal member hales a nonmember into tribal court as a 
defendant, a tribe’s interest in self-government is less direct because the suit concerns nonmember 
conduct.”). 
 183. Rincon Mushroom Corp. of Am. v. Mazzetti, No. 09cv2330-WQH-JLB, 2017 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 117179 (S.D. Cal. July 26, 2017). 
 184. See id. at *13. 
 185. Id. at *17–18 (“While the tribal court has made an initial determination on jurisdiction 
following the first portion of the bifurcated trial, exhaustion of tribal remedies includes tribal appellate 
review on the issue of jurisdiction. . . . While RMCA contends that these rulings are interlocutory and 
therefore not appealable, RMCA fails to establish that the tribal court’s decision on jurisdiction would 
not be subject to tribal appellate review at a later point during tribal court proceedings.”). 
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The district court then proceeded to ask whether any exception might 
excuse RMCA from exhausting its remedies.186 It asked whether the tribal 
court plainly lacked jurisdiction under Montana, such that exhaustion 
would serve no purpose but delay, but concluded that jurisdiction was 
plausible under the second Montana exception.187 Development of the land 
could affect ground water, and Ninth Circuit precedent suggests that 
threats to water could meet Montana’s second exception of affecting the 
health or welfare of the tribe.188 Since RMCA failed to exhaust its tribal 
remedies, and none of the exceptions to exhaustion were present, the court 
denied the motion to reopen the proceedings in federal court. 
C. Criminal Jurisdiction 
The Supreme Court long ago announced a presumptive rule that 
Indian tribes lack criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian persons.189 Such a 
bright-line rule seems easy to learn for many law students, but its 
ramifications result in a steady stream of criminal cases involving Indian 
law issues arriving in front of state and federal courts. The year 2017 saw 
a couple noteworthy cases address the questions of who is an Indian, and 
how does the government prove the defendant is an Indian when Indian 
status is a required element of the offense. Other issues included the role 
of tribal police in protecting the rights of the accused and how states and 
tribes handle questions of extradition from one sovereign to the other. 
1. Who Is an Indian 
The last time the U.S. Supreme Court answered the question of who 
is an Indian was in 1846;190 however, state and federal courts have 
continued to try to refine the doctrine, and new cases are decided every 
year. From Rogers there has emerged a two-part test for determining who 
is an Indian: (1) the individual must have some degree of Indian blood, 
and (2) the individual must be recognized as an Indian by their tribe and/or 
the United States.191 Four cases were decided in 2017 involving Indian 
                                                     
 186. Id. at *18–19. 
 187. Id. at *19–22 (“‘[T]hreats to water rights may invoke inherent tribal authority over non-
Indians’ pursuant to Montana’s second exception. . . .’ ‘Defendants have shown that conduct on 
Plaintiff’s property plausibly could threaten the Tribe’s groundwater resources and could contribute 
to the spread of wildfires on the reservation.’”). 
 188. Id. at *20–22. 
 189. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
 190. See United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567 (1846) (suggesting that to be an “Indian” required 
some degree of Indian blood and that the individual was recognized as an Indian by their tribe or the 
federal government). 
 191. For a discussion of the emergence of this two-part test from Rogers, see Daniel Donovan & 
John Rhodes, To Be or Not to Be: Who is an ‘Indian Person,’ 73 MONT. L. REV. 61, 66 (2012). 
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status, but this summary will touch on the two most notable. The first 
concerned a dismissal of state criminal charges, and the second concerned 
the Ninth Circuit’s dismissal of federal criminal charges.192 
In Idaho v. George, the defendant was initially arrested by Coeur 
d’Alene tribal police on the Coeur d’Alene Indian Reservation for 
possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia 
with intent to use, both misdemeanors under tribal law.193 Upon learning 
that the defendant was not an enrolled member of the tribe, she was 
transferred to the State of Idaho, where the state brought three felony 
charges against her.194 The defendant contested the jurisdiction of the state 
court, arguing that although she was not enrolled, she met the legal 
definition of an Indian under Rogers and, therefore, the state had no 
criminal jurisdiction over her on-reservation activity.195 The Idaho state 
trial court agreed. 
The state court recognized that Ms. George was at least twenty-two 
percent Indian by blood and descended from a Coeur d’Alene tribal 
member.196 The court further acknowledged that this status confers upon 
her all of the benefits of membership except for sharing in the proceeds of 
the tribe’s casino.197 Her children are enrolled members because their 
fathers are enrolled, and she is the adoptive daughter of another tribal 
member.198 Therefore, the court reasoned the defendant met the first part 
of the test from Rogers—that she have some degree of Indian blood.199 
The court went on to reason that while Ms. George was not eligible for 
enrollment based on her known blood quantum, she is eligible for tribal 
adoption given her adoptive parent’s enrollment and her own blood 
quantum.200 The court concluded and that the defendant otherwise has a 
                                                     
 192. For reference, the other two are Martin v. United States, Nos. 12-206(1) (DWF/LIB), 15-
3310 (DWF), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25508 (D. Minn. Feb. 17, 2017) (defendant stipulated to his 
Indian status even though he may not have been enrolled), and United States v. Tsosie, No. 12-10624, 
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 18513 (9th Cir. Sept. 25, 2017) (holding that even though there was an 
unauthenticated certificate of Indian blood, any error was harmless because countless other evidence 
demonstrated the defendant was an Indian, including testimony about his blood quantum from his 
wife, his participation in Navajo ceremonies, and his use of a Navajo language interpreter throughout 
the proceedings). 
 193. Idaho v. George, No. CR-16-21089, 2017 Ida. LEXIS 230 (First Judicial Dist. Court of 
Idaho, Kootenai Cty. May 9, 2017). 
 194. Id. at *2. 
 195. See id. at *19. 
 196. Id. at *4. 
 197. Id. at *5–7. 
 198. Id. at *4–6. 
 199. Id. at *28 (“It is undisputed that Ms. George has 22% Indian blood. There is some question 
whether she has a greater percentage of Indian blood based both on her biological father’s ancestry 
and any errors in her maternal Family Ancestry chart. . . . [But] the first prong requires only ‘some’ 
Indian blood.”). 
 200. Id. at *39. 
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“significant” or “substantial” amount of Indian blood for purposes of the 
first prong of the analysis determining her Indian status.201 
The court began its analysis of the second prong by recognizing that 
“[t]ribal enrollment is ‘the common evidentiary means of 
establishing Indian status, but it is not the only means nor is it necessarily 
determinative.’”202 Accordingly, the court looked to the Coeur d’Alene 
tribe’s recognition of Ms. George as an Indian and its provision of tribal 
services to her in order to determine that she did indeed meet the second 
prong of the test; the tribe had recognized her as an Indian.203 Because the 
court concluded Ms. George was an Indian, it dismissed the state criminal 
charges against her for lack of jurisdiction. 
In United States v. Seymour, the defendant appealed from his 
conviction under the Major Crimes Act involving the sexual abuse of three 
minor children on the White Mountain Apache Reservation.204 Even 
though he was an enrolled member of the White Mountain Apache Tribe, 
the defendant argued that the United States failed to prove that he was an 
Indian because it presented no evidence that he had any Indian blood.205 
The Ninth Circuit agreed and remanded the case with instructions to enter 
an acquittal.206 The government relied upon the testimony of the tribal 
enrollment officer who stated the defendant was a member, but it made no 
representation about any Indian blood.207 The court held that the 
government had failed to prove the first element of being an Indian: “But 
without any evidence regarding the basis for Seymour’s enrollment in 
the tribe or about Seymour’s ancestry, even construing the facts in the light 
most favorable to the prosecution, we cannot say that any rational trier of 
fact could find that Seymour has ‘some quantum of Indian blood.’”208 
                                                     
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at *42. 
 203. Id. at 45–46 (“[I]t is apparent to the Court that the Tribe recognizes her as an Indian. She 
has lived virtually her whole life on the Coeur d’Alene Reservation as an Indian. She is the adopted 
daughter of an enrolled member of the Coeur d’Alene Tribe and an enrolled member of the 
Flathead Tribe. Throughout her life she has received benefits from the Tribe or through 
the Tribe reserved for Indians and these benefits include health care, substance abuse treatment, 
housing assistance, job assistance, education, social benefits . . . and food assistance. She has worked 
on the reservation. Throughout her life she has participated in Tribal social and cultural events. Thus, 
while case law indicates that tribal enrollment is an important consideration, and if it exists, is 
determinative of the second element of the status test, it is not an absolute requirement for recognition 
as an Indian.”). 
 204. United States v. Seymour, 684 F. App’x 662 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 205. Id. at 663. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. (“The government now contends that the Tribal Affidavit, along with other 
circumstantial evidence, proves Seymour’s blood quantum when considered in light of the White 
Mountain Apache Tribe’s constitution, which establishes criteria for tribal membership.”). 
 208. Id. 
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2. Tribal Police 
Although numerous cases raised questions of the appropriate powers 
of tribal police, this annual review has selected two of them to provide an 
overview of the kinds of issues that were litigated this year. Both cases 
raise issues of the admissibility of evidence obtained by tribal police. For 
purposes of variety, I’ve selected one case where the evidence was 
excluded and one case where it was admitted.209 
Voluntary statements made to tribal law enforcement, even by non-
Indians, are admissible in federal court. In United States v. Peters, a non-
Indian was detained by a tribal law enforcement officer and placed in 
handcuffs while on the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation.210 Eventually 
a federal officer completed a probable cause arrest.211 During the five and 
a half hours he was detained by tribal police, which included a trip to the 
hospital and to Pierre, the defendant made comments that were recorded 
on both a lapel and a dashboard camera.212 At trial the defendant filed a 
motion to suppress the statements he made to officers on the grounds that 
he was unlawfully detained in violation of the Fourth Amendment or that 
he made statements without being given his Miranda warnings in violation 
of the Fifth Amendment.213 A federal magistrate recommended the motion 
be denied.214 The magistrate reasoned that even if the tribe lacks 
jurisdiction, tribal law enforcement can arrest and detain an offender until 
he can be turned over to the proper authorities.215 It further recommended 
that no Fifth Amendment violation occurred because there had been no 
“interrogation”—the statements were made either voluntarily or in 
response to questions tribal law enforcement asked to clarify what had 
already been said.216 A month later the district court adopted the 
magistrate’s recommendation.217 
                                                     
 209. For an honorable mention, see United States v. Tepiew, 859 F.3d 452 (7th Cir. 2017) 
(upholding evidence obtained by tribal law enforcement when they entered a home without a warrant 
on the basis of the emergency in aid doctrine). The case provides an excellent discussion of the 
difficulty in obtaining a tribal court warrant on some reservations. 
 210. United States v. Peters, No. 3:16-CR-30150-RAL, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56754 (D.S.D. 
Mar. 15, 2017). 
 211. Id. at *4. 
 212. Id. at *5. 
 213. See id. at *1. 
 214. Id. at *10–11. 
 215. Id. at *6–7 (“[T]ribal police officers have the authority to arrest an offender within Indian 
country and to detain him until he can be turned over to the proper authorities, even if the tribe itself 
lacks jurisdiction. Federal and state courts (including the Eighth Circuit) have likewise regularly 
upheld tribal police actions, including stopping, investigating and detaining non-Indians suspected of 
criminal conduct.”). 
 216. Id. at *9. 
 217. United States v. Peters, No. 3:16-CR-30150-RAL, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56488 (D.S.D. 
Apr. 13, 2017). 
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Evidence obtained by tribal police regarding a non-Indian is not 
always deemed admissible. In United States v. Cooley, a tribal law 
enforcement official stopped to offer assistance to a vehicle stopped along 
the side of a state highway running through the Crow Reservation.218 The 
officer quickly identified that the driver was not an Indian but continued 
to ask for identification.219 During the course of the conversation, the tribal 
officer observed firearms and methamphetamines.220 The tribal officer 
detained the driver and notified state police, who then confiscated the 
drugs and weapons.221 The driver moved to suppress the evidence on the 
basis that the tribal officer had no jurisdiction over him, a non-Indian, and 
therefore had no authority to prolong the police stop after the officer had 
ascertained that the driver was not an Indian.222 The federal district court 
agreed that the tribal police officer had conducted an unlawful search and 
excluded the evidence.223 
3. Extradition 
As a general rule, state law enforcement does not have the right to 
enter a reservation and remove individuals accused of violating state law 
without following tribal rules for extradition.224 Whether the state acted 
appropriately in removing an individual from a reservation was at the heart 
of a pair of 2017 cases. 
Federal courts are less likely to get involved in extradition 
proceedings when the extradition from tribal to state custody was subject 
to a tribal court order. In Henry v. McMahon, a California state police 
officer engaged the assistance of CRIT (tribal) police to assist in taking a 
tribal member into custody.225 Tribal police arrested the tribal member and 
later, subject to an order from the tribal court, the member was turned over 
to California state police and charged with multiple felonies.226 The 
petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he was 
                                                     
 218. United States v. Cooley, No. CR 16-42-BLG-SPW, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17276 (D. Mont. 
Feb. 7, 2017). 
 219. Id. at *2–4. 
 220. Id. at *3–6. 
 221. Id. at *6. 
 222. Id. at *8–9. 
 223. Id. at *11–12. “The remedy for evidence obtained by a tribal officer acting outside the scope 
of his authority is suppression. ‘No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government’ shall ‘violate 
the right of the people to be secure . . . against unreasonable search and seizures . . . .’” Id. at 8. 
 224. For a discussion of the complicated area of tribal–state relations in the context of extradition, 
see Kerstin G. LeMaire & Mark D. Tallan, Issues Involving Extradition and Their Impact on Tribal 
Sovereignty, 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 803 (1999). 
 225. Henry v. McMahon, No. EDCV 15-02384-CAS (DTB), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56153 
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2017). 
 226. Id. at *2–3. 
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not extradited in accordance with tribal law and seeking release from his 
pre-trial detention by the state of California.227 The federal court refused 
to consider the writ because it was reluctant to interfere with state criminal 
proceedings and the habeas claim failed to raise any immediate 
constitutional concerns.228 Accordingly, the magistrate recommended that 
the petitioner’s writ be denied, and the district court adopted the findings 
and dismissed the petition.229 
Extradition agreements between states and tribes require close 
examination as to the scope of the extradition procedures. In State v. 
Carpio, the defendant was charged with unlawful flight after a city police 
officer signaled for him to stop.230 A chase ensued, in which the defendant, 
a member of the Gila River Indian Community, drove from the city of 
Chandler, Arizona, and onto the reservation.231 The defendant alleged that 
the city police officer arrested and removed him from the reservation 
without complying with the extradition requirements of the Community.232 
The state replied that the officer was in hot pursuit of the defendant for a 
crime that was committed in the state of Arizona and therefore extradition 
was not necessary.233 The court agreed with the state.234 The court 
concluded that an agreement between the City and the Community that 
required extradition of member defendants only applied when the offense 
was committed on the reservation.235 Here, the offense was committed off 
the reservation, so the state had properly obtained jurisdiction over the 
defendant.236 
                                                     
 227. Id. at *3. 
 228. Id. at *7–8 (“Such a claim does not fall within the established exceptions [violation of 
speedy trial or double jeopardy], nor otherwise constitute ‘extraordinary circumstances’ such that 
immediate intrusion into state criminal proceedings by a federal habeas court would be warranted. 
Framed another way, the harm petitioner alleges does not embody a right that is necessarily forfeited 
by delaying review until after petitioner’s trial . . . . Indeed, the Constitution does not prohibit 
petitioner’s prosecution as, ‘an illegal arrest, without more, has never been viewed as a bar to 
subsequent prosecution, nor as a defense to a valid conviction.’”). 
 229. Henry v. McMahon, No. EDCV 15-02384-CAS (DTB), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56151 
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2017). 
 230. State v. Carpio, No. 1 CA-CR 15-0635, 2017 Ariz. App. Unpub. LEXIS 817 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
June 22, 2017). 
 231. Id. at *2. 
 232. Id. at *1. 
 233. See id. at *1. 
 234. Id. at *6 (“[T]he State has a particularly strong policy interest in not allowing suspects to 
narrowly escape arrest and avoid this State’s jurisdiction over offenses committed within this State by 
fleeing across the border to another jurisdiction.”). 
 235. Id. at *6–8. 
 236. Id. at *8–10 (“Carpio’s arrest therefore did not interfere with tribal sovereignty, and the 
superior court properly exercised jurisdiction over Carpio with respect to the unlawful flight 
offense.”). 
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4. Public Law 280 
Public Law 83-280 (PL-280) was enacted by Congress in 1953 to 
expressly permit states to assert some authority on the reservation.237 
While the law applied to five (later six) states in full,238 it allowed other 
states to “opt in” to assert jurisdiction over some or all of the Indian 
country land within their jurisdiction. 
In 2017, there was one notable case about criminal jurisdiction from 
Washington State that extended criminal jurisdiction under PL-280 over 
Indian allotments located outside the reservation. In State v. Comenout, 
members of federally recognized Indian tribes appealed from their 
criminal convictions in state court related to the possession and illegal sale 
of cigarettes without a license from their store on a trust allotment but not 
within any Indian reservation.239 The defendants argued that as Indians in 
Indian country, the state had no criminal jurisdiction over them.240 
The Washington appellate court disagreed and upheld their criminal 
convictions.241 The appellate court recognized that the property was 
“Indian country” for purposes of federal jurisdiction.242 However, because 
the allotment at issue was not within the borders of a reservation, the court 
reasoned that Washington’s assumption of jurisdiction under PL-280 in 
1963 conferred jurisdiction on the state.243 The appellate court noted that 
the Washington Supreme Court has had several occasions to interpret 
Washington’s assumption of jurisdiction over Indian persons on 
allotments not within a reservation, including in a case involving the exact 
store at issue here, and had regularly upheld jurisdiction.244 Because the 
                                                     
 237. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2012) 
and 25 U.S.C. § 1321 (2012)) (commonly referred to in Indian law circles in its abbreviated form as 
PL-280). 
 238. Id. The mandatory states are California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin. 
Alaska was subsequently added when it entered the Union in 1959. 
 239. State v. Comenout, Nos. 48990-2-II, 48994-5-II, 49000-5-II, 49004-8-II, 2017 Wash. App. 
LEXIS 2945 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 27, 2017). 
 240. Id. at *1. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. at *5 (“Allotment property held in trust by the United States, such as the property at 
issue here, constitutes ‘Indian country.’”). 
 243. See id. at *7. The relevant Washington statute reads: 
The state of Washington hereby obligates and binds itself to assume criminal and civil 
jurisdiction over Indians and Indian territory, reservations, country, and lands within this 
state in accordance with [federal legislation] . . . but such assumption of jurisdiction shall 
not apply to Indians when on their tribal lands or allotted lands within an established Indian 
reservation and held in trust by the United States or subject to a restriction against 
alienation imposed by the United States. 
WASH. REV. CODE § 37.12.010 (2016). 
 244. Id. 
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allotment fell within Washington’s expansion of PL-280, the Washington 
appellate court concluded that the state had criminal jurisdiction over the 
defendant’s activity.245 
D. Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL) 
Perhaps the Indian law issue that caught the greatest amount of 
attention in the national media during 2017 was the conflict over the 
construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL) between the Standing 
Rock and Cheyenne River Sioux Tribes on one side, and Energy Transfer 
Partners and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers on the other.246 The Sioux 
tribes fought vehemently against the decision by the Army Corps to permit 
an oil pipeline to pass under Lake Oahe.247 The tribes collectively raised 
environmental, social justice, and even religious arguments against the 
construction, and they won a limited reprieve at the end of 2016 when the 
Obama Administration agreed to further study the environmental 
impacts.248 However, with the inauguration of President Trump, the 
administration reversed course and the pipeline was eventually 
completed.249 
While DAPL litigation predated 2017, the first challenge decided 
that year involved the tribes’ claim that the routing of the pipeline was a 
violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).250 In 
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, the 
tribes argued that the mere presence of the DAPL under Lake Oahe would 
cause irreparable harm to the religious exercise of their members. 251 
Specifically, the tribes referenced a traditional Lakota belief: 
The Lakota people believe that the mere existence of a crude oil 
pipeline under the waters of Lake Oahe will desecrate those waters 
and render them unsuitable for use in their religious 
sacraments. . . . The Lakota people believe that the pipeline 
correlates with a terrible Black Snake prophesied to come into the 
Lakota homeland and cause destruction. . . . The Lakota believe 
that the very existence of the Black Snake under their sacred 
waters in Lake Oahe will unbalance and desecrate the water and 
                                                     
 245. Id. 
 246. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 239 F. Supp. 3d 77 (D.D.C. 
2017). 
 247. Id. at 80. 
 248. Id. at 80–82. 
 249. Id. at 82. 
 250. Id. at 83. 
 251. Id. at 82. 
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render it impossible for the Lakota to use that water in their Inipi 
ceremony.252 
The tribes sought an injunction from the district court, which was denied 
based upon both laches and the unlikelihood that the tribe would prevail 
on the merits.253 
Laches is a defense available when a party has inexcusably or 
unreasonably delayed filing their claim.254 The court noted that while the 
tribe was made aware of the pipeline’s proposed route in October 2014, it 
waited until February 2017 to raise its RFRA objection.255 Because the 
tribes had both notice of the route and an opportunity to voice their 
concerns, including concerns about contamination from a potential oil 
spill, the court held that the tribes had no excuse for delaying their claim.256 
The court also held that the tribes were unlikely to prevail on the 
merits. To prevail, the tribes would have to show that the government’s 
action implicated the tribe’s religious exercise, that their religious belief is 
sincere, and that the government’s action presented a substantial burden 
on their religious practice.257 While the court concluded that the tribes 
would likely be able to demonstrate that their religious belief is sincere, it 
concluded that it is unlikely the tribes would be able to show that their 
religious practice would be substantially burdened.258 For authority the 
court cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Lyng: “[T]he incidental effect 
on religious exercise of a government action undertaken in furtherance of 
the management and use of government land, even if extreme, is not alone 
enough to give rise to a Free Exercise claim.”259 Because of both the 
inexcusable delay and the unlikelihood that the tribes will prevail on the 
merits, the court denied their request for a preliminary injunction.260 One 
                                                     
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. at 80. 
 254. See id. at 84. 
 255. Id. at 85–87. 
 256. Id. at 86–87. As proof the tribe was aware of the dangers earlier but did not object to the 
mere presence of the pipeline under the river, the court cited the tribal chairmen: 
When the pipeline leaks, the Missouri river—the source of our drinking water, where we 
fish, swim, and conduct ceremonies—will be contaminated. Our Sundance, a spiritual 
ceremony sacred to us, is performed on the banks of the river. The source of life, as well 
as spiritual continuity, would be damaged. 
Id. at 88 (internal citation omitted). 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. at 89–92. The Court reasoned that the pipeline “does not impose a sanction on the Tribe’s 
members for exercising their religious beliefs, nor does it pressure them to choose between religious 
exercise and the receipt of government benefits.” Id. at 91. 
 259. Id. at 91–92. 
 260. Id. at 100. 
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week later the tribes filed a notice of appeal, and the court denied the 
tribes’ request for an injunction pending appeal for the same reasons.261 
Even after the pipeline was completed, the parties continued to argue 
in court over a variety of ongoing issues. In Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Dakota Access LLC sought a protection 
order to prevent public disclosure of eleven documents in the record on 
the grounds that “terrorists” or others could use the information to inflict 
environmental injury.262 The court agreed to protect only those redactions 
in five spill reports suggested by the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials 
Safety Administration that corresponded to the information that it would 
redact subject to a FOIA request.263 The court refused to redact the names 
of waterways expected to be impacted by a spill or the location of 
containment booms. 264 
The tribes also saw limited success from a challenge to the 
Environmental Assessment (EA). In Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. United 
States Army Corps of Engineers, the D.C. District Court heard the third 
major challenge to the pipeline brought by the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe 
and the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe.265 The court began by placing these 
new claims within the context of the larger litigation266 and concluded that 
while the tribes’ previous two challenges had failed, this third attack held 
some merit.267 The Army Corps completed an EA, in which it determined 
that the pipeline presented no significant impact on the environment and, 
therefore, a much more detailed Environment Impact Statement (EIS) was 
not prepared.268 The D.C. District Court concluded that while the Army 
                                                     
 261. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 16-1534 (JEB), 2017 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 93908 (D.D.C. Mar. 14, 2017). 
 262. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 249 F. Supp. 3d 516, 517–18 
(D.D.C. 2017). 
 263. Id. at 522–23. 
 264. Id. at 523–24. 
 265. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 255 F. Supp. 3d 101 (D.D.C. 
2017). 
 266. Id. at 111–12 (“The Tribes have since mounted two substantial legal challenges to DAPL, 
neither of which yielded success. The first contended that the grading and clearing of land for the 
pipeline threatened sites of cultural and historical significance, and that the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers had flouted its duty to engage in tribal consultations pursuant to the National Historic 
Preservation Act. The second maintained that the presence of oil in the pipeline under Lake Oahe 
would desecrate sacred waters and make it impossible for the Tribes to freely exercise their religious 
beliefs, thus violating the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. . . . Now that the Court has rejected 
these two lines of attack, Standing Rock and Cheyenne River here take their third shot, this time 
zeroing in DAPL’s environmental impact.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 267. Id. at 112. 
 268. Id. at 116 (“Given those measures and its evaluation of DAPL’s ‘anticipated environmental, 
economic, cultural, . . . social[, and] . . . cumulative effects,’ the Corps concluded that the crossing at 
Lake Oahe would not ‘significantly affect the quality of the human environment,’ and preparation of 
an EIS was therefore not required.”). 
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Corps complied with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in 
many areas, it failed to account for the potential effects a spill could have 
on fishing rights, hunting rights, and environmental justice when it issued 
its EA and, therefore, the EA in certain respects was inadequate.269 
The court remanded the case back to the Army Corps to reconsider 
the EA in light of the court’s discussion of the failures in the original 
analysis.270 Whether the pipeline must cease its operation during the 
reevaluation on remand was not decided by the court but was assigned to 
the parties for further briefing.271 
In Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the 
court decided that the pipeline did not need to cease its operation while the 
Army Corps reevaluated the EA.272 The district court ultimately decided 
that revoking the easement was not an appropriate remedy because the 
deficiencies of the agency’s action were not sufficiently serious and the 
agency had a high probability of being able to cure them and justify its 
prior determinations on remand.273 However, the court cautioned that its 
conclusion to continue to allow oil to flow does not reduce the burden on 
the Army Corps from complying with the NEPA errors that were 
previously identified.274 
                                                     
 269. Id. at 132–34. The Court recognized that the Tribe had raised the issue of hunting and 
fishing rights before the Corps had made its final determination in the Environmental Assessment 
(EA): 
Standing Rock, though, had alerted the Corps to its fishing–and hunting–related concerns 
after the agency published the Draft EA. . . . The Director of Standing Rock’s Department 
of Game, Fish, and Wildlife Conservation, moreover, explained that many of the Tribe’s 
members rely on fishing as ‘an important supplemental source of food and 
nutrition’ . . . . An oil spill, he said, could ‘cause extensive fish kills.’ He also spelled out 
the ways in which an oil spill could seriously affect game along the Oahe shoreline, 
including by poisoning animals that ingest, inhale, or are otherwise externally exposed to 
oil and preventing those birds and mammals whose feathers or fur are coated with oil from 
maintaining their body temperatures. 
Id. at 134 (internal citations omitted). 
 270. Id. at 112. 
 271. Id. at 160–61. 
 272. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 16-1534 (JEB), 2017 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 167569 (D.D.C. Oct. 11, 2017). 
 273. Id. at *13 (“Defendants argue that the three inadequacies identified by the Court—namely, 
the Corps’ failure to adequately address the degree to which the project’s effects are likely to be highly 
controversial, the impacts of a spill on fish or game, and the environmental-justice impacts of a spill—
are not significant deficiencies in the agency’s prior analysis.”). 
 274. Id. at *45 (“In light of the ‘serious possibility’ that the Corps will be able to substantiate its 
prior conclusions, the Court finds that vacatur is not the appropriate remedy in this case. That 
determination does not, however, excuse Defendants from giving serious consideration to the errors 
identified in this Court’s prior Opinion. Compliance with NEPA cannot be reduced to a bureaucratic 
formality, and the Court expects the Corps not to treat remand as an exercise in filling out the proper 
paperwork post hoc. After the agency’s further work on remand, the parties may well disagree over 
the sufficiency of its conclusion. If and when such a dispute arises, they will again have the opportunity 
to address whether Defendants have in fact fulfilled their statutory obligations.”). 
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Despite the fact that the court refused to stop active use of the 
pipeline, it recognized that the threat of a spill would have a serious effect 
on tribal communities and ordered enhanced public reporting of the 
pipeline’s status.275 In Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers, the tribe asked the court to impose a series of reporting and 
monitoring measures to ensure ongoing compliance.276 The federal court 
approved all of the measures requested by the tribe.277 The court 
recognized the need for ongoing monitoring measures and rejected the 
Army Corps’ suggestion that such monitoring was unwarranted.278 The 
reporting requires that Dakota Access file bi-monthly reports on the status 
of the pipeline beginning at the end of December 2017 and specifically 
include any repairs and incidents involving the portion of the pipeline 
crossing Lake Oahe.279 
E. Effect of a Tribal Court Judgment 
The U.S. Supreme Court decided United States v. Bryant in 2016, 
which held that a tribal court conviction for domestic violence, even if 
uncounseled, could qualify as a predicate offense for purposes of federal 
criminal prosecution.280 Several courts in 2017 have applied Bryant’s 
principles to build a canon of law on the effect of a tribal court judgment 
outside of the tribal courts. 
1. Application of Tribal Court Conviction as a Predicate Offense 
Conviction for an improper sexual offense in tribal court, even if 
uncounseled, is a sufficient offense to require the convicted party to 
register as a sex offender with the state.281 In State v. Lopez, the defendant 
was convicted of “child molesting” in Tohono O’odham tribal court and 
                                                     
 275. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 16-1534 (JEB), 2017 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 198603 (D.D.C. Dec. 4, 2017). 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. at *11 (“Plaintiffs request three specific conditions during the remand period: (1) the 
finalization and implementation of oil-spill response plans at Lake Oahe; (2) completion of a third-
party compliance audit; and (3) public reporting of information regarding pipeline operations. The 
Court agrees that each of these measures is appropriately tailored to monitoring the status of the 
pipeline during remand.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 278. Id. at *9–11 (“Recent events have made clear, moreover, that there is a pressing need for 
such ongoing monitoring. Earlier this month, the Keystone Pipeline leaked 210,000 gallons of oil in 
Marshall County, South Dakota. The spill occurred near the boundaries of the Lake Traverse 
Reservation, home of the Sisseton Wahpeton Oyate Tribe, thus highlighting the potential impact of 
pipeline incidents on tribal lands.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 279. Id. at *12–14. 
 280. United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954 (2016). 
 281. State v. Lopez, Nos. 2 CA-CR 2016-0076, 2 CA-CR 2016-0122, 2017 Ariz. App. Unpub. 
LEXIS 1097 (Ariz. Ct. App. July 27, 2017). 
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sentenced to 360 days in a proceeding in which he was uncounseled.282 He 
subsequently pled guilty in state court for failure to register as a sex 
offender.283 Three years later he was again charged with failure to register, 
and this time he contested the charge, arguing that his tribal court 
conviction was unconstitutional because it was uncounseled and, 
therefore, he had no duty to register as a sex offender.284 The state court 
agreed and threw out the conviction.285   
The U.S. Supreme Court then decided Bryant, which held that 
uncounseled convictions in tribal court could still be used in state or 
federal court without violating constitutional rights.286 Accordingly, the 
state in Lopez appealed the dismissal.287 Applying Bryant, the Arizona 
appellate court reversed: “[Bryant] makes clear that an otherwise valid but 
uncounseled tribal court conviction, where a defendant is sentenced to a 
term of less than one year, comports with both the Constitution and 
ICRA.”288 
The defendant in Lopez argued that his conviction in tribal court 
should still be construed as unlawful because his guilty plea was 
involuntarily extracted.289 However, the court concluded that because this 
issue was raised for the first time on appeal, it was improper for the 
appellate court to review it here, and so it remanded the issue to the trial 
court.290 
In United States v. Long, the defendant was charged with, among 
other things, being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm.291 The 
predicate offense upon which his status as a prohibited person was based 
was a tribal court conviction for domestic violence where the defendant 
was represented by someone approved as a lay advocate but not licensed 
                                                     
 282. Id. at *2. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. at *2–3. 
 285. Id. at *3. 
 286. See United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1959 (2016). 
 287. Lopez, 2017 Ariz. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1097, at *3 (“In light of the Supreme Court’s 
reversal in Bryant, the state requests that we vacate the trial court’s dismissal order.”). 
 288. Id. at *6. 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. at *7–8 (“Accordingly, we decline Lopez’s request to entertain his alternate basis for 
upholding the dismissal order, vacate that order, and remand to the trial court with instructions to 
reinstate the indictment.”). 
 291. United States v. Long, 870 F.3d 741, 743 (8th Cir. 2017) (“Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), it 
is unlawful for any person ‘who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic 
violence’ to possess a firearm in or affecting interstate commerce . . . . Section 921(a)(33)(B), however, 
provides: (B)(i) A person shall not be considered to have been convicted of such an offense for 
purposes of this chapter, unless— (I) the person was represented by counsel in the case, or knowingly 
and intelligently waived the right to counsel in the case.”). 
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as an attorney in tribal court.292 A divided panel of the Eighth Circuit ruled 
that the tribal court conviction was sufficient to trigger the federal 
statute.293 The court reasoned that the statute’s requirement that the 
defendant be represented by counsel “in the case” meant he only needed 
to be represented by someone recognized to appear before the court 
prosecuting the criminal case.294 
Judge Colloton dissented. He argued that a lay advocate should not 
qualify as counsel for purposes of the federal statute.295 The dissent would 
have reversed the conviction of the prohibited person in possession of a 
firearm claim because the defendant was not represented by counsel when 
he was convicted of domestic violence.296 
2. How to Treat a Tribal Court Conviction 
Because tribes do not always use the same labels as state and federal 
courts, it can be difficult to determine how to treat a tribal court conviction 
when in a different court system. In State v. Horselooking, the defendant 
appealed his sentence after being convicted of DUI and aggravated 
battery.297 The district court assigned him a criminal history score of B 
based on his prior conviction by the Kickapoo Nation Tribal Court for 
residential burglary, treating it like a felony conviction.298 The tribal code 
does not classify residential burglary as either a felony or a 
misdemeanor.299 The sole issue on appeal was whether it was proper to 
treat the tribal court conviction as a felony for criminal history purposes.300 
A divided Kansas appellate court determined that it was improper.301 
The court began by noting that criminal convictions by a tribal court 
in Kansas are treated as out-of-state convictions.302 Under Kansas law, if 
                                                     
 292. Id. at 745. 
 293. Id. at 747. 
 294. Id. at 746–47 (“Long has presented no evidence that his counsel at the tribal-court 
proceeding was not admitted to practice as lay counsel in the tribal court, arguing only that Ms. White 
Pipe is not a licensed attorney. Because lay counsel are admitted to practice before the tribal court, we 
conclude that Long was represented by counsel in the tribal-court proceeding within the meaning of 
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B) . . . .”). 
 295. Id. at 749–50 (“The ordinary meaning of ‘counsel’ in the legal context conveyed by the 
phrase ‘represented by counsel’ is a lawyer. . . . When Long was convicted of a misdemeanor in the 
tribal court, he was not represented by a lawyer in the case. Therefore, he was not ‘represented by 
counsel in the case’ within the meaning of § 921(a)(33)(B)(i)(I), and he ‘shall not be considered to 
have been convicted’ of a ‘misdemeanor crime of domestic violence’ for purposes of § 922(g)(9).”). 
 296. Id. at 750. 
 297. State v. Horselooking, 400 P.3d 189 (Kan. Ct. App. 2017). 
 298. Id. at 191. 
 299. Id. 
 300. Id. 
 301. See id. 
 302. Id. at 192. 
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the out-of-state jurisdiction treats a crime as a felony, that crime will be 
treated as a felony in Kansas, but the tribal code does not use the terms 
“misdemeanor” or “felony.”303 Because the legislative sentencing scheme 
is silent in situations like the defendant’s, the majority applied the rule of 
lenity and determined that the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the 
accused.304 
The dissent looked at the possible consequences the tribal court could 
impose for the offense. It noted that felonies are “serious” or “major” 
crimes while misdemeanors are “less serious.”305 In order to determine 
whether a tribal court conviction is equivalent to a felony or misdemeanor, 
the dissent suggested looking to the punishment the tribe may impose.306 
Because the punishment for residential burglary in the tribal code could 
include banishment, the dissent would have concluded that the lower court 
correctly accounted for the defendant’s criminal history.307 
3. The Recognition of a Tribal Court Judgment in State Court 
No federal law or constitutional provision has been held to require 
state courts to enforce tribal court judgments. The issue of how and when 
to enforce tribal court judgments comes up often in the interplay between 
the powers of competing sovereigns. One particularly notable case 
discussed the issue in 2017. In Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. Johnson, the Coeur 
d’Alene Tribe brought suit in tribal court against non-Indians who owned 
land in fee within the outer boundary of their reservation. 308 The tribe 
enforced a tribal ordinance that requires a tribal permit before a landowner 
can install a dock on the portion of the St. Joe River running through the 
reservation.309 The Johnsons were served with notice but failed to 
appear.310 The tribal court issued a default judgment for $17,400 and 
declared that the tribe was entitled to remove the dock and pilings.311 The 
tribe then sought to enforce the judgment in state court.312 
                                                     
 303. Id. (“The complicating issue here is that the Kickapoo Nation Tribal Code does not 
differentiate between felonies and misdemeanors. . . . [And] there is no explicit language in the KSGA 
explaining how a court is to classify an out-of-state conviction as either a felony or a misdemeanor 
when the convicting jurisdiction does not distinguish between the two.”). 
 304. Id. at 196. 
 305. Id. at 198. 
 306. Id. (“[T]he types of punishment that may be imposed for various wrongs under the Kickapoo 
Nation criminal code create an obvious line of demarcation between those considered serious crimes 
and those considered to be lesser offenses. The serious crimes include banishment from the tribe for a 
term of years or for life as a potential punishment. Other offenses do not permit banishment.”). 
 307. Id. at 201. 
 308. Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. Johnson, 405 P.3d 13 (Idaho 2017). 
 309. Id. at 15. 
 310. Id. 
 311. Id. 
 312. See id. 
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The state trial court upheld the enforcement of the civil judgment.313 
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court clarified that Idaho would no longer 
give full faith and credit to tribal court judgments but would instead apply 
the principles of comity.314 
The Idaho Supreme Court provided guidance going forward for when 
Idaho state courts should extend comity to tribal court opinions: “[A]s a 
general principle, ‘courts should recognize and enforce tribal judgments.’ 
However . . . a tribal judgment is not entitled to enforcement if the tribal 
court did not have both personal and subject matter jurisdiction or the 
defendant was not afforded due process of law.”315 The court briefly 
mentioned four additional instances in which a court may decline to 
exercise jurisdiction on the basis of equitability.316 
After reversing its prior guidance that tribal court judgments are 
entitled to full faith and credit, the court considered whether the Coeur 
d’Alene Tribal Court’s judgment should be entitled to comity under this 
new analysis. The court identified that the tribal court had jurisdiction over 
the dock because the U.S. Supreme Court, in Idaho v. United States, 533 
U.S. 262 (2001), held that the riverbed was held in trust for the tribe.317 
The court reasoned that the petitioners had failed to meet their burden to 
show that the tribe lacked jurisdiction over the dock and held that the due 
process rights of the petitioners were not violated because they had 
received notice of the claims against them and were afforded an 
opportunity to appear in tribal court.318 However, the Idaho Supreme Court 
still refused to extend comity to the $17,400 civil fine because the penalty 
                                                     
 313. Id. 
 314. Id. at 17 (“Although we value good relations with the tribal courts within Idaho, we are 
unable to continue to apply the strained construction of 28 U.S.C. section 1738 that we adopted in 
Sheppard in order to advance that important objective. Therefore, we overrule the holding in Sheppard 
that tribal judgments are entitled to full faith and credit and adopt the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit 
in Wilson and hold that tribal court judgments are entitled to recognition and enforcement under 
principles of comity. We do not overrule Sheppard in its entirety. We will continue to apply its 
requirement that a party attacking the validity of a tribal court’s judgment bears the burden of proving 
its invalidity.”). 
 315. Id. at 17–18 (internal citations omitted). 
 316. Id. at 18 (“[There are] four equitable grounds upon which a court may decide not to 
recognize a tribal judgment. Those grounds are: ‘(1) the judgment was obtained by fraud; (2) the 
judgment conflicts with another final judgment that is entitled to recognition; (3) the judgment is 
inconsistent with the parties’ contractual choice of forum; or (4) recognition of the judgment, or the 
cause of action upon which it is based, is against the public policy of the United States or the forum 
state in which recognition of the judgment is sought.’”) (internal citations omitted). 
 317. Id. at 19–20 (“In this case, the ownership of the land is dispositive. Unlike the situation in 
Hicks, the State here does not have any interests that would weigh against the Tribal Court exercising 
jurisdiction. This case is similar to Water Wheel in that there are no competing State interests. We hold 
that the Johnsons have failed to meet their burden of demonstrating that the Tribal Court lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction.”). 
 318. Id. 
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was penal in nature.319 Accordingly, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed the 
decision of the lower court awarding the monetary penalty but affirmed 
the lower court’s recognition of the declaratory relief—that the tribe may 
remove the Johnsons’ dock and pilings from the river.320 
F. Enrollment 
Federal law gives great deference to tribal courts to determine for 
themselves who is and who is not a member. Despite this deference, 
federal courts often hear cases when a tribal member has been disenrolled 
by their tribe. Many of these cases were brought in 2017, but this Section 
will focus on the Nooksack disenrollments and the Cherokee Freedmen.321 
The right to membership in an Indian tribe cannot be entirely 
controlled by the tribe when a treaty with the United States establishes 
some criteria for membership. In Cherokee Nation v. Nash, the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia addressed the disenrollment by 
the Cherokee Nation of the “Freedmen”—members who had traced their 
ancestry back to slaves owned by Cherokee citizens and then freed by 
treaty.322 In 2007, the Cherokee voted to limit citizenship to only those 
persons who were Cherokee, Shawnee, or Delaware by blood.323 The 
Cherokee Nation argued that it was only the Cherokee Nation Constitution 
that had guaranteed citizenship to the Freedmen and that the Constitution 
could be changed in accordance with its amendment provisions.324 The 
Cherokee Freedmen brought suit alleging that their attempted 
disenrollment violated the Treaty with the Cherokee in 1866 and that their 
Cherokee citizenship is instead conferred by the Treaty, which has never 
been abrogated.325 
                                                     
 319. Id. at 22 (“The rule that the courts of no country execute the penal laws of another applies 
not only to prosecutions and sentences for crimes and misdemeanors, but to all suits in favor of the 
state for the recovery of pecuniary penalties for any violation of statutes for the protection of its 
revenue, or other municipal laws, and to all judgments for such penalties.”). 
 320. Id. (“In this case the judgment comprises two parts. The first part is a civil penalty of 
$17,400. The second part is a declaration that the Tribe has the right to remove the offending 
encroachment. The civil penalty is not enforceable under principles of comity. However, the penal law 
rule does not prevent courts from recognizing declaratory judgments of foreign courts.”). 
 321. Other interesting cases presenting issues of enrollment include a dispute among members 
of the San Pasqual Band. See Alegre v. United States, No. 17-CV-0938-AJB-KSC, 2017 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 76136 (S.D. Cal. May 18, 2017) (granting a temporary restraining order to enjoin changes to 
the Tribe’s membership ordinance); Alegre v. Jewell, No. 16-CV-2442-AJB-KSC, 2017 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 130918 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2017) (lifting that injunction); see also Collins v. Salinan Heritage 
Pres. Ass’n, No. B267301, 2017 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5325 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2017) (a 
defamation action against the Salinan Heritage Preservation Association for publically claiming the 
plaintiff was not an Indian). 
 322. Cherokee Nation v. Nash, 267 F. Supp. 3d 87 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2017). 
 323. Id. at 111. 
 324. Id. at 114. 
 325. See id. at 112. 
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The 1866 Treaty with the Cherokee contained a provision that 
discussed the enrollment of the Cherokees’ freed slaves as members of the 
Cherokee Nation.326 The court was called upon to resolve whether the 
1866 Treaty guarantees a continuing right to Cherokee Nation citizenship 
for descendants of Freedmen listed on the Final Roll of Cherokee 
Freedmen as compiled by the Dawes Commission.327 
The court reasoned that the 1866 Treaty’s guarantee of “all the rights 
of Native Cherokee” included the right of citizenship.328 It also concluded 
that the language “and are now residents therein, or who may return within 
six months, and their descendants” included the current class of Freedmen 
petitioning the court.329 Therefore, the court held that the 2007 amendment 
to the Cherokee Constitution violated the Treaty and was therefore 
unlawful.330 
The court explicitly rejected the Cherokee Nation’s argument that 
citizenship in the nation is conferred solely by the Cherokee Constitution 
and is therefore subject to amendment.331 Instead, it held that the Cherokee 
have the right to determine their own membership and to change their 
membership criteria, but any changes must accord the rights conferred to 
the Freedmen by the 1866 Treaty.332 
Unlike the definitive answer Nash provided to the Cherokee 
Freedmen, the Western District of Washington had to issue repeated 
                                                     
 326. Id. at 90 (“[T]he Cherokee Nation promised that ‘never here-after shall either slavery or 
involuntary servitude exist in their nation’ and ‘all freedmen who have been liberated by voluntary act 
of their former owners or by law, as well as all free colored persons who were in the country at the 
commencement of the rebellion, and are now residents therein, or who may return within six months, 
and their descendants, shall have all the rights of native Cherokees . . . .’”). 
 327. Id. at 89. 
 328. Id. at 123 (“The Cherokee Nation Constitution defines native Cherokees’ right to citizenship 
in the Nation. Accordingly, by virtue of Article 9 of the 1866 Treaty, qualifying freedmen have a right 
to citizenship as defined by the Cherokee Nation Constitution to the same extent that native Cherokees 
have that right. Thus, the 1866 Treaty grants qualifying freedmen the right to citizenship but the 
Cherokee Nation Constitution actually makes them citizens. The history, negotiations, and practical 
construction of the 1866 Treaty do not suggest that the parties believed otherwise.”). 
 329. Id. at 129. 
 330. Id. at 140. 
 331. Id. at 127 (“The Cherokee Nation is mistaken to treat freedmen’s right to citizenship as 
being tethered to the Cherokee Nation Constitution when, in fact, that right is tethered to the rights of 
native Cherokees. Furthermore, the freedmen’s right to citizenship does not exist solely under the 
Cherokee Nation Constitution and therefore cannot be extinguished solely by amending that 
Constitution.”). 
 332. Id. at 140 (“The Cherokee Nation’s sovereign right to determine its membership is no less 
now, as a result of this decision, than it was after the Nation executed the 1866 Treaty. The Cherokee 
Nation concedes that its power to determine tribal membership can be limited by treaty. The Cherokee 
Nation can continue to define itself as it sees fit but must do so equally and evenhandedly with respect 
to native Cherokees and the descendants of Cherokee freedmen. By interposition of Article 9 of the 
1866 Treaty, neither has rights either superior or, importantly, inferior to the other. Their fates under 
the Cherokee Nation Constitution rise and fall equally and in tandem.”) (internal citations omitted). 
2018] The Year in Indian Law 2017 853 
opinions related to the alleged disenrollment of 306 Nooksack tribal 
members. On March 24, 2016, the Nooksack Tribal Council lost a quorum 
of recognized members, and since then Interior has refused to recognize 
the Council’s actions, including the attempt to disenroll the 306 tribal 
members.333 Litigation has proceeded, raising several different causes of 
action. 
In Nooksack Indian Tribe v. Zinke, the remnant Council sued Interior, 
seeking an order to restore federal funding for tribal programs under its 
638 contracts.334 The disenrolled tribal members moved to intervene in the 
proceedings, and the court granted the intervention.335 In Nooksack Indian 
Tribe v. Zinke, the court reached the merits of the tribe’s claim, 
determining that federal courts should not interpret tribal law.336 Instead, 
courts take their signal from the federal government, and “no Nooksack 
tribal leadership group is currently federally recognized.”337 Therefore, the 
court reasoned that the acting Council lacks the ability to bring its claims 
in federal court.338 
In November 2017, the Nooksack Indian Tribe filed for 
reconsideration.339 The federal court denied the motion for 
reconsideration.340 The tribe asserted the federal court committed manifest 
error when it refused to defer to tribal law that a holdover group of the 
Tribal Council could bring suit on behalf of the tribe.341 The court rejected 
the tribe’s argument, again deferring to Interior.342 
                                                     
 333. Rabang v. Kelly, No. C17-0088-JCC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63515, at *6–7 (W.D. Wash. 
Apr. 26, 2017). 
 334. Nooksack Indian Tribe v. Zinke, 321 F.R.D. 377 (W.D. Wash. 2017). 
 335. Id. at 383 (“[T]he Court sees no reason why intervention would be inappropriate. The 
intervention will not cause undue delay and Intervenors have a very probable relation to the merits of 
the case. Moreover, the Supreme Court has indicated that American Indian tribes’ ‘participation in 
litigation critical to their welfare should not be discouraged.’”). 
 336. Nooksack Indian Tribe v. Zinke, No. C17-0219-JCC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72364 (W.D. 
Wash. May 11, 2017). 
 337. Id. at 13. 
 338. Id. at 17 (“[T]he Court concludes deference is owed to the DOI decisions and the holdover 
Council does not have authority to bring this case against the federal government in the interim period 
where the tribal leadership is considered inadequate by the DOI.”). 
 339. See Nooksack Indian Tribe v. Zinke, No. C17-0219-JCC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188398, 
at *2 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 14, 2017). 
 340. Id. at *7. 
 341. Id. at *4. 
 342. Id. at *4–6 (“[T]he Court believes that it is appropriate to defer to DOI’s refusal to recognize 
Nooksack Tribal leadership and find that the holdover Council lacked authority to bring this lawsuit 
on behalf of the Tribe. As the Court described in its prior order, there was sufficient evidence in the 
record for the Court to determine that DOI’s recognition decision was reasonable. Nothing has 
changed since the Court made its ruling that would warrant a different outcome. Therefore, the Court 
does not find that its holding represented manifest error.”). 
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In Rabang v. Kelly, the 306 tribal members that the holdover Tribal 
Council attempted to disenroll bought suit against the members of the 
council and the tribal judge that had overseen the disenrollment 
proceedings.343 The district court dismissed the tribal judge in charge of 
the disenrollment procedures on the basis of judicial immunity because 
“when a judge knows that he lacks jurisdiction, or acts in the face of 
clearly valid statutes or case law expressly depriving him of jurisdiction, 
judicial immunity is lost.”344 The evidence presented by the parties in this 
case did not definitively show that the judge knew that Interior had refused 
to recognize all actions of the Tribal Council after March 24, 2016.345 On 
May 3, 2017, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint alleging additional 
facts against the tribal judge.346 The judge filed for summary judgment, 
and the plaintiffs asked for time to complete discovery related to when the 
judge had subjective knowledge that he lacked authority to act.347 The 
court granted the plaintiffs additional time to complete discovery.348 
By October 2017, the federal district court held out hope for a 
settlement of the issues that remained between the parties. In Rabang v. 
Kelly, the federal district court took notice of an August 28, 2017 
agreement between Interior and Kelly, which recognized Kelly as 
Chairman of the Nooksack Tribal Council, and the Council as the 
governing body of the Nooksack Indian Tribe contingent upon Kelly 
organizing an election within 120 days in which all the purportedly 
disenrolled members were eligible to vote, run for tribal office, and receive 
benefits from the tribe on an equal basis with all other members.349 In light 
of that agreement, the federal court stayed the proceedings, suggesting that 
Interior’s decision to recognize the Tribal Council could be an event of 
“jurisdictional significance.”350 In December 2017, the remnant Council 
won an election that was marred with allegations of fraud.351 Chairman 
                                                     
 343. Rabang v. Kelly, No. C17-0088-JCC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66798 (W.D. Wash. May 2, 
2017). 
 344. Id. at *2. 
 345. Id. at *3. 
 346. Rabang v. Kelly, No. C17-0088-JCC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101182 (W.D. Wash. June 
29, 2017). 
 347. Id. at *2. 
 348. Id. at *3. 
 349. Rabang v. Kelly, No. C17-0088-JCC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177176, at *4–5 (W.D. Wash. 
Oct. 25, 2017). 
 350. Id. at *12–13 (“The DOI’s action will likely have substantial relevance to—or even 
control—the Court’s subsequent rulings on this litigation. Given that the pending tribal election could 
affect the Court’s continued jurisdiction over this case, a stay of proceedings could conserve both the 
Court’s and parties’ resources.”). 
 351. Nina Shapiro, Nooksack Chairmen Vows to Continue Disenrollments in Wake of Contested 
Election, SEATTLE TIMES (Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/ 
nooksack-chairman-vows-to-continue-disenrollments-in-wake-of-contested-election/. 
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Kelly vowed to reinstate the disenrollment procedures,352 which almost 
certainly means this litigation will continue into 2018. 
G. Gaming 
The Supreme Court decided in 1987 that California could not impose 
its state civil regulations on a bingo operation run by the Cabazon Band of 
Mission Indians.353 The following year Congress enacted the Indian 
Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) to create federal requirements to oversee 
tribal gaming activity.354 Since then Indian gaming has become a $30 
billion operation, providing economic development for many tribes.355 
With the potential profitability of Indian casinos, the stakes have 
increased litigation on all sides. States, local communities, and non-Indian 
property owners object to the construction of casinos; even other tribes, 
sensing competition, have attempted to use the law and the courts to limit 
casino development. There are too many cases involving gaming to 
summarize them all. I have tried to provide an overview of the important 
decisions taken by state and federal courts in 2017. 
1. IGRA 
Among the most notable cases of 2017 was a decision permitting a 
degree of state regulation into Indian gaming as long as those regulations 
were directed at off-reservation activity. In Pueblo of Pojoaque v. New 
Mexico, the Pueblo of Pojoaque sued New Mexico for failing to conduct 
gaming compact negotiations in good faith as required under IGRA.356 The 
Pueblo also alleged that New Mexico deprived it and its members from 
their right to be free from state jurisdiction over activities that occur on its 
lands when the state gaming board denied vendor licenses for businesses 
doing work with the Pueblo.357 The district court dismissed the Pueblo’s 
claims, holding that IGRA does not preempt state regulatory authority over 
non-Indian state licensee vendors.358 
The Tenth Circuit affirmed.359 It concluded that traditional 
preemption analysis is appropriate for conduct that occurs outside Indian 
country (and is thus indirect) even if it has a substantial effect on the 
                                                     
 352. Id. 
 353. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987). 
 354. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2701 (2012). 
 355. Grant Christensen et al., Tribal Court Litigation, in RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN BUSINESS 
AND CORPORATE LITIGATION 436 (2017). In 2015, tribal gaming had grown to a $29.9 billion industry 
and had posted 5% annual growth. 
 356. Pueblo of Pojoaque v. New Mexico, 863 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 2017). 
 357. Id. at 1229–30. 
 358. See id. at 1229. 
 359. Id. at 1228. 
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tribe.360 It then held that IGRA does not explicitly preempt state regulatory 
action occurring outside Indian country, only activity on Indian lands.361 
The Tenth Circuit concluded that under traditional preemption analysis, 
there must be a comprehensive federal regulatory scheme in order to 
preempt regulation, but the IGRA has no such scheme that governs the 
state regulation of vendors doing business with Indian gaming enterprises; 
it is in fact “silent” as to the regulation of licensing gaming vendors.362 
Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit reasoned, IGRA does not implicitly 
preempt state authority based on field preemption because it explicitly 
allows state regulation of licensing, regulation, and prohibition of vendors 
with conduct based outside of Indian country in the area of gaming.363 
Conflict preemption also does not apply because it is possible to comply 
with IGRA and state rules on vendor licensing.364 
Judge Bacharach issued a dissenting opinion. He argued that 
Bracker’s interest balancing approach should be applied instead of 
traditional preemption because the underlying dispute involved an Indian 
tribe.365 The dissent cited Ramah Navajo School Board, 458 U.S. 832 
(1982), to conclude that Bracker is appropriate even when the effect on 
the tribe is indirect and the activity to be regulated is outside of Indian 
country.366 The dissent would have found that IGRA preempts state 
regulation regardless of whether the effect on the Pueblo was direct or 
indirect.367 
In a related challenge, the Tenth Circuit also held that IGRA’s grant 
of power to the Secretary to issue gaming regulations when a state refused 
to negotiate a compact was an unlawful exercise of the Secretary’s powers. 
368 In New Mexico v. United State Department of Interior, the state 
                                                     
 360. Id. at 1232–35. 
 361. Id.at 1235 (“[T]he pertinent question is not from where the State is regulating, but whether 
the State is regulating Indian gaming on tribal lands. If New Mexico is regulating gaming on tribal 
land, then the Bracker balancing test applies. If not, then the traditional preemption analysis applies.”). 
 362. Id. (“Indeed, ‘[e]verything—literally everything—in IGRA affords tools (for either state or 
federal officials) to regulate gaming on Indian lands, and nowhere else.’”) (quoting Michigan v. Bay 
Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2034 (2014)). 
 363. Id. at 1236. 
 364. Id. (“But here it is not impossible to comply with both federal and state law, because there 
are no conflicting obligations for state licensees. Moreover, the licensees can continue doing business 
with the Pueblo (as no license is required), and the absence of a compact demonstrates that the State 
is without authority to take enforcement action to prohibit or penalize such transactions.”). 
 365. Id. at 1237 (“In determining whether to apply Bracker, neither the Supreme Court nor our 
court has ever drawn a rigid distinction based on the directness of the effect on a tribe. To the contrary, 
the Supreme Court’s opinions on Indian taxation establish that Bracker may be triggered even when 
the burden on the tribe is indirect.”). 
 366. Id. 
 367. Id. at 1239–40. 
 368. New Mexico v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 854 F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 2017). 
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challenged the authority of Interior to issue regulations (25 C.F.R. § 291 
et. seq.) allowing the Secretary to approve gaming operations when the 
state itself did not enter into a gaming compact with the tribe.369 The state 
argued that Interior lacks this authority where a tribe’s IGRA suit against 
the state for failing to negotiate a compact in good faith is dismissed due 
to the state’s sovereign immunity.370 In this case, the Pueblo of Pojoaque 
sued New Mexico for failure to negotiate a compact in good faith as 
permitted under IGRA, but New Mexico had that case dismissed on the 
basis of sovereign immunity.371 The Pueblo then asked Interior to 
promulgate gaming regulations as permitted by 25 C.F.R. § 291 when a 
state does not negotiate in good faith.372 Before Interior could do so, New 
Mexico challenged its authority.373 The Tenth Circuit upheld the district 
court’s holding that the case was justiciable and affirmed the state’s 
summary judgment motion blocking the Secretary from approving tribal 
gaming under Section 291 because the creation of the regulation was an 
invalid exercise of the Secretary’s power.374 
The court concluded that New Mexico had standing.375 The Tenth 
Circuit then applied Chevron deference to the powers granted to the 
Secretary.376 The Tenth Circuit held that Congress spoke directly to the 
question of when the Secretary could issue regulations to permit gaming 
without a compact, and the text of IGRA requires a finding by a federal 
court that the state has acted in bad faith.377 The Tenth Circuit reasoned 
that Section 291 was therefore an attempt by the Secretary to rewrite 
IGRA.378 It rejected Interior’s argument that when Congress wrote IGRA 
it “drew a map in which all roads lead to some kind of gaming 
procedures.”379 The Tenth Circuit instead concluded that Congress 
                                                     
 369. Id. at 1211. 
 370. See id. 
 371. Id. 
 372. Id. 
 373. Id. 
 374. Id. at 1214. 
 375. Id. at 1215–18. New Mexico has suffered both a procedural and an injury in fact: “[T]he Part 
291 regulations injure New Mexico by forcing it to choose between participating in a process it 
considers unlawful and forgoing any benefit from that allegedly unlawful process . . . .” Id. at 1218. 
 376. Id. at 1221 (“‘If Congress has spoken directly to the issue, that is the end of the matter; the 
court, as well as the agency, must give effect to Congress’s unambiguously expressed intent.’ 
However, if the statute is silent or ambiguous as to the precise question at issue, a court must determine 
whether to afford the agency’s interpretation Chevron deference. Such deference is appropriate if 
‘‘Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law’ and 
the agency’s interpretation of the statute was issued pursuant to that authority.’”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 377. Id. at 1217–18. 
 378. Id. at 1225 (“At bottom, the Secretary is attempting to rewrite IGRA.”). 
 379. Id. at 1227. 
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intended to create a system that balances the equal sovereign interests of 
states and tribes.380 
Interior argued that the decision in Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 44 
(1996), altered what might have been an unambiguous statute into an 
ambiguous one by declaring Congress’s chosen enforcement mechanism 
(a lawsuit by the tribe against the state) violated the Eleventh 
Amendment.381 However, the Tenth Circuit rejoined: “The Supreme Court 
has never held that, in crafting a partially unconstitutional regulatory 
regime, Congress has necessarily delegated to the relevant administrative 
agency the power to fundamentally revise that regime in order to work 
around an area that had been declared unconstitutional.”382 Instead, it cited 
now Justice Gorsuch (then a member of the Tenth Circuit): “[W]hen the 
political branches disagree with a judicial interpretation of existing law, 
the Constitution prescribes the appropriate remedial process. It’s called 
legislation.”383 
In Massachusetts v. Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head (Aquinnah), the 
tribe moved to establish gaming pursuant to IGRA on lands gained subject 
to a 1987 settlement that made the land subject to the laws of the 
commonwealth.384 The settlement specifically contemplated bingo or any 
other game of chance and took effect six months after Cabazon but before 
the enactment of IGRA.385 The district court concluded that the tribe failed 
to exercise sufficient “government power” over the lands and that even if 
it had such power, IGRA did not impliedly repeal the settlement 
agreement’s grant of commonwealth authority over gaming on the tribal 
lands.386 
The First Circuit reversed.387 It recognized that IGRA requires the 
tribe to have jurisdiction over the land in order for IGRA to apply but 
concluded the settlement agreement recognized that jurisdiction.388 The 
court explained that those government powers utilized by the tribe include: 
a housing program that coordinates with the HUD, an intergovernmental 
                                                     
 380. Id. at 1227–28 (“Equal bargaining cannot be had, however, where the parties know that, 
absent an agreement, one side will nevertheless obtain its fundamental goals; yet, this is precisely the 
situation that the Part 291 regulations prescribe, where ultimately the tribe will secure gaming 
procedures.”). 
 381. Id. at 1212–13. 
 382. Id. at 1230. 
 383. Id. (citing Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1151 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring)). 
 384. Massachusetts v. Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head (Aquinnah), 853 F.3d 618 (1st Cir. 2017). 
 385. Id. at 622. 
 386. Id. at 623. 
 387. Id. at 621. 
 388. Id. at 624–25 (“Although the Federal Act does contain some language limiting the Tribe’s 
jurisdiction that language only confirms that the Tribe retains the jurisdiction it has not surrendered in 
the Federal Act.”). 
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agreement with EPA, a health clinic with assistance from IHS, an 
education and scholarship program financed by the BIA, a child welfare 
program, a tribal court, etc.389 The First Circuit made clear that IGRA does 
not require that the tribe exercise complete governmental power in order 
to engage in gaming.390 The First Circuit then went on to hold that IGRA 
effected a partial repeal of the Settlement Act.391 It reasoned that the 
Settlement Agreement had no language that contemplated that it could not 
be modified by future federal laws and that IGRA’s enactment in 1988 
removed the control of the commonwealth over class II games like bingo, 
pull-tabs, and non-banking card games like poker.392 The case was 
remanded so a judgment could be entered in the tribe’s favor.393 In a 
related case, the Eastern District of California held that when land is held 
in trust, the tribe has sufficient “jurisdiction” over it to operate casino 
gaming for the purposes of IGRA.394 
In other IGRA related cases, the federal courts: (1) permitted a claim 
against California to proceed on the basis that the state violated the terms 
of its gaming compact by misusing funds paid to the Special Distribution 
Fund;395 (2) held that a legal opinion by the Acting General Counsel of the 
National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC) is not a final “agency 
action” subject to judicial review;396 and (3) held that IGRA requires that 
management contracts between a tribe and a private company to operate a 
casino be approved by the NIGC Commissioner and that failure to receive 
approval makes the contract unenforceable.397 
2. Other Gaming Opinions 
Not all gaming litigation was necessarily focused on the 
requirements of IGRA. In Outsource Services Management v. Nooksack 
                                                     
 389. Id. at 625–26. 
 390. Id. at 626 (“Pursuant to IGRA, ‘the operation of gaming by Indian tribes [is] a means of 
promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments.’ The Town 
now seeks to put this logic on its head by requiring the Tribe’s government to be fully developed 
before it can have the benefit of gaming revenue. This is not what IGRA requires, nor is it our case 
law.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 391. Id. at 629. 
 392. Id. at 627–29. 
 393. Id. at 629. 
 394. Club One Casino v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, No. 1:16-cv-01908-AWI-EPG, 2017 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 196312 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2017). 
 395. Pauma Band of Luiseno Mission Indians of the Pauma & Yuima Reservation v. California, 
No. 16-cv-01713-BAS-JMA, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47122 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2017). 
 396. Kansas ex rel. Schmidt v. Zinke, 861 F.3d 1024 (10th Cir. 2017). 
 397. Sharp Image Gaming, Inc. v. Shingle Springs Band of Miwok Indians, 223 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
362 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017). A similar claim brought in federal court was dismissed for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction. See Osceola Blackwood Ivory Gaming Grp. v. Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi 
Indians, No. 1:17-cv-00394-DAD-BAM, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118065 (E.D. Cal. July 27, 2017). 
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Business Corporation, NBC, a tribal business owned by the Nooksack 
Indian Tribe, defaulted on a $15 million loan that was secured to build a 
casino on trust land.398 The casino closed before the loan could be fully 
repaid.399 Outsource Services Management sought compensation from the 
profits generated from the use of the facility itself, despite the casino 
closure, because the loan gave Outsource a claim to revenues generated 
from the casino complex’s facilities—not merely its profits from 
gaming.400 The tribe argued that claiming revenue from non-casino 
activity that occurred on the land was equivalent to a claim on the land 
itself, which, because the land is held in trust, is prohibited under the 
law.401 The trial court disagreed.402 The appellate court affirmed, reasoning 
that the pledged security is not the land itself but income generated from 
activities on the land.403 
Other gaming opinions in 2017 saw the Ninth Circuit hold that the 
“doctrine of prevention” makes it a violation of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing for a party to a contract to interfere with a 
condition precedent to the agreement, and that the lobbying of the BIA and 
a governor by city officials to deny gaming after the city signed a contract 
with a tribe for potential casino development violated that doctrine.404 
Federal courts also: (1) determined that they could not interpret the 
Muscogee Creek Nation’s tribal law prohibiting gaming on an allotment 
held by a member of the Kialegee Tribal Town but located on the 
Muscogee Reservation;405 (2) upheld a contract between tribes for the 
provision of casino management services;406 (3) refused to seal the entire 
                                                     
 398. Outsource Servs. Mgmt., LLC v. Nooksack Bus. Corp., No. 74764-9-I, 2017 Wash. App. 
LEXIS 790 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2017). 
 399. Id. at *4–5. 
 400. Id. at *2–4. 
 401. Id. at *6. Any contract that encumbers the land must be approved by the Secretary of Interior 
under 25 U.S.C. § 81. 
 402. Id. at *4–5 (“NBC and the Tribe may choose to use the Facilities in a manner that generates 
no income; the agreements give them that opinion. If the Facilities are used in a manner that generates 
income, however, that income is a Pledged Revenue subject to collection.”). 
 403. Id. at *10 (“The pledged security is not a legal interest in the land itself. Nor does OSM’s 
right interfere with the tribe’s exclusive proprietary control over the land. . . . OSM has limited 
recourse financing and retains a right to income from the facilities, but not the right to the land or to 
control operation of the facilities. Because the tribe retains complete control over the casino building 
and property and can use the facilities for any purpose, there is no encumbrance for purposes of Section 
81, and thus the agreements did not require preapproval.”). 
 404. See Guidiville Rancheria of Cal. v. United States, 704 F. App’x 655 (9th Cir. Aug. 4, 2017). 
 405. Kialegee Tribal Town v. Dellinger, No. 17-CV-0478-CVE-FHM, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
138417 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 29, 2017). 
 406. Yavapai-Apache Nation v. La Posta Band of Diegueno Mission Indians, No. D069556, 
2017 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4430 (Cal. Ct. App. June 28, 2017). 
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record of litigation involving a failed gaming compact407 but permitted a 
limited redaction;408 (4) refused to amend the appellate record to include 
documents not considered by the agency on a challenge to a decision to 
disapprove amendments to a gaming compact;409 and (5) determined a 
claim by one tribe alleging that another tribe’s gaming facility was in 
violation of its gaming compact was subject to a six-year statute of 
limitations.410 
3. Non-Indian v. Indian Gaming 
Finally, there was one notable case out of the Second Circuit where 
non-Indian gaming interests claimed that state rules discriminated against 
them by preferring Indian gaming. In MGM Resorts International Global 
Gaming Development LLC. v. Malloy, plaintiff MGM filed suit against 
Connecticut, alleging that Special Act 15-7 places it at a competitive 
disadvantage in the state’s gaming industry.411 Special Act 15-7 permits 
Connecticut’s two federally recognized tribes (the Mashantucket Pequot 
and the Mohegans) to jointly form a Tribal Business Entity in order to 
negotiate with state municipalities about the prospect of building 
commercial casinos on non-Indian-owned land.412 MGM attempted to 
register as a Tribal Business Entity but was rejected because it was not 
affiliated with either, let alone both, of the tribes as required by the Special 
Act.413 The Special Act does not mention non-Indian entities, the 
significance of which was disputed by the parties.414 The district court 
dismissed MGM’s complaint because it lacked Article III standing.415 The 
court held that MGM presented no plans to open or compete for a 
commercial casino on non-Indian land in Connecticut and so it lacked 
standing to bring the claim.416 
                                                     
 407. Williams & Cochrane LLP v. Quechan Tribe of the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation, No. 
3:17-cv-1436-GPC-MDD, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132731 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2017). 
 408. Williams & Cochrane LLP v. Quechan Tribe of the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation, No. 
3:17-cv-1436-GPC-MDD, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184512 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2017). 
 409. Forest Cty. Potawatomi Cmty. v. United States, No. 15-105 (CKK), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
147778 (D.D.C. Sept. 12, 2017). 
 410. Stockbridge-Munsee Cmty. v. Wisconsin, No. 17-cv-249-jdp, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
176596 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 25, 2017). 
 411. MGM Resorts Int’l Global Gaming Dev., LLC. v. Malloy, 861 F.3d 40 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 412. Id. at 43. 
 413. Id. at 43–44. 
 414. Id. at 43 (“MGM interprets the statutory language to mean that only the Tribes are 
authorized to establish commercial casinos in Connecticut at all. . . . The state argues that nothing in 
the Act prevents other developers from soliciting municipalities for contracts, and that it imposes a 
unique burden on the Tribes by requiring them to partner with each other. . . .”). 
 415. Id. at 44. 
 416. Id. 
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The Second Circuit agreed.417 It held that “Connecticut has provided 
municipalities with a general authority to enter into contracts under a 
separate statute” and so MGM can negotiate for commercial casinos under 
that provision.418 MGM replied that even if it negotiated an agreement with 
a municipality, Connecticut would hold such a contract void for illegality 
as gambling is generally prohibited.419 The Second Circuit recognized that 
concern but determined that MGM was free to enter into these contracts 
with municipalities, which is all Special Act 15-7 permits tribes to do; the 
Special Act still makes all casino operations subject to the agreement of 
the Connecticut General Assembly.420 
Alternatively, MGM argued that Special Act 15-7 discriminates 
against it by giving the Tribal Business Entity the exclusive right to 
publish its casino proposal on the Department of Consumer Protection’s 
website.421 The Second Circuit agreed that this contention alleges an injury 
in fact.422 However the Second Circuit held that because such an injury is 
not “imminent” or “certainly impending,” MGM still lacks standing to 
challenge the Connecticut law.423  
H. Housing 
There were two important cases from federal circuit courts in 2017 
regarding the Native American Housing Assistance and Self-
Determination Act (NAHASDA). In Modoc Lassen Indian Housing 
Authority v. United States Department of Housing & Urban Development, 
a group of tribes brought suit against the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD).424 HUD distributes funds under NAHASDA 
based on tribes reporting their public housing units.425 The program is 
                                                     
 417. Id. at 43. 
 418. Id. at 46. 
 419. Id. 
 420. Id. 
 421. Id. 
 422. Id. (“MGM’s complaint plausibly alleges that the RFP requirement reallocates state 
resources—specifically, space on the website of a state agency—in a discriminatory manner, and that 
the Act generally encourages municipalities to favor the Tribes’ projects over others. If MGM’s 
assertions are correct, this places it at a disadvantage in attracting negotiating partners for future 
development sufficient to trigger protection under the Equal Protection Clause and the dormant 
Commerce Clause.”). 
 423. Id. at 47 (“Here, MGM has pleaded only that it is ‘interested’ in exploring development 
opportunities in Connecticut, and that it has made initial studies of the viability of a casino in the state. 
It has not alleged any concrete plans to enter into a development agreement with a Connecticut 
municipality, or demonstrated any serious attempts at negotiation.”). 
 424. Modoc Lassen Indian Hous. Auth. v. U.S. Hous. & Urban Dev., 864 F.3d 1212 (10th Cir. 
2017). 
 425. Id. at 1216–17 (“Critically, HUD relies on each tribe to provide an accurate yearly count of 
its eligible housing units.”). 
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zero-sum, so if a tribe overstates its units, it necessarily reduces the amount 
available to other tribes.426 HUD identified a group of tribes who had 
misstated their public housing units and therefore had been overpaid under 
the funding model.427 It subsequently reduced future payments to them 
under NAHASDA in order to essentially claw back the difference.428 The 
tribes sued, arguing the money should not have been withheld without a 
hearing.429 The district court held that hearings were required and HUD 
appealed.430 
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed.431 It first held that hearings 
were not required because HUD did not recapture the funds that were 
overpaid pursuant to a review or audit covered by 25 U.S.C. § 4165, and 
so no hearing was required to recover the overpayments from the tribes.432 
In doing so, the Tenth Circuit created a circuit split with the Ninth Circuit 
and the Federal Court of Claims, which have both come to the opposite 
conclusion.433 
Having identified that hearings were not required, the three judge 
panel of the Tenth Circuit fractured on the remaining issue. Judge Moritz 
and Judge Matheson434 concluded that HUD’s reclaiming of overpaid 
funds was unlawful.435 However, Judge Bacharach436 joined Judge Moritz, 
                                                     
 426. Id. 
 427. Id. 
 428. Id. (“These consolidated appeals arise from a government agency’s decision to recapture, 
via administrative offset, funds that the agency allegedly overpaid to multiple grant recipients.”). 
 429. Id. at 1217. 
 430. Id. 
 431. Id. at 1216. 
 432. Id. at 1218–20 (“[W]e agree with HUD that the applicable statutes unambiguously establish 
that the terms ‘eligible activities’ and ‘certifications’ don’t encompass a tribe’s report on its eligible 
housing units.”). 
 433. Id. (“Accordingly, we part ways with both the Ninth Circuit and the Court of Federal Claims 
to the extent those courts have held that when HUD reviews a tribe’s report of its eligible housing 
stock, that review falls within the scope of HUD’s authority to review or audit a tribe’s activities and 
certifications.”). 
 434. Judge Matheson, concurring in part and dissenting in part, would have granted the tribes 
the requested relief. He concluded that the tribes are seeking a statutory right—the return of monies 
wrongfully taken—to which the federal government’s sovereign immunity defense does not apply. Id. 
at 1231 (“The Tribes do not allege the government destroyed or damaged their housing units or that 
other harms arose from the government’s recapture of grant funds or failure to pay in a timely fashion. 
The Tribes seek only the grant funds themselves—the very thing to which they are entitled. . . . the 
Tribes have sued as statutory beneficiaries to enforce a mandate for the payment of money by the 
federal government. This is not a suit for damages, § 702’s waiver applies, and sovereign immunity 
poses no bar.”). 
 435. Id. at 1224–25 (“[B]ecause HUD hasn’t advanced on appeal any alternative basis for its 
authority to recapture the funds via administrative offset, we therefore affirm the district court’s ruling 
that HUD acted illegally by recapturing the alleged overpayments.”). 
 436. Judge Bacharach, concurring in part and dissenting in part, would have concluded that HUD 
has the right to recoup the funds from the tribes. But with two votes holding that HUD does not have 
that right, he joined with Judge Moritz to conclude that HUD can claim sovereign immunity to claims 
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dismissing the claims by the tribe for a return of those funds on the basis 
of HUD’s sovereign immunity—no repayment of funds was required.437 
A second case decided by the Federal Circuit raised a similar issue. 
In Lummi Tribe of the Lummi Reservation v. United States, the United 
States sought review of a decision of the Court of Federal Claims that held 
that violations of NAHASDA were money-mandating.438 HUD admitted 
that it had miscalculated payments under NAHASDA to plaintiff tribes 
(including Lummi, Fort Berthold, and Hopi) and recouped the 
overpayment by withholding future funds from the tribes.439 The tribes 
sued under the Tucker Act and the Indian Tucker Act, arguing that 
recoupment was unlawful because it denied them funds to which they were 
currently entitled.440 The United States moved to dismiss, but the Court of 
Federal Claims denied the motion, holding that NAHASDA was money-
mandating and that the Secretary was bound to pay to a qualifying tribe 
the amount to which it was statutorily entitled under the formula each 
year.441 The United States sought interlocutory review.442 
The Federal Circuit reversed and ordered that the tribe’s claim be 
dismissed.443 It reasoned that to come under the waiver of sovereign 
immunity provided by the Tucker Act requires a party asserting a claim 
against the United States to identify a separate source of substantive law 
that creates a right to money damages.444 The Federal Circuit reversed the 
decision of the Court of Federal Claims that NAHASDA is money-
mandating.445 The court reasoned that the money won under a successful 
                                                     
for a return of the funds by the tribes. Id. at 1238–39 (“Congress implicitly delegated this common-
law authority to HUD, authorizing it to recoup overpayments through offset. Indeed, in the absence of 
such a delegation, Congress would have left a gaping hole in NAHASDA by requiring HUD to allocate 
funds from a finite sum without any power to correct errors, leaving some tribes with too much and 
other tribes with too little.”). 
 437. Id. at 1225–29 (“But this victory for the Tribes is largely a hollow one. That’s because HUD 
enjoys sovereign immunity from claims for money damages.”). 
 438. Lummi Tribe of the Lummi Reservation v. United States, 870 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 439. Id. at 1315–16. 
 440. Id. at 1316. 
 441. Id. at 1316–17. 
 442. Id. at 1317. 
 443. Id. at 1315. 
 444. Id. at 1317 (“The Tucker Act itself does not create a substantive cause of action; in order to 
come within the jurisdictional reach and the waiver of sovereign immunity in the Tucker Act, a 
plaintiff must identify a separate source of substantive law that creates the right to money damages.”). 
 445. Id. at 1318 (“Under NAHASDA, the Tribes are not entitled to an actual payment of money 
damages, in the strictest terms; their only alleged harm is having been allocated too little in grant 
funding. Thus, at best, the Tribes seek a nominally greater strings-attached disbursement. But any 
monies so disbursed could still be later reduced or clawed back. And any property acquired with said 
monies would be ‘held in trust’ by the Tribes, ‘as trustee for the beneficiaries’ of NAHASDA. . . . To 
label the disbursement of funds so thoroughly scrutinized and cabined as a remedy for ‘damages’ 
would strain the meaning of the term to its breaking point.”). 
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NAHASDA claim was not so much “damages” as it was a larger share of 
future appropriated monies, which was essentially equitable relief.446 The 
Federal Circuit ordered the Claims Court to dismiss the tribe’s claim for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.447 
I. Hunting & Fishing 
Many of the cases involving hunting and fishing rights are related to 
treaty rights, with a majority of these cases decided in 2017 originating in 
the Pacific Northwest.448 There was one particularly interesting case 
involving the interpretation of the right to fish that warrants further 
discussion. In Makah Indian Tribe v. Quileute Indian Tribe, the Quileute 
and Quinault tribes argued that the 1855 Treaty of Olympia’s “right of 
taking fish” applies to the taking of whales and seals, which the Makah 
Tribe claimed are demonstrably mammals and not fish.449 After a twenty-
three-day trial, the court held that in 1855, the Quileute and Quinault 
understood the “right of taking fish” to include the right to whale and 
seal.450 The Makah Tribe and the State of Washington appealed.451 The 
Ninth Circuit affirmed.452 
The Ninth Circuit applied the Indian canons of construction: “As a 
general rule, treaties ‘are to be construed, so far as possible, in the sense 
in which the Indians understood them,’ and ‘ambiguous provisions [should 
be] interpreted to their benefit.’”453 The court looked at the meaning of the 
word “fish” from the 1800s when the treaties were negotiated and 
concluded that there was ambiguity.454 The Ninth Circuit recognized that 
                                                     
 446. Id. at 1319 (“It is for larger strings-attached NAHASDA grants—including subsequent 
supervision and adjustment—and, hence, for equitable relief.”). 
 447. Id. at 1320. 
 448. Many of these cases deal with the interpretation of usual and accustomed rights under a 
series of treaties signed with tribes in Washington State. Most of these opinions are generally 
unremarkable and require no detailed discussion in this annual review. See generally United States v. 
Lummi Nation, 876 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2017); Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 
871 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 2017); United States v. Washington, No. C70-9213, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
140882 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 30, 2017); Skokomish v. Forsman, No. C16-5639 RBL, 2017 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 42730 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 23, 2017); State v. Snyder, No. 73893-3-I, 2017 Wash. App. LEXIS 
779 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2017). 
 449. Makah Indian Tribe v. Quileute Indian Tribe, 873 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 450. Id. 
 451. See id. 
 452. Id. (“The court’s extensive factual findings supported its ultimate conclusion that ‘fish’ as 
used in the Treaty of Olympia encompasses sea mammals and that evidence of customary harvest of 
whales and seals at and before treaty time may be the basis for the determination of a tribe’s [usual 
and accustomed fishing grounds].”). 
 453. Id. at 1163. 
 454. Id. at 1162 (“At the time of signing, ‘fish’ had multiple connotations of varying breadth. 
For example, Webster’s Dictionary simultaneously defined ‘fish’ broadly as ‘[a]n animal that lives in 
water’ (which would include whales and probably seals) and narrowly as a ‘name for a class of animals 
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whales and seals were harvested by the tribes in their usual and 
accustomed fishing grounds encompassed by the treaty, and so the Indians 
may have understood the term “fish” to include whales and seals.455 
However, the appellate court concluded that the boundary rights assigned 
by the district court to hunt whales and seals were too large and remanded 
with instructions for the district court to fashion alternative boundaries that 
are more closely related to the tribes’ historical fishing range.456 
J. Indian Civil Rights Act 
The Constitution does not restrict the activities of tribal courts and 
tribal governments as, unlike states, tribes have never agreed to be bound 
by the document.457 In order to ensure that tribal governments protect the 
rights of individuals Congress has enacted the Indian Civil Rights Act 
which applies many of the rights conferred by the Constitution to 
individuals in Indian country.458 However, the only remedy Congress 
provided for individuals who have had their rights violated is a habeas 
corpus petition.459 The year 2017 saw more than a dozen cases involving 
ICRA, but one in particular deserves discussion because it arguably creates 
a circuit split between the Ninth and Second Circuits.460 
                                                     
subsisting in water’ that ‘breathe by means of gills, swim by the aid of fins, and are oviparous’ (which 
would exclude whales and seals). Webster’s American Dictionary of the English Language (1828).”). 
 455. Id. at 1165 (“As Professor Hoard explained, the Quileute would likely have used ‘?aàlita?,’ 
which translates as ‘fish, food, salmon.’ Similarly, the Quinault’s term ‘Kémken’ is defined 
alternatively as ‘salmon,’ ‘fish,’ and ‘food.’ Because the Quileute and Quinault traditionally harvested 
whales and seals for food at and before treaty time, these pieces of linguistic evidence strongly support 
the district court’s finding that the tribes ‘would have understood that the treaty reserved to them the 
right to take aquatic animals, including . . . sea mammals, as they had customarily done.’”). 
 456. Id. at 1167–70. The court includes some maps in its opinion to make the boundary issue 
very clear. 
 457. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978) (“As separate sovereigns pre-
existing the Constitution, tribes have historically been regarded as unconstrained by those 
constitutional provisions framed specifically as limitations on federal or state authority. Thus, in 
Talton v. Mayes, this Court held that the Fifth Amendment did not ‘[operate] upon’ ‘the powers of 
local self-government enjoyed’ by the tribes.”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting 
Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896)). 
 458. The Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1341 (2012). For a discussion of the rights 
conferred by the ICRA, see Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Indian Courts and Fundamental Fairness: Indian 
Courts and the Future Revisited, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 59, 94 (2013) (“ICRA, merely a federal statute, 
does not carry the same weight as the United States Constitution and, therefore, provides insufficient 
protection for nonmembers in tribal court.”). 
 459. 25 U.S.C § 1303. For a Supreme Court ruling clarifying that the ICRA may provide rights 
that individuals may not be able exercise through suit in federal courts, see Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 
U.S. 49 (holding that Ms. Martinez cannot challenge her tribe’s denial of the enrollment of her children 
in the tribe because the only remedy provided by ICRA is habeas). 
 460. See Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 905 (2d Cir. 1996). The 
Second Circuit has previously held that permanent banishment from the reservation was sufficient 
confinement so as to constitute detention for purposes of the ICRA. 
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In Tavares v. Whitehouse, the United Auburn Indian Community 
disciplined a group of its members who it claimed had “slandered and 
defamed” the tribe by withholding their per capita distributions and 
member privileges, and by temporarily banning them from tribal lands.461 
The members filed a petition for habeas corpus under the Indian Civil 
Rights Act, arguing that their banishment from the reservation for up to 
ten years was a form of detention.462 The district court held that the 
petitioners’ punishment was not a “detention” and so it lacked 
jurisdiction.463 A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed.464 
The majority held that the loss of financial benefits did not constitute 
a detention.465 It further held that temporary banishment was not a 
“detention” as that term is used in the Act.466 The majority recognized that 
“petitioners raise free speech and due process claims that implicate the 
substantive protections Congress saw fit to grant Indians with respect to 
their tribes through the ICRA”467 but concluded that a temporary exclusion 
is not a “detention,” and so the petitioner’s only redress was an appeal to 
the tribe itself.468 
The dissent would not have distinguished as clearly between the 
terms “detention” and “custody” and would have held that being banished 
from the tribal lands for ten years was significant enough to constitute a 
sufficiently severe restraint on petitioners’ liberty to exercise habeas 
jurisdiction.469 
Other 2017 ICRA cases held that: (1) the imposition of a $2,355 fine 
is not a form of physical confinement that triggers habeas;470 (2) a 
conviction obtained without informing the defendant of his right to 
                                                     
 461. Tavares v. Whitehouse, 851 F.3d 863, 867–68 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 462. Id. at 869. 
 463. Id. 
 464. Id. at 878. 
 465. Id. at 870 (“[T]he loss of quarterly distributions paid to all tribal members is ‘insufficient 
to bring plaintiffs within ICRA’s habeas provision. . . .’”). 
 466. Id. at 871 (“[W]e think Congress’s use of ‘detention’ instead of ‘custody’ when it created 
habeas jurisdiction over tribal actions is significant. . . . At the time Congress enacted 
the ICRA . . . ‘detention’ was commonly defined to require physical confinement.”). 
 467. Id. at 878. 
 468. Id. at 877–78 (“A temporary exclusion is not tantamount to a detention. And recognizing 
the temporary exclusion orders at issue here as beyond the scope of ‘detention’ under the ICRA 
bolsters tribes’ sovereign authority to determine the makeup of their communities and best preserves 
the rule that federal courts should not entangle themselves in such disputes.”). 
 469. Id. at 880–89 (“Banishment is a uniquely severe punishment. It does ‘more than merely 
restrict one’s freedom to go or remain where others have the right to be: it often works a destruction 
of one’s social, cultural, and political existence.’ Tavares’s ten-year banishment is not ‘a modest fine 
or a short suspension of a privilege . . . but [rather] the coerced and peremptory deprivation of [her] 
membership in the tribe and [her] social and cultural affiliation.’”) (internal citations omitted). 
 470. Scudero v. Moran, 230 F. Supp. 3d 980 (D. Alaska 2017). 
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counsel at his own expense or a jury trial violates ICRA;471 (3) the proper 
venue to bring an ICRA challenge is where the petitioner is currently 
incarcerated and not where he was convicted;472 (4) ICRA requires the 
exhaustion of tribal remedies473 but does not require an appeal to the tribal 
governor;474 (5) ICRA requires suit against both the warden who can 
physically release the petitioner but also some member of tribal 
government to ensure that the petitioner does not get prosecuted again 
upon return to the reservation;475 (6) ICRA applies to convictions from 
tribal court but does not apply when the defendant is incarcerated under 
orders of the federal government; 476 (7) ICRA no longer applies after the 
petitioner has been released from tribal custody;477 and (8) being fined for 
trespass on tribal land is not the kind of confinement to which ICRA’s 
habeas relief is designed to apply.478 
K. Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) 
Cases involving ICWA were by far the largest number of Indian law 
cases decided in 2017, constituting more than a third of the total at 252 out 
of 646.479 It is important to note that while ICWA is a federal law, many 
states have adopted their own state versions which may have even stronger 
protections or procedures for cases involving Indian children. California, 
Michigan, and Minnesota stand out particularly in this regard.480 It is also 
important to note that there are thousands of decisions by trial courts 
                                                     
 471. Fragua v. Casamento, No. CV 16-1404 RB/WPL, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69534 (D.N.M. 
May 8, 2017). 
 472. Cheykaychi v. Geisen, No. 17-CV-00514-KG-GBW, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70426 
(D.N.M. May 9, 2017). 
 473. Darnell v. Merchant, No. 17-03063-EFM-TJJ, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195793 (D. Kan. 
Nov. 29, 2017). 
 474. Toya v. Toledo, CIV 17-0258 JCH/KBM, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160173 (D.N.M. Sept. 9, 
2017). 
 475. See Talk v. S. UTE Det. Ctr., No. 1:17-cv-00669 WJ/KK, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129915 
(D.N.M. Aug. 15, 2017); Garcia v. Elwell, No. CV 17-00333 WJ/GJF, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80303 
(D.N.M. May 25, 2017); Toya v. Casamento, No. CV 17-00258 JCH/KBM, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
80091 (D.N.M. May 25, 2017). 
 476. Adams v. Elwell, No. CV 17-00285 RB/SCY, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99806 (D.N.M. June 
27, 2017). 
 477. United States v. Smith, Nos. CV 16-08160-PCT-GMS (ESW), CR 13-08043-PCT-GMS, 
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131560 (D. Ariz. Aug. 15, 2017). 
 478. Napoles v. Rodger, No. 1:16-cv-01933-DAD-JLT, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106382 (E.D. 
Cal. July 7, 2017). 
 479. See infra Part I. 
 480. For a discussion of state acts that implement the federal Indian Child Welfare Act and may 
provide even greater protections to Indian children, see Caroline M. Turner, Implementing and 
Defending the Indian Child Welfare Act Through Revised State Requirements, 49 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. 
PROBS. 501 (2016). 
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involving Indian children that never result in a written opinion and are not 
captured through a Lexis search. 
This Section could not possibly attempt to cite to every ICWA case 
from 2017. Moreover, a majority of the published ICWA cases raise just 
one of two issues: (1) violations of a duty to inquire into a child’s status as 
an Indian or (2) failure to provide notice to one or more Indian tribes. 
Anyone wishing for a complete list of the 2017 ICWA cases is welcome 
to contact the author, but for the sake of brevity, only a handful of cases 
that raise relatively unique issues under ICWA will be discussed here. 
1. Constitutionality of ICWA 
There were a couple challenges to the constitutionality of ICWA in 
2017. In A.D. v. Washburn, the plaintiffs, a group of parents who 
intentionally left Indian country to try to avail themselves of state law, 
challenged the constitutionality of ICWA.481 They alleged that because 
ICWA applies only to Indian children it discriminates on the basis of race 
in violation of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, and that 
Congress lacks the power to regulate state court proceedings relating to 
parental rights and the custody of children in accordance with the 
Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment.482 The court dismissed the 
claims for lack of standing because none of the plaintiffs could show that 
the application of ICWA would have resulted in a different outcome or 
delayed their personal adoption proceedings.483 
In Doe v. Piper, parents, members of different federally recognized 
tribes, wanted to complete a voluntary adoption by selecting a non-Indian 
couple as the adoptive parents for their Indian child. 484 The parents 
challenged the constitutionality of ICWA and the Minnesota Indian 
Family Preservation Act (MIFPA).485 Importantly, MIFPA applies to both 
voluntary and involuntary adoptions, requires notice be given to the tribe, 
and gives the tribe the right to intervene.486 In this instance the tribes 
agreed not to intervene, and the voluntary adoption was completed. The 
federal district judge then dismissed the case as moot.487 
                                                     
 481. A.D. v. Washburn, No. CV-15-01259-PHX-NVW, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38060 (D. Ariz. 
Mar. 16, 2017). 
 482. Id. at *10–11. 
 483. Id. at *32. 
 484. Doe v. Piper, No. 15-2639 (JRT/DTS), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124308 (D. Minn. Aug. 4, 
2017). 
 485. Id. at *2–4. 
 486. Id. at *3. 
 487. Id. at *13–14 (“This case presents significant constitutional questions, including whether 
MIFPA’s extension of the tribal notice requirement and intervention right to voluntary adoption 
proceedings implicates the biological parents’ fundamental right to care, custody, and control of their 
children; whether those portions of MIFPA are entitled to rational-basis review because they are 
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2. Jurisdiction § 1911 
Section 1911(a) of ICWA requires that if a child is domiciled on the 
reservation, then the tribal court has exclusive jurisdiction over the 
child.488 Section 1911(b) allows a tribe to request that a state proceeding 
involving one of its members be transferred to the tribal court and that a 
transfer should be allowed absent “good cause” or objection by the child’s 
parents.489 Section 1911(c) allows a tribe to participate in state court 
proceedings involving one of their members or children eligible for 
enrollment.490 Each of these provisions was contested in 2017. 
Section 1911(a): In In re X.C., the court held that when the mother 
moved to the reservation after her children were born, and the children 
remained in California, the children were not domiciled on the 
reservation.491 In State v. State, the Utah appellate court determined that 
the children were domiciled in Utah when proceedings began and that the 
mother was a member of the Timpanogos Tribe, which is not federally 
recognized.492 The fact that the children were later moved to a federally 
recognized tribe’s reservation did not give tribal courts exclusive 
jurisdiction over the children.493 
Section 1911(b): In V.S.O. v. C.G. (In re People), the South Dakota 
Supreme Court held that just because the state proceedings had lasted for 
more than one year, the length of the proceeding was an insufficient reason 
to deny transfer to the tribal court.494 Instead, the lower court needed to 
consider all the facts and make a determination on a case-by-case basis 
before determining whether there was good cause not to transfer the case 
after a request for transfer was properly made.495 In In re Dependency of 
                                                     
authorized by federal law or further a federal policy benefitting Indians; and whether the statute could 
survive strict scrutiny, if applicable, under either theory. Presented in the proper context, these 
questions merit careful consideration. But the Court cannot reach them due to jurisdictional 
constraints. Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion and dismiss the Does’ action as 
moot.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 488. Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (2012). 
 489. Id. § 1911(b). 
 490. Id. § 1911(c). 
 491. In re X.C., No. B272461, 2017 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 8881, at *21–23 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Dec. 29, 2017) (“As respondents point out, none of the cases Mother cites holds that a child’s domicile 
is with a parent who was recently granted primary physical custody but with whom the child is not yet 
cohabitating, as opposed to the parent with whom the child has lived his entire life.”). 
 492. State v. State, 2017 UT App. 237, ¶ 6 (Utah Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2017). 
 493. Id. ¶¶ 18–21. 
 494. V.S.O. v. C.G. (In re People), 2017 SD 30, 896 N.W.2d 652 (Dakota 2017). 
 495. Id. at 655 (“[I]n determining whether the motions to transfer were timely, the court was 
required to consider all the particular circumstances of this case, not simply the amount of time that 
had passed since the proceedings first began. . . . Without knowing the Tribe’s and Mother’s reasons 
for waiting to seek transfer, the circuit court necessarily did not consider all the circumstances of this 
case.”). 
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B.M.A., a mother abandoned her four children at the local Indian Child 
Welfare office but then subsequently objected when the father requested 
the case be transferred to tribal court.496 The father appealed the court’s 
refusal to transfer, but the Washington appellate court held that under 
ICWA state courts cannot transfer to tribal courts over the objection of a 
parent and that the mother remained a parent even if she had left her 
children.497 In Gila River Indian Community v. Department of Child 
Safety, the Arizona Supreme Court held that since pre-adoptive and 
adoptive placements after parental rights have been terminated are not 
included under § 1911(b), a transfer to tribal court is not required.498 In 
San Bernardino County Children & Family Services v. M.S. (In re G.S.), 
the father appealed the decision of the California court to transfer the 
proceedings to Picuris Pueblo in New Mexico (the mother’s tribe) without 
giving notice to the Osage Nation (the father’s tribe).499 The California 
appellate court agreed the transfer was in error but held that the court could 
not order relief because the transfer had already happened and, therefore, 
California courts had lost jurisdiction.500 
Section 1911(c): In In the Interest of J.T.T., the Texas juvenile court 
recognized that the child was a member of the Navajo Nation but denied 
the tribe’s motion to intervene in the proceedings because it was 
untimely.501 The Texas appellate court reversed, holding that the plain 
language of § 1911(c) allows the tribe to participate even if the tribe moves 
to intervene at the final hearing.502 The appellate court also concluded that 
while Texas law requires a written request to intervene, ICWA does not 
require the request be in writing and ICWA preempts Texas state law.503 
                                                     
 496. In re Dependency of B.M.A., No. 75404-1-I, 2017 Wash. App. LEXIS 1379, at *1–4 (Wash. 
Ct. App. June 12, 2017). 
 497. Id. at *28–31. 
 498. Gila River Indian Cmty. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 395 P.3d 286, 290 (Ariz. 2017) 
(“Congress’s differentiation throughout ICWA indicates its desire to place certain federal mandates 
on states for foster care placement and termination-of-parental-rights actions but not preadoptive and 
adoptive placements. The latter are not presumptively subject to transfer to tribal court under 
§ 1911(b).”). 
 499. San Bernardino Cty. Children & Family Servs. v. M.S. (In re G.S.), No. E068000, 2017 
Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 8409 (Cal Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2017). 
 500. Id. at *10 (“[T]he dependency case was dismissed by the court. Therefore, neither this court 
nor the juvenile court has any further jurisdiction. Even though we agree that the juvenile court erred 
in failing to notice any of the Indian tribes and in transferring the case to the Picuris Pueblo tribal court 
over father’s objection, if we order a reversal of the transfer order, no effective relief could be gained 
at the juvenile court level.”). 
 501. In the Interest of J.T.T., No. 08-17-00162-CV, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 11801 (Tex. App. 
Dec. 20, 2017). 
 502. Id. at *7–8 (“Courts should not infer a waiver of the right to intervene simply because the 
Indian’s child tribe does not intervene at the first opportunity.”) 
 503. Id. at *9–10 (“Intervention by the tribe insures that the child will not be removed from the 
Indian community and consequently lose touch with Indian traditions and heritage. A state procedural 
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3. Notice § 1912(a) 
Section 1912(a) requires that in an involuntary proceeding involving 
a foster care placement or the termination of parental rights, if the court 
knows or has reason to know an Indian child is involved, notice must be 
given to the child’s tribe.504 The following are a sampling of the more than 
one hundred cases that raised the issue of notice in 2017. 
In In re Breanna S., the court held that although notice was sent to 
the Yaqui tribe, and the tribe replied verifying that the child was not an 
Indian child under Yaqui law, because the notice did not include all the 
required information about Yaqui ancestors, the notice was incomplete.505 
The Department objected, arguing that even if the great-grandmother was 
a full-blooded Yaqui, the child would not be eligible for membership, 
being no more than one-eighth Yaqui by blood and therefore below the 
one-fourth threshold written into the tribal law;506 however, the court held 
that under ICWA it is up to the tribe to decide for itself the application of 
its laws related to membership eligibility.507 
Many states had cases decided on the question of notice. Arizona 
held that when the mother told the court that she was not enrolled but that 
she was eligible for enrollment in either the Oglala Sioux (through her 
mother) or Spirit Lake (through her father), notice must be sent to those 
tribes.508 California held that when a parent raises “Blackfoot’” as their 
Indian ancestry, the court has an obligation to determine whether the 
parent meant “Blackfeet,” which is a federally recognized tribe and 
requires notice under ICWA, or “Blackfoot,” which is not.509 Colorado 
held that even though the mother did not claim membership in any 
federally recognized tribe, her repeated assertions of Apache heritage 
required notice be sent to the Apache tribes.510 Kansas held that courts 
                                                     
rule which would deny the right to intervene in a child custody proceeding because the tribe did not 
file a written pleading prior to the hearing directly conflicts with this purpose. Accordingly, we 
conclude that Section 1911(c) preempts Rule 60’s requirement of a written pleading because it stands 
as an obstacle to the accomplishment of congressional objectives.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 504. Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (2012). 
 505. In re Breanna S., 8 Cal. App. 5th 636 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017). 
 506. Id. at 654. 
 507. Id. at 654–55 (“‘[M]embership . . . is a tribe’s determination based on tribal law’ . . . . 
[A]lthough the Department accurately quotes language from the Pascua Yaqui Constitution, we are 
unwilling to determine in the first instance the tribe’s membership eligibility requirements, particularly 
since we are without benefit of testimony regarding how that language has been applied by the tribe 
and whether exceptions have been created by tribal custom and practice.”). 
 508. Michelle M. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 401 P.3d 1013 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017). 
 509. Tehama Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. B.M. (In re Z.B.), No. C084117, 2017 Cal. App. 
Unpub. LEXIS 8303, at *5–9 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2017). “When Blackfoot heritage is claimed, part 
of the [Department’s] duty of inquiry is to clarify whether the parent is actually claiming Blackfoot or 
Blackfeet heritage so that it can discharge its additional duty to notice the relevant tribes.”. Id. at *7. 
 510. People v. L.L., 2017 COA 38, 395 P.3d 1209 (Colo. App. 2017). 
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must continue treating children as Indian children when a prospective tribe 
had requested more information about their ancestry and had not yet made 
a determination of their eligibility for membership.511 
Massachusetts held that the new ICWA guidelines require courts to 
verify that proper notice was sent to each potential tribe by reviewing 
return receipts or other proofs of service.512 Michigan held that while 
juvenile courts have an obligation to inquire into the Indian status of all 
children within their jurisdiction, the failure to do so was harmless because 
the mother never alleged the child was an Indian child.513 However, a 
Texas court held that a father’s allegation that he “had ‘Indian blood’” and 
that his family was “part of a reservation” was enough to trigger the 
notification requirement of ICWA.514 
4. Active Efforts § 1912(d) 
Section 1912(d) requires that before a foster care placement or a 
termination of parental rights can be entered by the court, the court must 
conclude that “active efforts” have been made to prevent the breakup of 
the Indian family.515 Numerous cases were decided on this provision in 
2017; however, most of them turned heavily on the specific factual 
situation.516 I will highlight just two cases here, one a published opinion 
out of California and the other a divided opinion by the Alaska Supreme 
Court. 
In In re T.W.-1, the father argued that active efforts had not been 
made to prevent the breakup of the Indian family—specifically, that the 
initial case plan failed to identify any service providers placing the burden 
on the father to locate services. 517 Subsequent case plans included a 
service provider but no contact information or information on 
enrollment.518 Some case plans failed to include any substance abuse 
counseling or any assessment related to substance abuse, and the father 
was never tested despite district court direction that the plan include 
                                                     
 511. In the Interest of D.H., 401 P.3d 163, 172–74 (Kan. Ct. App. 2017). 
 512. Adoption of Uday, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 51, 52–53 (Mass. App. Ct. 2017). 
 513. In re York, No. 333672, 2017 Mich. App. LEXIS 498 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2017). 
 514. In the Interest of C.C., No. 12-17-00114-CV, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 6036, at *7–8 (Tex. 
App. June 30, 2017). 
 515. Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §1912(d) (2012). 
 516. See e.g., Bob S. v. Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., 400 P.3d 99 (Alaska 2017); Jude M. v. 
State, 394 P.3d 543 (Alaska 2017); Carlos R. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, No. 1 CA-JV 16-0372, 2017 
Ariz. App. Unpub. LEXIS 290 (Ariz. Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2017); Ritter v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 
511 S.W.3d 343 (Ark. Ct. App. 2017); In re J.L., 217 Cal. Rptr. 3d 201 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017); Dep’t of 
Human Servs. v. M.L.M. (In re L.M.G.M.), 388 P.3d 353 (Or. Ct. App. 2017). 
 517. In re T.W.-1, 9 Cal. App. 5th 339, 341–46 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017). 
 518. Id. at 346. 
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“testing protocols.”519 Additionally, the record was unclear whether there 
were any services specifically related to parenting skills or avoiding 
criminal activity, which would be instrumental in preventing the breakup 
of the family.520 Finally, the father was provided with only one telephone 
visit despite his request for more interaction and the fact that visitation is 
a critical component of a reunification plan.521 Accordingly, the California 
appellate court concluded that active efforts were not made to prevent the 
breakup of the Indian family, and it reversed the lower court’s termination 
of parental rights.522 
In Margot B. v. State, a divided vote of the Supreme Court of Alaska 
(3–2) affirmed the termination of parental rights by concluding that active 
efforts had been made to prevent the breakup of the Indian family.523 The 
majority suggested that it was proper to look at the entire period in which 
social services was involved in order to decide whether active efforts had 
been made.524 The majority recognized that there was a seven-month 
period between when the mother graduated from Mental Health Court and 
the actual termination proceedings, where limited efforts occurred.525 
However, the majority ultimately relied on the trial court’s finding that the 
Office of Child Services (OCS) had developed case plans throughout the 
case, which had included visitation, urine analysis tests, numerous 
referrals to parenting classes, individual and couple’s counseling, and 
substance abuse assessments.526 Accordingly, it affirmed the lower court 
order that active efforts had been made.527 
The dissent would have held that the facts indicated that active efforts 
had not been made.528 It noted that both the mother’s counselor and the 
couple’s counselor felt that six months of additional services might better 
prepare the parents to resume custody of their children.529 Further, it would 
have held that OCS did not make the required active efforts.530 The dissent 
                                                     
 519. Id. at 346–47. 
 520. Id. at 347. 
 521. Id. 
 522. Id. at 349. 
 523. Margot B. v. State, Nos. S-16318, S-16331, S-16332, 2017 Alas. LEXIS 38 (Alaska Mar. 
22, 2017). 
 524. Id. at *11. 
 525. Id. at *11–12. 
 526. Id. at *13. 
 527. Id. at *20. 
 528. Id. 
 529. Id. at *20–21. 
 530. Id. at *24–25 (“The caseworker’s trial testimony reveals that she did not update Margot’s 
case plan between December 2014 and March 2016; that she did not meet with Margot at any time 
after her graduation from Mental Health Court in July 2015; and that she never conveyed her 
expectation that Margot would continue to engage in the counseling that had been part of her treatment 
program in Mental Health Court.”). 
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placed particular weight on the mother’s testimony that she did not know 
what else OCS expected of her in order to be compliant with her case 
plan.531 Accordingly, the dissent would have reversed the lower court and 
allowed six additional months of services to try to prevent the breakup of 
the Indian family.532 
5. Procedure for a Foster Care Placement (§ 1912(e)) or 
Termination of Parental Rights (§ 1912(f)) 
ICWA requires that before an Indian child can be placed in foster 
care (§ 1912(e)) and/or before a parent’s parental rights to an Indian child 
are terminated (§ 1912(f)), the court must determine, on the record, that 
the continued custody of the child by its parents would likely result in 
serious emotional or physical harm to the child.533 The determination must 
be based at least in part on testimony from a qualified expert.534 In 2017, 
many courts were faced with appeals from parents arguing that the lower 
court erred in determining that continued custody would harm the child or 
that the court’s decision was not based upon the testimony of a qualified 
expert. 
Continued Custody Likely to Result in Serious Harm: In 2017, courts 
held that the same information that justified an emergency removal could 
not also be used to justify the § 1912(e) requirement that continued 
custody would likely result in serious harm to the child,535 that the 
evidence that demonstrates that serious harm would result from continued 
custody does not have to be solely provided by a qualified expert,536 that a 
finding of serious harm must be formally made on the record,537 and that 
marijuana use alone does not qualify as evidence that continued custody 
would result in serious harm to the child.538 
Qualified Expert: In 2017, courts held that the qualified expert did 
not have to be a social worker but could be someone with knowledge of 
prevailing social and cultural standards or child-rearing practices within 
                                                     
 531. Id. at *25. 
 532. Id. at *25–26. 
 533. Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §1912(e)–(f) (2012). 
 534. Id. 
 535. In the Interest of D.E.J., Nos. 116,103, 116,104, 116,106, 2017 Kan. App. Unpub. LEXIS 
293, at *23–24 (Kan. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2017). 
 536. Jude M. v. State, 394 P.3d 543, 558–59 (Alaska 2017) (“We have interpreted ICWA to 
require that ‘[t]he expert testimony constitute[] some of the evidence upon which the judge bases this 
finding. But it does not need to be the sole basis for that finding; it simply must support it.’”). 
 537. In re Welfare of Child S.R.K. & O.A.K., No. A16-2067, 2017 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 
457, at *12–14 (Minn. Ct. App. May 15, 2017). 
 538. Los Angeles Cty. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. v. William B. (In re W.B.), No. 
B279288, 2017 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7105, at *16 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2017). 
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the tribe,539 that a member of the Indian child’s tribe who is recognized by 
the tribal community as knowledgeable in tribal customs as they pertain to 
family organization and child-rearing practices is a qualified expert,540 that 
even when a person is reluctant to consider themselves an “expert” or an 
“elder,” they may still possess the qualifications of an expert for the 
purposes of ICWA,541 that even if the evidence was otherwise clear that 
continued custody would cause serious harm to the children, the court 
must have some testimony from a qualified expert,542 and that when the 
tribe designates the expert, the parents cannot contest that the expert is not 
qualified.543 
6. Other ICWA Issues 
There are three related issues that were discussed by the courts this 
year but that do not fit neatly into the categories described above that 
correspond directly to ICWA’s statutory provisions: (1) the severance of 
a non-Indian parent’s rights under ICWA, (2) whether the state has an 
obligation to assist parents in enrolling their children with their respective 
tribes, and (3) who is a “parent” under ICWA. 
Non-Indian Parental Rights: In S.S. v. Stephanie H., the Arizona 
appellate court determined that ICWA applied to a proceeding in which an 
Indian parent sought the termination of the non-Indian parent’s parental 
rights.544 The court reasoned that ICWA applies to any “child custody 
proceeding” involving an “Indian child.”545 Since the children at issue 
were Indian children and the severance of parental rights was a child 
custody proceeding, the requirements of ICWA governed the proceeding: 
“[T]he plain language of the act reveals its focus is not on custody 
                                                     
 539. Caitlyn E. v. State, 399 P.3d 646, 652 (Alaska 2017). The Court concluded that the expert 
here met those qualifications; she had 
Yupik upbringing as a member of the Native Village of Tununak and her six years of work 
in social services for the Tribe in Bethel. Charlie worked with children on cultural and 
subsistence awareness as a youth coordinator for five years; the Tribe then promoted her 
to Social Services Director, and she supervised the departments for ICWA, rural child 
welfare, and youth services for a year and a half. The Tribe also approved Charlie’s 
participation as an expert witness in this case. 
Id. 
 540. In the Interest of L.M.B., 398 P.3d 207, 217–19 (Kan. Ct. App. 2017). 
 541. In re Dependency of KS, No. 75169-7-I, 2017 Wash. App. LEXIS 1464, at *18–24 (Wash. 
Ct. App. June 19, 2017). 
 542. See Gaddie v. K.S.D. (In re K.S.D.), 2017 ND 289, ¶¶ 27–29, 904 N.W.2d 479 (N.D. 2017). 
The Chief Justice dissented on this point, arguing that the likelihood the decision of the lower court 
would be challenged was so small that he would have upheld the termination without sending the case 
back to the lower court to gather testimony from the expert witness. Id. ¶¶ 32–35. 
 543. In re Children of S.R.K., No. A17-1194, 2017 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1007, at *3–4 
(Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2017). 
 544. S.S. v. Stephanie H., 388 P.3d 569 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017). 
 545. Id. at 573. 
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proceedings that affect Indian parents, but instead is on custody 
proceedings that affect Indian children.”546 
Duty to Enroll: In Solano County Health & Social Services v. R.E. 
(In re A.E.), the Department sent notice to the Cherokee tribes and received 
a reply that the children did not meet ICWA’s definition of an “Indian 
Child” but that they were eligible for enrollment through their paternal 
great-grandmother, who was a member.547 The Department sent the 
Cherokee Nation the information it needed to determine whether it would 
intervene in the lawsuit but did not take steps to enroll the children.548 The 
father argued that the Department had a duty to enroll the children.549 The 
court disagreed. It recognized that California law does require the 
Department to assist Indian children with tribal enrollment, but only if they 
are already Indian children.550 Because the children in this instance were 
eligible for enrollment but were not yet Indian children, the Department 
had no duty to assist them with their enrollment.551 
In San Bernardino County Children & Family Services v. J.P. (In re 
A.W.), the father claimed that he had been born on the reservation and was 
enrolled as a child but that he was adopted off the Cheyenne River Sioux 
Reservation at a young age and did not have the proper records to show 
enrollment.552 The tribe represented to the court that a fire fifteen to twenty 
years ago had destroyed the enrollment records and that the father was in 
the process of reenrolling.553 The father asked for several continuances to 
give him time to get enrolled so that ICWA would apply to the 
proceedings.554 The lower court ultimately denied a further continuance, 
held that because the father was not enrolled at that time that the child was 
not an Indian child, and proceeded to terminate the father’s parental 
                                                     
 546. Id. at 574. 
 547. Solano Cty. Health & Soc. Servs. v. R.E. (In re A.E.), No. A149302, 2017 Cal. App. Unpub. 
LEXIS 4077, at *26 (Cal. Ct. App. June 12, 2017). 
 548. Id. at *27. 
 549. Id. at *28. 
 550. Id. at *28–31 (“We likewise reject Father’s argument that the Department violated its duties 
under rule 5.484(c)(2), which provides that efforts to provide services to an Indian child ‘must include 
pursuit of any steps necessary to secure tribal membership for a child if the child is eligible for 
membership in a given tribe, as well as attempts to use the available resources of extended family 
members, the tribe, tribal and other Indian social service agencies, and individual Indian caregivers.’ 
Our high court has made clear that this mandate applies to those who meet the definition of Indian 
children, not to those who, like Minors, are eligible for tribal membership but do not meet that 
definition.”). 
 551. Id. at *29. 
 552. San Bernardino Cty. Children & Family Servs. v. J.P. (In re A.W.), No. E067059, 2017 
Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5540, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2017). 
 553. Id. at *6–7. 
 554. Id. at *6–9. 
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rights.555 The father argued that CFS had a duty to help him enroll.556 The 
court disagreed.557 It held that the lower court does not have a duty to assist 
a parent in enrolling or to wait indefinitely for a parent to enroll.558 While 
the court recognized that it may be appropriate for a court to extend a 
proceeding “‘a few days or weeks while a parent or child pursues an 
application for tribal membership,’ if such a delay would be in the child’s 
best interest[,]” the court concluded that the continuances here had already 
lasted 4.5 months.559 The appellate court ultimately concluded that 
because the child was not an Indian child at the time the court refused a 
continuation and terminated parental rights, ICWA did not apply.560 
Who Is a Parent: In E.T. v. R.B.K. (In re B.B.), a sharply divided Utah 
Supreme Court concluded that the biological father was a “parent” under 
ICWA and remanded for proceedings in which the father could 
participate.561 The facts read like a movie plot. The biological father and 
mother are both enrolled members of the Cheyenne River Reservation.562 
The mother got pregnant, and the father supported her for six months until 
the mother decided to move to Utah.563 In Utah, the mother met an ex-
boyfriend and then cut off contact with the biological father.564 Only 
twenty-four hours and six minutes after giving birth to their son, she 
relinquished parental rights and consented to an adoption.565 The mother 
lied to the hospital and listed her brother-in-law as the biological father. 
The brother-in-law also executed a termination of rights in relation to the 
                                                     
 555. Id. at *9–10. 
 556. Id. at *18 (“Father argues that even after the Northern Cheyenne Tribe had intervened and 
was processing Father’s application to enroll, ICWA required CFS to delve into ‘the particulars’ of 
Father’s status with the Tribe rather than wait for the Tribe to determine for itself whether it wished 
to declare Father an enrolled tribal member and move to transfer the case to the Tribal court.”). 
 557. Id. at *18–19. The father cited to a California statute and Section 1912(a) for the proposition 
that the Department had a duty to assist his enrollment and to report proactively about his enrollment 
status. The court held that “[n]either code requires CFS to investigate Father’s Native American 
ancestry on behalf of the Tribe, nor to provide the court with detailed reports on Father’s status.” Id. 
at *19. 
 558. Id. at *10–11 (“In Abbigail A., our Supreme Court clarified that a court can apply ICWA to 
dependency proceedings only when the child is an Indian Child at the time the court makes the ICWA 
determination, not when it is possible that the child could be determined to be an Indian Child at some 
future date.”). 
 559. Id. at *13. 
 560. See id. at *20. 
 561. E.T. v. R.B.K. (In re B.B.), 2017 UT 59 (Utah 2017). 
 562. Id. ¶ 2. 
 563. Id. ¶ 4. 
 564. Id. ¶ 2. 
 565. Id. ¶ 6. 
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adoption.566 The mother denied having any Indian ancestry, and no notice 
was sent to the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe or to the biological father.567 
After executing the adoption, the mother returned to South Dakota 
and told the biological father what she had done.568 The biological father 
then moved to intervene in the adoption proceedings, seeking custody.569 
At the same time, the mother attempted to withdraw her consent to the 
adoption.570 The Utah Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the 
father was a “parent” for the purposes of ICWA and, therefore, entitled to 
intervene in the adoption proceedings.571 A 3–2 majority of the court 
determined that the biological father was a parent under ICWA, and so the 
case was remanded for further proceedings in which the father could 
participate.572 
The majority held that the appropriate definition of a parent under 
ICWA should be determined by reference to a federal standard for 
paternity and not the state standard.573 The majority applied a reasonability 
standard to paternity, which the biological father could meet in this case.574 
The majority then reasoned that ICWA, under § 1912(a), gives a “parent” 
the right to notice and the right to intervene in the proceedings.575 After 
mother filed an affidavit informing the court she had misrepresented the 
birth father, the proceedings were no longer voluntary because at least one 
of the parents was objecting, and so the real biological father was entitled 
to notice and a right to intervene under ICWA.576 
                                                     
 566. Id. 
 567. Id. ¶¶ 6–7. 
 568. Id. ¶ 8. 
 569. Id. ¶ 9. 
 570. Id. 
 571. Id. ¶ 2. 
 572. Id. ¶ 3. 
 573. Id. ¶ 59 (“‘Parent’ is a critical term under ICWA. Whether an individual qualifies as a 
‘parent’ determines whether he or she may benefit from the heightened protections for parental rights 
available under ICWA. There is ‘no reason to believe that Congress intended to rely on state law for 
the definition of [this] critical term.’”). 
 574. Id. ¶ 71. (“We acknowledge that ICWA does not explicitly define the procedures and timing 
required, but in light of the congressional findings and the purpose of ICWA as discussed above, as 
well as its protectiveness of parental rights pertaining to Indian children, we conclude that the 
requirements must be less exacting than those for establishing paternity under Utah law. Instead, we 
conclude that a reasonability standard applies to the time and manner in which an unwed father may 
acknowledge or establish his paternity.”). 
 575. Id. at ¶ 86. 
 576. Id. ¶ 88 (“[I]n light of ICWA’s policy ‘to protect the best interests of Indian children and to 
promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families,’ 25 U.S.C. § 1902, it would be 
inconsistent to deny a parent the right to receive notice and to intervene in proceedings for the 
termination of his or her parental rights just because the termination of the other parent’s rights was 
voluntary. Thus, we conclude that the proceedings in this case are involuntary as they pertain to Birth 
Father. Birth Father therefore was entitled to notice of the proceedings and the opportunity to 
intervene.”). 
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The dissent would have held that the biological father was not a 
parent within the meaning of ICWA because the parents were unwed and 
paternity had not been established.577 The dissent would have applied 
Utah’s state law on paternity to determine that the biological father never 
acknowledged his paternity and therefore is not a parent subject to 
intervene in the proceedings.578 
7. Scope 
There were many challenges to the scope of the Indian Child Welfare 
Act and its related state counterparts during 2017. While I do not have 
space to include a summary of all of the cases, this section summarizes 
some of the opinions dealing with the scope of the act divided by state.  
An Alaska court held that the ICWA applies whenever the children 
are being removed from their parents and not returned, even if the person 
removing them is an extended family member.579 An Arizona court 
required compliance with ICWA’s placement preferences even when the 
mother completed enrollment with her tribe after her parental rights had 
been terminated. 580 An Arkansas court held that the ICWA does not apply 
because there was no evidence a child was an Indian when the child’s 
father applied for tribal membership nine days before a hearing and the 
father never informed the court whether the application was successful.581 
A California court held that the ICWA is not triggered when a child 
is placed with a legal parent, even if that party is not the biological 
parent.582 When a new tribe was federally recognized in the middle of 
custody proceedings, the ICWA did not require that the parties go back 
and restart the process or revisit past decisions on the termination of 
parental rights.583 The court further held that ICWA requires a child’s 
biological parents to be Indian and does not apply when only the adoptive 
                                                     
 577. Id. ¶ 162 (ICWA “states that a ‘parent’ is ‘any biological parent or parents of an Indian 
child,’ not including ‘the unwed father where paternity has not been acknowledged or established.’ Id. 
§ 1903(9).”). 
 578. Id. ¶ 192. 
 579. Rice v. McDonald, 390 P.3d 1133, 1136–37 (Alaska 2017). 
 580. Alexandra K. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, No. 1 CA-JV 16-0340, 2017 Ariz. App. Unpub. 
LEXIS 278 (Ariz. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2017). 
 581. Davis v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 275 (Ark. App. 2017). 
 582. In re M.R., 212 Cal. Rptr. 3d 807 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017). 
 583. Contra Costa Cty. Children & Family Servs. Bureau v. T.G. (In re Z.J.), A147446, 2017 
Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1470, at *19–25 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2017). 
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parents are Indian,584 and that courts are not required to prove paternity 
through genetic testing whenever the father claims Indian heritage.585 
A Colorado court held that a judge must make an ICWA inquiry both 
when the child is removed to foster case and again when the parent’s rights 
are terminated.586 A federal court in Georgia held that ICWA does not 
apply when the alleged tribe is not federally recognized.587 A Michigan 
court held that its state act applies when one parent involuntarily gives up 
custody even if it is to the other parent because the child has been 
“removed,” but does not apply when custody is given up by one parent to 
the other voluntarily.588 A Missouri court held that a tribe may appeal a 
decision issued by a state court on behalf of its members even if the parent 
does not appeal.589 A Montana court held that when the mother appealed 
only the placement of her child, but not the termination of her rights, that 
she lacked standing to proceed because she no longer possessed parental 
rights.590 A New Jersey court held that “vague and casual references” to 
possible ancestry were insufficient to trigger ICWA as the court still does 
not have reason to know the child is an Indian child.591 A North Carolina 
court held that the burden of proving ICWA applies is on the party asking 
for ICWA’s application.592 A Wisconsin court held that when a father 
never had custody of the children he could not raise an ICWA objection.593 
L. Indian Country 
Indian country describes the land over which tribes exercise their 
authority and demarcates much of the line between state and tribal 
                                                     
 584. San Diego Cty. HHS Agency v. Christopher M. (In re C.M.), D071165, 2017 Cal. App. 
Unpub. LEXIS 1843, at *3–4 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2017). 
 585. See In re G.A., B282730, 2017 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 8285, at *11–12 (Cal. Ct. App., 
Dec. 5, 2017). 
 586. People ex. rel. C.A., 2017 COA 135, 2017 Colo. Appp. LEXIS 1333, at *9–11 (Colo. Ct. 
App. Oct. 19, 2017). 
 587. Thomas v. Disanto, NO.: 5:17-cv-7, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97296, *12-15 (S.D. Ga. June 
23, 2017). 
 588. In re Detmer/Beaudry, No. 336348, 2017 Mich. App. LEXIS 1350 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 
22, 2017). 
 589. In re S.E. & B.E., 527 S.W.3d 894, 899–901 (Mo. App. Sept. 12, 2017). 
 590. In re C.B D., 387 Mont. 347, 349–50 (Mont. 2017). 
 591. New Jersey Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. J.N., NO. A-4390-15T1, 2017 N.J. Super. 
Unpub. LEXIS 855, *15 (Sup. Ct. N.J. Apr. 6, 2017). 
 592. In re L.W.S., 804 S.E.2d 816, 818–19 (N.C. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 2017). 
 593. Kewaunee Cty. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. R.I. (In re Termination of Parental Rights to 
M.J.), No. 2017AP1697, 2017 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1094, at *7 (Wisc. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2017) (“In 
Adoptive Couple, the Supreme Court held § 1912(f) does not apply where a parent never had physical 
or legal custody of the Indian child prior to any child custody proceedings. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. 
Ct. at 2562. On this point, the Court interpreted the phrase ‘continued custody’ in § 1912(f) as referring 
to ‘custody that a parent already has (or at least had at some point in the past).’”). 
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jurisdiction.594 When an event occurs in Indian country different 
jurisdictional rules may apply.595 Given the importance of jurisdiction to 
the practice of Indian Law the issue of whether or not an event has 
occurred in “Indian country” has been decided repeated by the Supreme 
Court.596 
1. In the Context of Criminal Jurisdiction 
Several cases decided in 2017 required their respective courts to 
determine whether a crime was committed in Indian country. Arguably the 
most important of these criminal cases, as it involved the death penalty, 
was Murphy v. Royal.597 In Murphy, a member of the Muscogee Creek 
Nation was convicted of murder in an Oklahoma state court and sentenced 
to death.598 The defendant appealed, arguing that he was an Indian and his 
crime occurred in Indian country; therefore, the federal government and 
not the state had the sole authority to prosecute him.599 The Tenth Circuit 
agreed.600 It reasoned that once land is set aside as a reservation it does not 
matter if the state later takes an interest in the land; the land remains Indian 
country until Congress determines otherwise.601 It expressly rejected the 
State’s argument that the Creek Nation’s reservation had been diminished, 
which would have given the state authority over the crime.602 
To determine whether Congress intended the reservation to be 
diminished the Tenth Circuit applied the three part test from Solem.603 
First, it concluded that there was no explicit statutory language suggesting 
                                                     
 594. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012). 
 595. For example, a number of federal criminal laws only apply if the crime occurred in Indian 
Country. See Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2012); Indian Country Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1153 (2012). 
 596. For a discussion of four Supreme Court cases in the last three decades that have had to 
determine whether a reservation was diminished, see Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072, 1076 
(2016); South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 333 (1998); Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 
399, 409 (1994); Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 467 (1984). 
 597. Murphy v. Royal, 866 F.3d 1164 (10th Cir. 2017). 
 598. Id. at 1171. 
 599. Id. (“[W]hen an Indian is charged with committing a murder in Indian country, he or she 
must be tried in federal court. Mr. Murphy is a member of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation. Because the 
homicide charged against him was committed in Indian country, the Oklahoma state courts lacked 
jurisdiction to try him.”). 
 600. Id. at 1172. 
 601. Id. at 1183 (“[R]eservation status depends on the boundaries Congress draws, not on who 
owns the land inside the reservation’s boundaries: ‘[W]hen Congress has once established a 
reservation, all tracts included within it remain a part of the reservation until separated therefrom by 
Congress.’. . . ‘Once a block of land is set aside for an Indian Reservation and no matter what happens 
to the title of individual plots within the area, the entire block retains its reservation status until 
Congress explicitly indicates otherwise.’”) (internal citations omitted). 
 602. Id. at 1190. 
 603. Id. at 1187–90. 
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the reservation had been diminished.604 The court cited to Parker for the 
proposition that even if the statutory language is unclear, it is still possible 
for a court to determine that a reservation has been diminished.605 
However, the Tenth Circuit concluded that there was insufficient evidence 
to support a finding of diminishment because the events surrounding 
passage were ambiguous.606 The court also determined that a change in the 
Indian character alone is not enough to find congressional intent.607 
Because the crime was committed by an Indian in Indian country the state 
had no jurisdiction over the crime and the Tenth Circuit overturned the 
tribal member’s conviction.608 The state petitioned for a rehearing en banc 
which was subsequently denied by the Tenth Circuit.609 
A couple other opinions decided this year discussed whether a crime 
was committed in Indian Country. In United States v. Jackson, the Eighth 
Circuit affirmed federal jurisdiction over felony charges occurring on the 
Red Lake Reservation because it had never been diminished.610 The Court 
applied the Supreme Court’s test for diminishment and noted that in 1934 
the Secretary of Interior observed that “Red Lake has remained a ‘closed’ 
reservation, meaning almost all lands are held communally, ‘apparently 
one of only two reservations in the nation to enjoy this status.’”611 The lack 
of clear congressional intent to diminish the reservation was indicated by 
the large portions of land held communally. Because the Red Lake 
                                                     
 604. Id. at 1215–18 (“Congress never expressly terminated the Creek Reservation in any of the 
statutes, nor did it use the kind of language recognized by the Supreme Court as evidencing 
disestablishment. It has long been clear ‘the Congresses that passed the surplus land acts’ were hostile 
to the reservation system; indeed they ‘anticipated [its] imminent demise’ and ‘passed the acts partially 
to facilitate the process,’ but Solem prevents courts from “extrapolat[ing]” this general congressional 
expectation into ‘a specific congressional purpose’ with respect to a given reservation.”). 
 605. Id. at 1220–21 (“When the statutory text at step one does not reveal that Congress has 
disestablished or diminished a reservation, such a finding requires ‘unambiguous evidence’ that 
‘unequivocally reveals’ congressional intent.”). 
 606. Id. at 1226 (“None of the step-two evidence, whether viewed in isolation or in concert, 
shows unmistakable congressional intent to disestablish the Creek Reservation. The State’s historical 
evidence supports the notion that Congress intended to institute a new government in the Indian 
Territory and to shift Indian land ownership from communal holdings to individual allotments. But 
this does not show, unequivocally or otherwise, that Congress had erased or even reduced the Creek 
Reservation’s boundaries.”). 
 607. Id. at 1232. Finally, even though the Creek reservation is now 73% White and only 16% 
American Indian the Court concluded that the demographic history was insufficient without some 
language from the statute and/or events surrounding passage to justify diminishment. (“The 
demographic evidence does not overcome the absence of statutory text disestablishing the Creek 
Reservation.”). 
 608. Id. at 1233 (“Because Mr. Murphy is an Indian and because the crime occurred in Indian 
country, the federal court has exclusive jurisdiction. Oklahoma lacked jurisdiction.”). 
 609. Murphy v. Royal, 875 F.3d 896 (10th Cir. 2017). 
 610. United States v. Jackson, 853 F.3d 436 (8th Cir. 2017). 
 611. Id. at 440. 
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reservation had not been diminished, the crime had occurred in “Indian 
country” and the federal government had jurisdiction.612 
In Hackford v. Utah, the Tenth Circuit reaffirmed that the Uintah and 
Ouray Reservation had been disestablished because of the clear language 
of “cession” coupled with the payment of a “sum certain” that created a 
presumption of diminishment that the petitioner could not overcome.613 
Finally, in United States v. Antonio the federal district court for New 
Mexico applied the Pueblo Land Act Amendments of 2005 to conclude 
that the United States had jurisdiction over the defendant’s conduct on a 
highway running through a Pueblo regardless of whether that land was 
actually part of the Sandia Pueblo because it had been within any land 
grant from a prior sovereign.614 
2. In the Context of Civil Jurisdiction 
Two important Indian country cases arose from circuit courts in the 
civil context, each attracting a divided opinion and a spirited dissent. In 
Penobscot Nation v. Mills, the Penobscot Nation filed suit against the state 
of Maine after the Maine Attorney General issued an opinion that allowed 
the Nation to regulate hunting on islands within the river channel but could 
not regulate fishing or restrict access to the river itself.615 The district court 
agreed with the Attorney General and held that the tribe’s control extended 
to the islands in the river but not the waters or the land under the waters.616 
The tribe appealed and the First Circuit affirmed in a divided opinion.617 
The majority reasoned that the language of the Maine Implementing Act 
                                                     
 612. See id. at 446–47. 
 613. Hackford v. Utah, 845 F.3d 1325 (10th Cir. 2017). The area had originally been part of the 
Uintah and Ouray reservation, but in 1910 Congress directed the Secretary of Interior to pay the tribe 
$1.25 per acre for the land so it could be used as a future reservoir. The Act concluded that after this 
payment “[a]ll right, title, and interest of the Indians in the said lands are hereby extinguished.” Id. at 
1328 (citing Act of April 4, 1910, ch. 140, 36 Stat. 285.) 
 614. United States v. Antonio, No. CR 16-1106 JB, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85436, at *69–71 
(D.N.M. June 5, 2017) (“The jurisdictional inquiry is not whether the collision site is located within 
the Sandia Pueblo’s present-day boundaries; rather, the jurisdictional inquiry is whether the collision 
site is located ‘anywhere within the exterior boundaries of any grant from a prior sovereign, as 
confirmed by Congress or the Court of Private Land Claims to a Pueblo Indian tribe of New 
Mexico.’ . . . The Court concludes that it has jurisdiction, because the collision site is located within 
the exterior boundaries of the May 16, 1748, grant to the Sandia Pueblo, as confirmed by the Act of 
December 22, 1858, 11 Stat. at 374.”) 
 615. Penobscot Nation v. Mills, 861 F.3d 324, 328 (1st Cir. 2017) (“[T]he . . . Nation may 
lawfully regulate hunting on, and restrict access to, the islands within the River from Medway to Old 
Town that comprise its Reservation, but may not regulate activities occurring on, nor restrict public 
access to, the River itself . . . .”). 
 616. Id. at 327. 
 617. Id. 
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(MIA) was clear on its face that the Tribe’s reservation included only the 
islands and not the water.618 
Judge Torruella dissented: “Everything in US history is about the 
land—[including] who . . . fished its waters.”619 He would have held that 
Reservation includes the main stem of the Penobscot River because “the 
Supreme Court has held that a grant of ‘lands’ and ‘islands’ to Indians 
includes ‘submerged lands’ and ‘surrounding waters.’”620 Judge Torruella 
also would have held that “the Settlement Acts provide for the Penobscot 
Nation to have the right to fish within its Reservation, yet if the majority 
view prevails, the Nation’s ‘fishing’ will only take place in the uplands of 
their islands, on dry land where there are no fish and no places to fish.”621 
Accordingly, Judge Torruella concluded that the language of the Maine 
Implementing Act was ambiguous and both controlling Supreme Court 
precedent in Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78 (1918), 
and the Indian canons of construction, require that ambiguities in the 
statutes be interpreted to the Indians’ benefit.622 
In Wyoming v. EPA, the Eastern Shoshone and Northern Arapaho 
applied to regulate some clean air programs on the Wind River reservation 
under the Tribe as State provision of the Clean Air Act.623 The State of 
Wyoming contested the application arguing that the tribe lacked 
jurisdiction over parts of the reservation since it had been diminished in 
1905.624 The EPA, relying on analysis from Interior, concluded the 
reservation was not diminished and Wyoming appealed.625 A divided 
panel of the Tenth Circuit concluded the reservation was diminished 
utilizing the three part test adopted first in Solem v. Bartlett.626 
The majority began with the language of the 1905 Act: “cede, grant, 
and relinquish to the United States, all right, title, and interest . . .” which 
the majority determined “aligns with the type of language the Supreme 
Court has called ‘precisely suited’ to diminishment. . . . We believe 
Congress’s use of the word ‘cede’ can only mean one thing—a diminished 
                                                     
 618. Id. at 331–35 (“[T]he statute is clear that the role of the treaties is simply to define which 
‘islands’ are included in the Reservation, not to alter the plain meaning of the term Reservation itself”). 
 619. Id. at 338. 
 620. Id. at 338–39. 
 621. Id. at 339. 
 622. Id. at 339–40. 
 623. Wyoming v. EPA, 849 F.3d 861 (10th Cir. 2017). 
 624. Id. at 865. 
 625. Id. at 868 (“In their comments, Wyoming and the Farm Bureau argued the Reservation was 
diminished by the 1905 Act, which, they contended, established the current boundaries of the 
Reservation. Based on these objections, the EPA asked the Department of the Interior for an analysis 
of the competing claims. In 2011, the solicitor issued a legal opinion concluding the 1905 Act had not 
changed the boundaries established by the 1868 treaty. Relying on this analysis, the EPA issued its 
final decision granting the Tribes’ application.”). 
 626. Id. at 869–89. 
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reservation.”627 The Tribe argued that the lack of a lump sum or sum 
certain payment proved that Congress did not intend to diminish the 
reservation but the majority described a hybrid method of compensation 
where funds were directed for specific activities and programs, and further 
cited Hagen v. Utah for the proposition that while “the provision for 
definite payment can certainly provide additional evidence of 
diminishment, the lack of such a provision does not lead to the contrary 
conclusion.”628 
Judge Lucero, in dissent, would have found the reservation was not 
diminished.629 His opinion placed great weight on the lack of a sum certain 
payment to buttress the cession language described by the majority, and 
would have held a reservation diminished only with the cession language 
coupled with an unconditional commitment to pay for the land or language 
returning the land to the public domain.630 The tribe’s petition for a 
rehearing en banc was denied.631 
Other 2017 opinions involving Indian country included a decision (1) 
that a section of land originally reserved for schools in California was not 
part of the Chemeheuvi reservation,632 (2) that a village located entirely 
within the original boundaries of the Oneida Nation was entitled to 
conduct discovery on the question of whether the reservation was 
diminished633 but that it ultimately had the burden to prove 
diminishment,634 (3) that New York could not assert its ad valorum tax 
over land parcels on the Cayuga Nation,635 (4) that a decision on a land 
parcel’s status as Indian country in state court is preclusive in federal 
court,636 and (5) that a dispute between non-Indian landowners on a 
diminished reservation belongs in state court.637 
                                                     
 627. Id. at 870–72. 
 628. Id. at 872–73. 
 629. Id. at 882. 
 630. Id. 872–74 (“By deriving an intent to diminish absent sum-certain payment or statutory 
language restoring lands to the public domain, the majority opinion creates a new low-water mark in 
diminishment jurisprudence.”). 
 631. Wyoming v. EPA, 875 F.3d 505 (10th Cir. 2017). 
 632. Chemeheuvi Indian Tribe v. McMahon, No.: ED CV 15-1538-DMG (FFMx), 2017 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 143446 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2017). 
 633. Oneida Nation v. Village of Hobart, No. 16-C-1217, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114712 (E.D. 
Wisc. April 19, 2017). 
 634. Oneida Nation v. Village of Hobart, No. 16-C-1217, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174662 (E.D. 
Wisc. Oct. 23, 2017). 
 635. Cayuga Indian Nation v. Seneca County, 260 F. Supp. 3d 290 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2017). 
 636. Navajo Nation v. Rael, No. 1:16-cv-00888 WJ/LF, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55797 (D.N.M. 
Apr. 11, 2017), Navajo Nation v. Rael, No. 1:16-cv-00888 WJ/LF, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107136 
(D.N.M. July 11, 2017). 
 637. Austin v. Dietz, No. 2:16-cv-459-DB, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36057 (D. Utah Mar. 13, 
2017). 
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M. Land Into Trust 
The last section discussed when land could be termed “Indian 
country” for purposes of federal law.638 The Indian Reorganization Act 
established a process by which the United States could take new land into 
trust for Indian tribes.639 These decisions are contentious as any land taken 
into trust is removed from the tax base of the state/county in which it sits 
and becomes subject to the tribe’s jurisdictional authority. This section 
will summarize an important Ninth Circuit opinion and then briefly 
summarize two other district court opinions that were decided on land into 
trust issues in 2017. 
In County of Amador v. United States Department of Interior, the 
County challenged a decision of the Department of the Interior to take land 
into trust for the Ione Band of Miwok Indians and permit the Band to 
operate a casino on the property.640 The County argued that Ione Band was 
not eligible to have land taken into trust under the IRA because the law 
requires that the Band be recognized back in 1934 (it was formally 
recognized in 1995), or alternatively, that the lands do not qualify for the 
“restored lands of a restored tribe” exception to IGRA.641 The district court 
disagreed and gave summary judgment to the Band.642 The Ninth Circuit 
unanimously affirmed.643 
The Ninth Circuit explained that the IRA statute permits Interior to 
take land into trust for the purpose of providing land to Indians and defines 
“Indian” as “all persons of Indian descent who are members of any 
recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction.”644 The Ninth 
Circuit recognized that the Supreme Court in Carcieri defined ‘now under 
Federal jurisdiction’ to mean those tribes who were under the jurisdiction 
of the United States in 1934, but that the Supreme Court left open when 
federal recognition had to occur.645 The Ninth Circuit held “Given the 
IRA’s text, structure, purpose, historical context, and drafting history—
                                                     
 638. Contrary to the commonsense perspective that all land within a reservation is owned by the 
federal government for the benefit of tribes (held in trust), much of this land was parceled out and sold 
to non-Indians under the Dawes Act. This Act resulted in non- Indians owning land in fee on the 
reservation, further complicating the jurisdictional questions presented to tribal courts. For discussions 
of the Dawes Act, see Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (1995). 
 639. Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 461 et. seq. (2011). 
 640. County of Amador v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 872 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 641. Id. at 1018–19. 
 642. Id. at 1019–20. 
 643. Id. at 1015. 
 644. Id. at 1020. 
 645. Id. at 1020 n.8 (“There is a third question left open by Carcieri: Are the ‘now under Federal 
jurisdiction’ and ‘recognized’ requirements even distinct, or do they comprise a single requirement? 
The Court in Carcieri did not explicitly hold that the two requirements are distinct but, as Justice 
Souter noted in his opinion, ‘[n]othing in the majority opinion forecloses the possibility that the two 
concepts, recognition and jurisdiction, may be given separate content.’”). 
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and Interior’s administration of the statute over the years—the better 
reading of § 5129 is that recognition can occur at any time.” 646 
Accordingly, the court held that a tribe qualifies to have land taken into 
trust for its benefit under § 5108 if it (1) was “under Federal jurisdiction” 
as of June 18, 1934, and (2) is “recognized” at the time the decision is 
made to take land into trust.647 
The Ninth Circuit went on to adopt Interior’s interpretation of the 
phrase “under federal jurisdiction” which broadly asks “whether the 
United States had . . . taken an action or series of actions . . . sufficient to 
establish or that generally reflect[ed] Federal obligations, duties, 
responsibility for or authority over the tribe by the Federal Government . . 
. .”648 
The court reasoned that such a flexible interpretation of the phrase is 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s language in United States v. John.649 
The Ninth Circuit applied this standard to the Band and determined that 
there were sufficient dealings with the United States both before and 
during 1934 to conclude that the Band was under federal jurisdiction for 
the purposes of the IRA.650 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit determined that the acquisition of land for 
the Band by Interior falls within the IGRA’s restored land to restored tribes 
provision.651 The County argued that because the Band was 
administratively recognized by Interior outside of the section 83 process 
the Band did not qualify for the IGRA exception.652 The Ninth Circuit 
disagreed, holding instead that Congress’ intent was to permit a qualifying 
tribe to be “restored” at any time.653 The Ninth Circuit thus affirmed the 
decision of the district court granting summary judgment to the Band and 
the United States and permitting the land to be taken into trust for the 
purpose of gaming.654 
                                                     
 646. Id. at 1024. 
 647. Id. 
 648. Id. at 1026. 
 649. Id. at 1027 (“‘[T]he fact that federal supervision over [a tribe] has not been continuous’ 
does not ‘destroy[] the federal power to deal with’ that tribe.”). 
 650. Id. at 1027–28. (“A 1941 letter from an Interior official in California to the Commissioner 
of Indian Affairs states that efforts to purchase land for the Ione Band resumed in 1935, but that the 
efforts once again failed, this time because of ‘mineral rights and values.’ Given that efforts were made 
by the federal government on the Band’s behalf a few years before and just one year after 1934, it was 
reasonable for Interior to conclude that the Band’s ‘jurisdictional status remained intact in 1934.’”). 
 651. Id. at 1028–31. 
 652. Id. at 1030. 
 653. Id. at 1030–31 (“Because Congress did not clearly intend for the ‘restored lands’ exception 
to be unavailable to those tribes administratively re-recognized outside the Part 83 process, 
grandfathering in those tribes would not frustrate congressional intent. Accordingly . . . Interior’s 
decision to grandfather in the Ione Band under 25 C.F.R. § 292.26(b) was permissible.”). 
 654. Id. at 1031. 
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District courts also grappled with challenges to a decision to take 
land into trust. Two notable decisions were decided in 2017 in which one 
tribe challenged the Secretary’s decision to take land into trust for another 
tribe. In Cachil Dehe Band of Wintun Indians. v. United States Department 
of Interior, the Colusa tribe asked the Court to reconsider the denial of its 
summary judgement motion contesting the decision by the Secretary to 
take land into trust for the benefit of the Estom Yumeka Maidu Tribe of 
the Enterprise Rancheria.655 The Court denied the request to reconsider, 
holding that it could not say as a matter of law that the decision by the 
Secretary to take land into trust was arbitrary and capricious, and that 
under IGRA the Secretary was not required to consider the adverse effects 
of the decision on the Colusa Band because it was located more than 25-
miles away from the subject of the land into trust decision. 656 
In Cherokee Nation v. Jewell, the Cherokee Nation challenged the 
2011 decision of the Department of the Interior to take a seventy-six acre 
parcel of land into trust for the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee that 
was located on the reservation of the Cherokee Nation.657 The Cherokee 
Nation argued that the decision was arbitrary and capricious, would violate 
treaties with the Cherokee, and would require the Cherokee’s consent.658 
The Eastern District of Oklahoma agreed and sent the decision back to the 
BIA Region for consideration.659 The court relied on 25 C.F.R. § 151.8660 
to conclude that the Cherokee Nation must consent to the transfer because 
the land, although belonging to a member of another tribe, was located 
within the outer boundaries of its reservation and that the decision to take 
the land into trust violated the 1866 Treaty with the Cherokee.661 
                                                     
 655. Cachil Dehe Band of Wintun Indians v. U.S. Dept of Interior, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9107 
(E.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2017). 
 656. Id. at *15–17. 
 657. Cherokee Nation v. Jewell, No. CIV-14-428-RAW, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82896 (E.D. 
Okla. May 31, 2017). 
 658. Id. at *2. 
 659. Id. at *26. 
 660. Id. at *20–21 (“[T]hat an individual Indian or tribe ’may acquire land in trust status on a 
reservation other than its own only when the governing body of the tribe having jurisdiction over such 
reservation consents in writing to the acquisition.’”). 
 661. Id. at *22–23 (“The court agrees with the Cherokee Nation’s arguments that taking land 
into trust within the Cherokee Nation’s former reservation without its consent violates its treaties, is 
contrary to precedent, and ignores the jurisdictional conflicts. The 1866 Treaty with the Cherokee 
Nation provides: ‘The United States guarantee to the people of the Cherokee Nation the quiet and 
peaceable possession of their country and protection against domestic feuds and insurrections, and 
against hostilities of other tribes.’ The members of the UKB are also Cherokee; thus, this could be 
considered a ‘domestic feud or insurrection.’ The UKB is also an independent tribe; thus, this could 
be considered ‘hostility of another tribe,’ as the UKB has announced its intention to assert exclusive 
jurisdiction over the Subject Tract. In either event, the 1866 Treaty guaranteed the Cherokee Nation 
protection against it.”) (internal citations omitted). 
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N. Payday Lending 
The payday lending cases all derive from questions of tribal 
sovereignty. Tribes are generally not subject to state law, and tribes have 
used this exception to expand their economic development in a number of 
different sectors. Some tribes have opted to operate or help facilitate 
payday lending because tribal entities are otherwise exempt from state 
usury laws.662 While there were no groundbreaking cases involving 
payday lending in 2017, this section will highlight a couple circuit court 
cases and will briefly summarize some of the more notable cases from 
other courts. 
In Dillon v. BMO Harris Bank, N.A., the plaintiff, an individual from 
North Carolina, entered into a loan agreement with Great Plains, a lender 
wholly owned by the Otoe-Missouria Tribe of Indians.663 North Carolina 
law prohibits loans with an interest rate over 16% as usurious, but 
plaintiff’s loan had an effective interest rate of 440.18%.664 The plaintiff 
electronically signed the loan agreement which included a clause that the 
loan was subject only to the laws and jurisdiction of the Otoe–Missouria 
Tribe and “no other state or federal law or regulation shall apply to this 
Agreement, its enforcement, or its interpretation.”665 The Fourth Circuit 
found this case indistinguishable from a 2016 case holding identical 
language was unenforceable as a matter of law.666 In addition to finding 
the choice of law provision unenforceable because it attempted to waive 
rights granted by federal statutes, the Fourth Circuit also held that the 
contract violated public policy.667 
In Finn v. Great Plains Lending LLC, the plaintiff took out a payday 
loan from the same defendant.668 After the defendant made repeated 
automated calls to the plaintiff’s phone in an attempt to collect, the 
                                                     
 662. Victor D. Lopez, When Lenders can Legally Provide Loans with Effective Annual Interest 
Rates Above 1,000 Percent, Is it Time for Congress to Consider a Federal Interest Cap on Consumer 
Loans?, 42 J. LEGIS. 36, 58 (2016) (“In recent years, lenders aligned with Indian tribes across the 
country have successfully used tribal immunity in many states to defeat usury laws. Despite criticism 
from consumer advocates and industry groups, as well as the mostly unsuccessful efforts of state 
attorneys general to enforce regulations, tribal-affiliated lenders operate with relative impunity.”). 
 663. Dillon v. BMO Harris Bank, N.A., 856 F.3d 330 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 664. Id. at 331. 
 665. Id. 
 666. Id. at 335 (“[W]e interpret these terms in the arbitration agreement as an unambiguous 
attempt to apply tribal law to the exclusion of federal and state law. . . . [W]e conclude that the 
arbitration agreement functions as a prospective waiver of federal statutory rights and, therefore, is 
unenforceable as a matter of law.”).  
 667. Id. at 336 (“[W]hen a party uses its superior bargaining power to extract a promise that 
offends public policy, courts generally opt not to redraft an agreement to enforce another promise in 
that contract. . . . Accordingly, we hold that the entire arbitration agreement is unenforceable.”). 
 668. Finn v. Great Plains Lending LLC, 689 Fed. Appx. 608 (10th Cir. 2017). 
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plaintiff sued under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.669 The 
defendant claimed that it was a corporation run by the Otoe–Missouria 
Tribe of Indians and therefore asked the court to dismiss on the basis of 
sovereign immunity.670 The plaintiff argued the defendant was actually run 
for the benefit of a non-tribal entity and asked for limited discovery on the 
question of tribal immunity.671 The district court denied the plaintiff’s 
request and dismissed on the basis of sovereign immunity.672 The Tenth 
Circuit reversed.673 It reasoned that the plaintiff’s allegations were specific 
and plausible and that the court needed more information before 
determining that the defendant was entitled to assert its immunity 
defense.674 The Tenth Circuit remanded the case with instructions to 
permit limited discovery.675 
State and federal district courts also decided payday pending cases in 
2017. A federal court upheld indictments against a non-Indian who had 
allegedly engaged the tribe’s immunity through a series of ‘sham business 
relationships’ to operate a payday lending network. 676 The court rejected 
the defendant’s attempt to hide behind the tribe holding, “a tribe has no 
legitimate interest in selling an opportunity to evade state law.”677 In the 
same lawsuit, the court ordered the production of attorney documents 
related to the defendant’s businesses, the plaintiff having successfully 
argued that the crime-fraud exception justified their production. 678 
In another federal case, the District Court of New Jersey refused to 
recognize tribal jurisdiction over non-member Indians subject to a payday 
loan agreement despite the presence of a choice of law clause specifying 
tribal law. 679 The court reasoned that the choice of law clause violated the 
                                                     
 669. Id. at 609. 
 670. Id. at 609–10. 
 671. Id. 
 672. Id. at 610. 
 673. Id. at 611. 
 674. Id. (“‘[D]iscovery should be ordered circumspectly and only to verify allegations of specific 
facts crucial to an immunity determination,’ and a discovery order should be ‘narrowly tailored . . . to 
the precise jurisdictional fact question presented.’”). 
 675. Id. at 611–12. 
 676. United States v. Tucker, 16-cr-91 (PKC), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134265 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 
1, 2017). 
 677. Id. at *9. 
 678. United States v. Tucker, 254 F. Supp. 3d 620 (S.D.N.Y. June 6, 2017). 
 679. Macdonald v. CashCall Inc., No. 16-2781, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64761 (D.N.J. Apr. 28, 
2017) (The loan agreement purported to apply only the law of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe and 
specifically disclaimed the applicability of any state or federal law. The initial $5,000 loan carried a 
116.73% interest rate. Taken out in December 2012, by April 2016 “Defendants had collected a total 
of $15,493.00 from Plaintiff on his $5,000 loan. This included $38.50 in principal, $15,256.65 in 
interest, and $197.85 in fees. At the time of the filing of the Complaint, Plaintiff still owed more than 
$7,833.91.” Id. at *2–3. (internal citations omitted)). 
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state’s public policy and was therefore unenforceable. 680 California state 
appellate courts remanded several cases to the lower courts after the 
California Supreme Court clarified that it is the burden of the tribal entity 
alleging sovereign immunity to prove that it qualifies as an ‘arm of the 
tribe,’ making it harder for payday lenders in that state from raising the 
sovereign immunity defense when sued by unhappy borrowers. 681 
O. Recognition of Indian Tribal Status 
The United States maintains a formal recognition process for Indian 
tribes.682 Only tribes that have been federally recognized are eligible for 
most federal benefits and programs designed for Indian tribes and Indian 
persons.683 There are currently 573 federally recognized tribes,684 a 
complete list of which is required by the Federally Recognized Tribes List 
Act (List Act) to be published annually in the Federal Register.685 Some 
tribes have not been federally recognized but are recognized by the state 
in which their traditional lands are located.686 These tribes are given 
whatever rights their states afford them and may qualify for a small 
number of federal programs by virtue of their state recognition.687 In 2017 
there were a handful of cases deciding issues related to the recognition of 
various Indian tribes. 
                                                     
 680. Id. at *18–28. 
 681. See Baille v. Processing Sols. LLC, A144105, 2017 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6771 at *21 
(Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2017); Baille v. Tucker, A142101, 2017 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6757 at 
*10–11 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2017); Rosas v. AMG Servs., A139147, 2017 Cal. App. Unpub. 
LEXIS 6756 at *6–7 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2017). 
 682. 25 C.F.R. § 83 (2018). 
 683. See Mark D. Myers, The State of Native America and its Unfolding Self-Governance: 
Federal Recognition of Indian Tribes in the United States, 12 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 271, 271–72 
(2001). 
 684. Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States Bureau 
of Indian Affairs, 83 Fed. Reg. 20, Pg. 4235 (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2018-
01-30/pdf/2018-01907.pdf [https://perma.cc/AXZ6-XV7F]. (The Federal Registrar recognized 567 
federally recognized tribes, but on January 29, 2018 the President signed H.R. 984, the Thomasina E. 
Jordan Indian Tribes of Virginia Federal Recognition Act of 2017 which added six new federally 
recognized tribes bringing the total to 573. See Press Release, The White House, President Donald J. 
Trump Signs H.R. 984 and H.R. 4641 into Law, (Jan. 29, 2018) https://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-signs-h-r-984-h-r-4641-law/ [https://perma.cc/T2AG-
LD33]. 
 685. Federally Recognized Indian Tribes List Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103–454, 108 Stat. 4791 
(1994). 
 686. For a discussion of state recognition see Alexa Koenig & Jonathan Stein, Federalism and 
the State Recognition of Native American Tribes: A Survey of State-Recognized Tribes and State 
Recognition Processes Across the United States, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 79 (2008) (The survey 
finds that as of 2008 there were 62 tribes that were recognized by states but not by the federal 
government spread across 16 states. Id. at 84.). 
 687. See id. 
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1. Federal Recognition 
In Wyandot Nation v. United States, the Wyandot Nation of Kansas 
claimed to be a federally recognized tribe as the successor in interest to the 
Historic Wyandot Nation.688 The Wyandot Nation of Kansas brought two 
claims against the United States for breach of trust related to two treaties 
signed with the Historic Wyandot Nation.689 The first claim was for 
monetary damages, and the second claim was for recognition that the 
Wyandot Nation of Kansas has an ownership interest in the Huron 
Cemetery, a Wyandot burial ground.690 The Court of Federal Claims 
dismissed the claims for lack of standing and jurisdiction, and the 
Wyandot Nation appealed.691 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that the List Act “exclusively 
governs federal recognition of Indian tribes”692 and therefore the Wyandot 
Nation of Kansas is not a federally recognized tribe and cannot to seek an 
accounting of trust monies.693 Since the tribe had previously petitioned 
Interior for recognition and was denied, the Federal Circuit held it was 
appropriate to dismiss the petitioner’s claim.694 For the same reason the 
Wyandot Nation of Kansas has no claim to the cemetery lands.695 
In Allen v. United States, plaintiffs were a group of eighteen persons 
who lived on or near the Pinoleville Rancheria, most of whom were 
previously members of the federally recognized Pinoleville Pomo Nation. 
696 Plaintiffs gave up their tribal membership and petitioned the BIA to 
recognize them as a new tribe and permit them to organize under the 
IRA.697 The BIA denied the request and plaintiffs filed suit under the 
Administrative Procedure Act, arguing the decision to deny their 
recognition was arbitrary and capricious, and was not supported by 
substantial evidence.698 
                                                     
 688. Wyandot Nation v. United States, 858 F.3d 1392 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 689. Id. at 1394. 
 690. Id. at 1396. 
 691. Id. at 1394. 
 692. Id. at 1398. 
 693. Id. at 1402–04 (“We hold that tribal recognition is within the primary jurisdiction of Interior 
and that we thus cannot independently make a determination of the effects of the various treaties or 
resolve the various conflicting legal and factual contentions about whether, apart from the Interior 
determination, Wyandot Nation is a federally recognized Indian tribe.”). 
 694. Id. at 1403 (“For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that the threshold issue of 
whether the appellant is in fact a federally recognized successor tribe to the Historic Wyandot Nation 
is within the primary jurisdiction of Interior, and that the Claims Court properly dismissed without 
prejudice.”). 
 695. Id. 
 696. Allen v. United States, No. C 16-04403 WHA, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194497, *2–4 (N.D. 
Cal. Nov. 27, 2017). 
 697. See id. at *6. 
 698. Id. at *6–7. 
894 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 41:805 
The federal district court granted the defendant’s motion for 
summary judgment.699 The court reasoned that the Regional Director 
concluded that the plaintiffs were a subset of an existing federally 
recognized tribe,700 which was further supported by the record.701 The 
court held that neither the IRA nor federal regulations permit recognition 
of a subset of an existing tribe.702 Finally the court rejected the plaintiffs 
contention that the Regional Director’s decision to deny recognition on the 
basis that they are a subset of an existing tribe announced a new ‘one-tribe-
only’ rule—or essentially that each reservation must consist of a single 
tribe.703 
Other cases decided in 2017 relating to recognition include (1) a 
determination that a tribe seeking federal recognition in federal court must 
first exhaust its administrative remedies,704 (2) a clarification that 
Congress is the body to whom a band of Indians claiming to be recognized 
by a prior treaty should direct their appeal,705 (3) a decision that challenges 
to a tribe’s recognition need to be brought in the federal district where the 
tribe claims to be located,706 (4) a refusal to block a tribal election because 
a group of tribal members believe they should be separately recognized as 
a tribe,707 (5) an affirmation of an agency decision that the California 
Valley Miwok tribe contains more than five recognized members,708 (6) a 
decision that a non-federally recognized tribe is ineligible for Indian 
                                                     
 699. Id. at *22. 
 700. Id. at *14 (The Regional Director “found that plaintiffs fell outside of the definition of tribe 
set forth in the IRA by dint of being ‘only a subset of the Indians for whom the Pinoleville Rancheria 
was set aside.’ This finding was based upon a rational interpretation of the relevant statutes as applied 
to the record, and was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 701. Id. at *17–9 (“Indeed, plaintiffs are descendants of several of the Indians for whom the 
rancheria was established in 1911 (a fact each of them notes in their declarations submitted to the 
BIA), which is ultimately what gave them the right to settle on the reservation. This, of course, 
supports the Regional Director’s conclusion that plaintiffs are only a subset of the descendants of the 
Indians for whom the reservation was set aside.”)(internal citations omitted). 
 702. Id. at *11–15. 
 703. Id. at *20–21 (“Plaintiffs point to the Wind River Reservation, where two recognized tribes 
reside, as proof that the one-tribe-per-reservation rule is contrary to the IRA. Those tribes, however, 
both fall within the IRA’s first definition of tribe, which includes historically recognized tribes. The 
Regional Director’s decision in no way defies such an arrangement and does not rest on a newly 
created one-tribe-per-reservation rule, as plaintiffs contend.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 704. See Mdewakanton Sioux Indians v. Zinke, 264 F. Supp. 3d 116 (D.D.C. Sept. 1, 2017). 
 705. Bruette v. Sec’y of Interior, No. 17-C-286, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152917, *19–20 (E.D. 
Wisc. Sept. 20, 2017). 
 706. See Tsi Akim Maidu of Taylorsville Rancheria v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, No. 16-cv-07189-
LB, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80732 (N.D. Cal. May 25, 2017). 
 707. See Mdewakanton Sioux Indians v. Zinke, 255 F. Supp. 3d 48 (D.D.C. June 9, 2017). 
 708. See Cal. Valley Miwok Tribe v. Zinke, NO. 2:16-01345 WBS CKD, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
84282, at *11-16 (E.D. Cal. May 31, 2017). 
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gaming under the IGRA,709 and (7) a resolution of a tribal leadership 
dispute which clarified that the appropriate person to claim funds a tribe 
was entitled to as proceeds from a class action suit was the factional leader 
recognized by Interior.710 
2. State Recognition 
2017 also saw several challenges by state recognized tribes. In 
Nanticoke Lenni-Lenape Tribal Nation v. Hoffman, the Tribe brought an 
action against the State alleging a violation of its rights under the New 
Jersey Constitution and common law when the State denied and repudiated 
the State’s prior recognition of the Tribe as an American Indian tribe. 711 
The New Jersey Superior Court reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the 
claim, holding that the Tribe had alleged a sufficient injury to overcome a 
motion to dismiss.712 
Like some of the cases involving federal recognition, there are also 
disputes among factions of state recognized tribes, each faction seeking 
legitimacy for its claim to speak for the tribe. In Schaghticoke Tribal 
Nation v. State, the plaintiff, Schaghticoke Tribal Nation, brought suit 
against the State of Connecticut for breaching various duties conferred by 
statute, constitution, and common law.713 Connecticut defended itself by 
arguing that the Schaghticoke Tribal Nation did not have the ability to 
appear in court as a representative of the Schaghticoke tribe the State had 
recognized.714 The State pointed out there is a second faction, the 
Schaghticoke Indian Tribe, and that the Tribal Nation alone cannot assert 
claims on behalf of the state recognized tribe.715 The court disagreed, 
holding that the Tribal Nation has associational standing to sue, however 
                                                     
 709. Frank’s Landing Indian Cmty. v. Nat’l Indian Gaming Comm’n, 242 F. Supp. 3d 1156 
(W.D. Wash. 2017). 
 710. See Ramah Navajo Chapter v. Jewell, No. 90 CV 957 JAP/KBM, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
108514 (D.N.M. July 11, 2017). 
 711. Nanticoke Lenni-Lenape Tribal Nation v. Hoffman, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1691 
(N.J. Super. Ct. July 10, 2017). 
 712. See id. at *10 (The benefits of state recognition include “plaintiff has suffered and will 
continue to suffer the loss of: the ability to market and sell products as ‘Indian-made’ under the Indian 
Arts and Crafts Act, 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 305 to 310; grants from the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services Administration (HHS) for Native Americans; the ability to do business as a certified tribal 
company; educational opportunities and funding; loss of funding from HHS’s block grant program; 
membership and standing in professional organizations, including the National Congress of American 
Indians; approval for lines of credit; and eligibility for government contracts.”). 
 713. Schaghticoke Tribal Nation v. State, X07HHDCV166072009S, 2017 Conn. Super. LEXIS 
4452 (Sup. Ct. Conn. Sept. 19, 2017). 
 714. Id. at *1. 
 715. Id. at *1–2. 
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the court was careful to limit the effect of its decision to the unique parties 
and facts before it.716 
P. Religion 
Every year, courts decide a handful of cases related to the religious 
rights of American Indians. Many of these cases are appeals from 
prisoners. With so many different American Indian religious traditions, it 
can be hard for prisons to accommodate the variety of requests for 
religious accommodation. This section includes a short discussion of four 
cases in which incarcerated Indians prevailed in some way on a freedom 
of religion claim. The section proceeds to review several cases where the 
government has been accused of infringing on American Indian religious 
traditions. 
1. Prisoners 
The courts decided a number of cases where American Indian 
prisoners alleged violations of the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).717 In Hildalgo v. Pennsylvania 
Department of Corrections, petitioner, a Mohawk Indian, complained that 
the only American Indian religious service offered at the prison was led 
by a Lakota and that the Mohawk do not smudge or engage in other 
traditions led by the Lakota leader.718 After petitioner complained, he was 
denied the right to participate in any Native American religious services.719 
The district court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss and permitted 
the case to proceed.720 
                                                     
 716. Id. at *7–8 (“[T]he Schaghticoke Tribal Nation is a group composed of Schaghticoke 
Indians who could have brought this lawsuit on their own but chose to do it as a group. Nothing here 
prevents the state from saying the other group purporting to represent the Schaghticoke tribe (which 
in fact has moved to intervene) or even the tribe members themselves are necessary parties to fairly 
resolving this litigation. Nothing here sheds any light whatsoever on the many other weighty questions 
of the case, including whether the state ever wronged the Schaghticokes and whether it is too late to 
do anything about any wrongs the state might have committed. It also doesn’t decide the state’s claim 
that it may not be sued without its permission and hasn’t given it—its claim of sovereign immunity.”). 
 717. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et. seq., 114 Stat. 
803 (Sept. 20, 2000). 
 718. Hildalgo v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 3:14-CV-03012-RAL, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3243, *3–4 
(W.D. Pa. Jan. 10, 2017) (“Native American religious practices dictate that when many nations come 
together, ‘it is up to the individual to decide whether . . . he or she chooses to smudge with the herbs 
being used.’ For smudging, ‘the herbs used are different for all [n]ations.’ The Native Americans at 
[the prison] are ‘told to follow a Lakota teaching’ even though members of many other tribes are 
there.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 719. Id. at *5 (“The result of these events is that Hildalgo was ‘banned from participating in 
Native American [s]ervices and removed from the [p]rison [c]all out sheet.’”). 
 720. Id. at *12–3 (The Court clarified that the Plaintiff’s claims which would proceed to 
discovery include (1) the right to freely exercise his religion under the First Amendment, (2) the 
prohibition of the religious practice violates the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 
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The court also allowed the petitioner’s claim to proceed under 
RLUIPA in Dorsey v. Shearin.721 The petitioner had made multiple 
requests for Native American religious services, but the warden denied the 
requests because the services included the use of ceremonial tobacco.722 
The court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss and ordered briefing 
on the merits within thirty days723 stating, “[p]rison walls do not form a 
barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the 
Constitution.”724 
In White v. Davis, the petitioner sued the prison director and the 
warden because he was in ill health and under the mandate of his tribal 
religious practice he needed to die with long hair; however the prison 
denied his request, telling him to grow a beard instead.725 The plaintiff 
argued that the prison’s grooming policy, which prevented men from 
having long hair, was not the least restrictive means to achieve its 
compelling government interest and therefore violated his constitutional 
rights.726 The court recognized that 38 states and the federal prison system 
have an accommodation for hair length, and that the Supreme Court had 
recently disfavored a ban on beard length.727 In Holt v. Hobbs, the Supreme 
Court held that a prison ban on hair length was not the least restrictive 
means because less restrictive means were available to protect the 
compelling government interest in prison safety.728 In White v. Davis, the 
magistrate judge concluded that a genuine issue of material fact existed 
regarding whether the ban on hair length was the least restrictive means to 
accomplish prison safety and so recommended that the summary judgment 
                                                     
(RLUIPA) wherein the failure to provide religious accommodation substantially burdens his First 
Amendment rights, and (3) that corrections officers illegal retaliated against him for asserting his First 
Amendment rights.). 
 721. Dorsey v. Shearin, No. GLR-15-3645, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38483 (D. Md. Mar. 17, 
2017). 
 722. Id. at *1. 
 723. Id. at *14. 
 724. Id. at *9 (citation omitted). 
 725. White v. Davis, A-16-CA-059-LY, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120453 *2–3 (W.D. Tex. August 
1, 2017) (“Plaintiff maintains it is his deeply held religious belief that he must have long hair upon his 
death in order to be recognized and taken into eternity by his ancestors, none of whom grew beards. 
Plaintiff asserts, prior to entering prison, he had never cut his hair.”). 
 726. Id. at *10–11 (On the RLUIPA claim the court focused on the least restrictive means 
analysis “Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff sincerely believes growing long hair is mandated by 
his faith and do not argue whether TDCJ ‘s grooming policy substantially burdens his ability to grow 
long hair. Therefore, the Court focuses on whether TDCJ’s short-hair grooming policy is the least 
restrictive means to advance its compelling interests in maintaining security and safety and controlling 
costs in light of the security risk presented by Plaintiff.”) 
 727. Id. at *15. 
 728. Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 864 (2015) (“[I]ts contraband argument would still fail 
because the Department cannot show that forbidding very short beards is the least restrictive means of 
preventing the concealment of contraband.”). 
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motions filed by both parties be denied and that the case timely proceed to 
trial.729 
In Schlemm v. Litscher, the plaintiff, an American Indian prison 
inmate, had previously won a verdict that the Wisconsin Department of 
Corrections had violated the plaintiff’s RLUIPA rights by failing to 
accommodate his religious request for a multi-colored headband, game 
meat, and fry bread at the annual Ghost Feast. 730 Here, the same plaintiff 
requested some modifications to that order including that he be permitted 
to acquire ‘fresh’ food brought in by a volunteer, local tribes, or a caterer, 
and that the court find the defendants in contempt for their refusal to 
comply with previous court orders.731 The court denied all of the plaintiff’s 
requests.732 It concluded that there was no evidence that dried game meat, 
if prepared without nitrates or chemicals, would place a substantial burden 
on the plaintiff’s religious practice nor was there evidence in the record 
that professional preparation of food was required.733 
2. Other Religion Cases 
In Morris v. Huebsch, the plaintiff, a member of the Red Cliff Band 
of Lake Superior Chippewa, brought suit against Wisconsin police officers 
for violating his First Amendment rights when they issued him a citation 
for playing his spiritual Chippewa drum in violation of a rule against 
playing any instrument in the capitol building without a permit.734 The 
citation was later dismissed.735 The court recognized that “[t]o the 
Chippewa people, drumming is a sacred form of musical expression that 
communicates feelings and spiritual energy, which cannot be expressed 
with the voice alone.”736 
The question left for the court was whether the officer had official 
immunity when he violated the First Amendment rights of the plaintiff.737 
The court determined that the rule against musical instruments in the 
                                                     
 729. White, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *19. 
 730. Schlemm v. Litscher, 11-cv-272-wmc, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156975, at *1 (W.D. Wisc. 
Sept. 26, 2017). 
 731. Id. at *1–2. 
 732. Id. at *2. 
 733. Id. at *9–10 (“Plaintiff provided no further testimony during the trial on his own belief that 
certain preparations of food are required for a meaningful Ghost Feast or that preserved foods would 
be inadequate. Nor did he explain the basis for these beliefs.”). 
 734. Morris v. Huebsch, 12-cv-319-wmc, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30770, *1-2 (W.D. Wisc. Mar. 
3, 2017). 
 735. Id. at *8. 
 736. Id. at *4–5. 
 737. Id. at *1. 
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capitol was content-neutral and thus applied intermediate scrutiny.738 The 
court concluded that the government has a substantial interest in protecting 
its citizens from unwanted noise.739 It further concluded that a ban on 
instruments without a permit was narrowly tailored enough because 
instruments can be much louder than voices and a permit permits officers 
to plan for loud noises which might otherwise limit their ability to be heard 
in an emergency.740 Finally it held there were other alternatives, the use of 
the voice, application for a permit, or playing the drum outside.741 
In Wingra Red-Mex Inc. v. Burial Sites Preservation Board, the court 
concluded that the plaintiff had not presented evidence to overcome the 
Burial Sites Preservation Board’s conclusion that “in the absence of 
contravening evidence, prehistoric Indian mounds—including effigy 
mounds [as in this case]—are properly considered to be human burial 
sites.”742 The circuit court later granted a motion to reconsider and 
reversed itself, removing protections for the Ward Mound.743 The 
appellate court reversed the circuit court and ordered that the Ward Mound 
remain protected.744 Of particular interest in the opinion was the religious 
significance of the Ward Mound to the Ho-Chunk people.745 The court 
relied upon this testimony to conclude that the original agency review that 
                                                     
 738. Id. at *15 (“[T]o survive intermediate scrutiny, a regulation must be ‘narrowly tailored to 
serve a significant governmental interest’. . . and they must ‘leave open ample alternative channels for 
communication of the information.’”). 
 739. Id. (“[T]here is no real dispute that the government has ‘a substantial interest in protecting 
its citizens from unwelcome noise . . . .’”). 
 740. Id. at *16–17 (“The rule requiring a permit to play an instrument does not clearly violate 
these principles. As a general matter, musical instruments can reach volumes far exceeding the limits 
of the human voice; in fact, drumming in the Capital has, in the past, proven to be so loud that officers 
were concerned they would not be heard if they needed to order an evacuation. By requiring a permit 
for instruments, and banning them otherwise, the Capitol police ensure that they are aware of, and can 
plan for, the use of instruments.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 741. Id. at *18. 
 742. Wingra Redi-Mex Inc. v. Burial Sites Pres. Bd., No. 2014AP2498, 2017 Wisc. App. LEXIS. 
563, at *9–10 (Wisc. Ct. App. July 31, 2017). 
 743. Wingra Redi-Mix Inc. v. State Historical Soc’y, Nos. 2015AP1632, 2015AP1844, 2017 
Wisc. App. LEXIS 564, at *1 (Wisc. Ct. App. July 31, 2017). 
 744. Id. at *2. 
 745. See id. at *10–11 (“Both witnesses testified about Ho-Chunk religious and spiritual beliefs 
concerning burial of the dead and that, according to Clan Leader Funmaker, the Ho-Chunk believe 
that one of the purposes of effigy mounds is to provide spiritual ‘protection’ to the dead interred within 
them. Clan Leader Funmaker testified that Ho-Chunk people believe that when the remains of a dead 
person are disturbed, ‘the spirit . . . goes wandering and it gets lost. They’re never at rest, they’re never 
at peace.’ Based on this belief, disturbing the dead after they have been buried is spiritually forbidden. 
Clan Leader Funmaker testified that, for the above reasons, the Ho-Chunk people consider the 
proposed disturbance of the Ward Mounds by Wingra Stone a desecration of those burial sites.”). 
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denied Plaintiff’s request to remove the Ward Mound from the catalog of 
protected cites was based on substantial evidence.746 
Q. Sovereign Immunity 
Tribal sovereignty is at the core of Indian law.747 It is also the basis 
of more than fifty opinions decided by federal and state courts in 2017.748 
There was a wide range of topics covered in relation to tribal sovereign 
immunity this year, including: whether federal statutes of general 
applicability apply to tribes,749 whether tribes are obligated to pay 
                                                     
 746. Id. at *12 (“We are satisfied that DHA’s decision is based on substantial evidence. There 
was testimony that the Ho-Chunk people consider as sacred all of the effigy mounds throughout the 
Four Lakes region, which include the Ward Mounds, and believe that desecration of burial sites in 
general, and the Ward Mounds specifically, is spiritually forbidden for the reason that the remains of 
Native American people who have died will wander, get lost, and not rest in peace if the burial sites 
are disturbed.”). 
 747. Wenona Singel, Labor and Employment Laws in Indian Country: The Institutional 
Economics of Tribal Labor Relations, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 487, 489 (2008) (“[M]uch of Indian 
law scholarship focuses on arguments based on the core attributes of tribal sovereignty”). 
 748. See, e.g., Comenout v. Whitener, No. 15-35261, No. 15-35268, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 
10640 (9th Cir. June 9, 2017); Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Great Plains Lending LLC, 846 F.3d 
1049 (9th Cir. 2017);  Montella v. Chugachmiut, 3:16-CV-00251 JWS, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156013 
(D. Alaska, Sept. 25, 2017); Dine Citizens Against Ruining Our Environment v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 
No. CV-16-08077-PCT-SPL, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147432 (D. Ariz. Sept. 11, 2017); Dine Dev. 
Corp. v. Fletcher, No. CIV 17-0015 JB/KBM, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34590 (D. N.M. March 10, 
2017); Forsythe v. Reno Sparks Indian Colony, No.: 2:16-cv-01867-GMN-VCF, 2017 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 140453 (D. Nev. Aug. 30, 2017); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Runyon, No. 3:17-cv-00038-AA, 97 
Fed. R. Serv. 3d 445, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33006 (D. Ore. March 8, 2017); Oglala Lakota Coll. v. 
Hudson Ins. Grp., CIV. 16-5093-JLV, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152932 (D.S.D. Sept. 20, 2017);;; 
Douglas Indian Ass’n v. Cent. Council of Tlingit, No. S-16235, No. 7198, 2017 Alas. LEXIS 112 
(Alaska, Sept. 8, 2017); Churchill Fin. Mgmt. Corp. v. ClearNexus Inc., 802 S.E.2d 85 (Ga. App. 
2017); Scott v. Dir. of Dep’t of Licensing, No. 75664-8-I, 2017 Wash. App. LEXIS 1486 (Wash. Ct. 
App. June 26, 2017). 
 749. See Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Great Plains Lending LLC, 846 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 
2017). The Ninth Circuit reiterated the proposition that “laws of general applicability govern tribal 
entities unless Congress has explicitly provided otherwise.” Id. at 1053. Because Congress did not 
write in an exception for Indian tribes, the Court reasoned that the Consumer Finance Protection Act 
applies to tribal businesses. Id. In contrast, see Pancheco v. Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Cmty., 
No. CV-16-01947-PHX-GMS 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23352, at *4–5 (D. Ariz. Feb. 15, 2017) 
(holding the Family Medical Leave Act does not apply to tribes “[w]ithout any explicit reference to 
‘court enforcement, suing or being sued, or any other phrase clearly contemplating suits against’ the 
tribe, the tribe’s adoption of FMLA policies do ‘not amount to an unequivocal waiver’ of sovereign 
immunity”); see also Bruguier v. Lac du Flambeau Band, 237 F. Supp. 3d 867, 870 (W.D. Wis. 2017) 
(holding that the Tribe is not an ‘employer’ for purposes of Section VII of the Civil Rights Act and 
therefore may raise sovereign immunity as a defense to claims of discrimination); Montella v. 
Chugachmiut, No. 3:16-CV-00251 JWS, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156013 (D. Alaska Sept. 25, 2017) 
(a second case concluding that a tribe may raise immunity to a Title VII action). 
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attorney’s fees under the Lanham Act,750 and whether tribal entities other 
than the tribe itself are eligible to assert immunity.751 
The rest of this section will focus on four larger subsets of immunity 
cases. The first deals with cases involving whether the tribe waived 
immunity, the second discusses whether tribal immunity extends to cases 
in rem and not just in personam, the third raises the relatively new issue 
of tribes licensing their immunity to drug companies, and the final section 
reviews a development in Alabama where that state’s supreme court has 
questioned the very existence of tribal sovereign immunity. 
1. Waiver of Immunity 
Generally a waiver of immunity cannot be implied but must be 
clearly and unequivocally expressed. In Casino Caribbean LLC v. Money 
Centers of America, QCA, a tribal casino run by the Quapaw Tribe, filed 
a claim against the bankruptcy trustee to recover funds it claimed are owed 
to it separately and not part of the bankruptcy estate. 752 The trustee 
counterclaimed to recoup money transferred in the last 90 days as allowed 
under the bankruptcy code.753 The trustee also brought a claim to recoup 
funds against Thunderbird, another tribal casino (owned by the Absentee 
Shawnee of Oklahoma).754 Both casinos moved to dismiss on the basis of 
sovereign immunity.755 
                                                     
 750. See Elem Indian Colony of Pomo Indians v. Ceiba Legal, LLP, 230 F. Supp. 3d 1146, 1150-
52 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 
 751. See Diné Citizens Against Ruining Our Environment v. BIA, No. CV-16-08077-PCT-SPL, 
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147432, at *11–12 (D. Ariz. Sept. 11, 2017) (Navajo Transitional Energy 
Company is a necessary party to an action to close a coal plant on the reservation and could not be 
joined because it enjoys the tribe’s sovereign immunity); Ireson v. Avi Casino Enters., No. 2:17-CV-
987 JCM (VCF), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106651, at *4 (D. Nev. July 10, 2017) (tribe’s casino 
enterprise was entitled to assert the tribe’s immunity); Churchill Fin. Mgmt. Corp. v. ClearNexus Inc., 
802 S.E.2d 85, 90 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017) (holding that Churchill is entitled to claim immunity as an arm 
of the tribe and therefore dismissing the action. “This result may seem unfair, but that is the reality of 
[tribal] sovereign immunity[.]” Id.); United States ex. rel. Cain v. Salish Kootenai College, Inc., 862 
F.3d 939, 940 (9th Cir. 2017) (remanding to the district court to determine whether a Tribal College 
is an ‘arm of the tribe’ and, therefore, not a person for purposes of the False Claims Act); Howard v. 
Plain Green, LLC, No. 2:17cv302, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137229, at *19 (E.D. Va. Aug. 7, 2017) 
(corporation owned by the tribe’s holding company closely enough related to be considered an ‘arm 
of the tribe’ for purposes of raising a sovereign immunity defense). 
 752. Casino Caribbean, LLC v. Money Ctrs. of Am. (In re Money Ctr. of Am., Inc.), 565 B.R. 
87, 92 (D. Del. 2017). 
 753. Id. at 93. 
 754. Id. at 94. 
 755. Id. at 97–98 (holding that the casinos are capable of asserting the tribe’s immunity; “Tribal 
sovereign immunity may extend to subdivisions of a tribe, including those engaged in economic 
activities, provided that the relationship between the tribe and the entity is sufficiently close to 
properly permit the entity to share in the tribe’s immunity”). 
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The trustee argued that the bankruptcy code abrogated tribal 
immunity because tribal governments are “governmental units” under 
106(a) and 101(27).756 The federal district court recognized there is a 
circuit split between the Ninth Circuit ruling that tribes are governmental 
units757 and the Eighth Circuit and Eastern District of Michigan ruling that 
states that tribes are immune under the Bankruptcy Code.758 The Delaware 
court was ultimately more persuaded by the Eighth Circuit.759 It relied 
upon the prior holdings which noted that Congress need not use ‘magic 
words’ but needs to clearly express its intent to abrogate immunity before 
an abrogation of immunity can be presumed.760 In a similar 2017 case, the 
Eastern District of California came to the opposite conclusion.761 
Following Ninth Circuit precedent, it held that the tribe could not claim 
immunity in the bankruptcy proceeding.762 
In Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida v. Lewis Tein, former 
attorneys for the Miccosukee Tribe filed civil tort claims against the tribe 
for malicious prosecution related to the tribe’s activity in four previous 
proceedings which had been resolved in the former attorneys’ favor. 763 
The tribe moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based 
upon the defense of sovereign immunity.764 The trial court denied the 
motion claiming the tribe waived its immunity in a previous action where 
it had advanced money to members in order to pay lawyers bills and that 
filing continuous frivolous lawsuits constituted a waiver of immunity with 
regard to the matter.765 
The Florida appellate court reversed.766 It held that absent an express, 
clear, explicit, and unmistakable waiver of immunity or congressional 
abrogation of immunity tribes are immune to the civil jurisdiction of 
                                                     
 756. See id. at 101–02 (“This Court concludes that Congress has not unequivocally abrogated 
the sovereign immunity of Indian tribes under sections 106(a) and 101(27) of the Bankruptcy Code.”). 
Id. at 103. 
 757. Krystal Energy Co. v. Navajo Nation, 357 F.3d 1055, 1057–58 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 758. In re Whitaker, 474 B.R. 687, 697 (8th Cir. 2012); In re Greektown Holdings LLC, 532 
B.R. 680, 700–01 (E.D. Mich. 2015). 
 759. See Casino Caribbean, LLC, 565 B.R. at 103 (“The Court finds that, as neither the terms 
‘Indians’ nor ‘Indian tribes’ were included in the language of section 101(27) of the Bankruptcy Code, 
Congress did not unequivocally express an intent to abrogate the sovereign immunity of Indian tribes 
in section 106(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.”). 
 760. Id. 
 761. See Jamestown S’Klallam Tribe v. McFarland, No. CIV. NO. 2:17-00293-WBS, 2017 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 152372 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2017). 
 762. Id. at *6 (“because the Tribe has failed to demonstrate that § 106(a)’s reference to § 544 
should be limited to § 544(a), the court finds the bankruptcy court was correct in concluding that the 
Tribe’s sovereign immunity has been abrogated.”). 
 763. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. Lewis Tein, P.L., 227 So. 3d 656 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017). 
 764. Id. at 660. 
 765. Id. at 668–69. 
 766. Id. at 669. 
2018] The Year in Indian Law 2017 903 
courts.767 Tribal immunity survived because no waiver was present in this 
case.768 The court reasoned that a waiver of immunity exists only for the 
particular matter in which immunity was waived.769 In this instance the 
tribe waived immunity related to its attorney’s release of copies of checks 
that were loaned by tribal members to pay legal bills related to a wrongful 
death lawsuit.770 The tribe’s immunity was waived only for the disclosure 
of checks and no further.771 Furthermore the appellate court held that even 
evidence of vexatious and bad faith litigation did not amount to a waiver 
of immunity;772 this is true “even where the results are deeply troubling, 
unjust, unfair, and inequitable.”773 Additionally, the court held that a tribe 
that waives immunity by participating in one piece of litigation has not 
waived immunity for a second, related piece of litigation, and “[i]f the 
unfairness and inequity of a tribal employee negligently killing or 
battering someone is not enough to waive immunity, it follows that 
allegations of vexatious and bad faith litigation are also not enough to 
waive or abrogate it.”774 
Holdings by other courts in 2017 affirm this notion that there is a 
high—but not insurmountable—bar for a finding that sovereign immunity 
has been waived or abrogated. For example, courts held that (1) producing 
documents to the United States waives a tribes ability to claim immunity 
to prevent it from producing the same documents to opposing parties in 
litigation,775 (2) a tribe is not a ‘person’ under the False Claims Act and so 
can claim immunity,776 (3) a choice of forum clause selecting Suffolk 
County as the place to resolve conflicts in a contract was not an 
unequivocal waiver of immunity,777 (4) they will assume tribes and their 
                                                     
 767. Id. at 658 (“Whatever its wisdom, tribal immunity endures, and Indian tribes are not subject 
to the civil jurisdiction of our courts absent a clear, explicit, and unmistakable waiver of tribal 
sovereign immunity or a congressional abrogation of that immunity. Because neither exception to 
tribal immunity has been established in this case, we reverse the trial court’s denial of the Miccosukee 
Tribe’s motion to dismiss.”). 
 768. Id. 
 769. See id. at 661–64 (“If the Tribe dips its toe in the litigation waters, the reasoning goes, it 
can be asked about its toe but not the whole body.”). 
 770. Id. (“The Tribe was immune from the Bermudez lawsuit but waived its immunity to a 
limited extent to allow Roman’s deposition about the disclosure of the sixty-one checks and check 
stubs.”). 
 771. Id. at 664. 
 772. Id. at 666. 
 773. Id. at 667. 
 774. Id. 
 775. United States v. Encore Servs. LLC, No. GF-16-19-GF-BMM-JTJ 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
23973, at *2–3 (D. Mont. Feb. 21, 2017). 
 776. Dahlstrom v. Sauk-Suiattle Indian Tribe, NO. C16-0052JLR, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40654, 
at *7 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 21, 2017). 
 777. Aron Sec. Inc. v. Unkechaug Indian Nation, 54 N.Y.S. 3d 668, 671 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 2017) 
(“Although this choice of forum clause requires ‘any claim or controversy’ regarding the contract to 
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officials are immune from suit, tribal officials need not appear themselves 
to assert sovereign immunity,778 (5) even if a contract contains a valid 
waiver of immunity, if the contract is not valid the tribe may still raise the 
immunity defense to have the case dismissed,779 (6) “a tribe does not waive 
its sovereign immunity from actions that could not otherwise be brought 
against it merely because those actions were pleaded in a counterclaim to 
an action filed by the tribe,”780 (7) merely accepting federal money, 
without more, does not constitute a waiver of immunity,781 (8) one tribe 
may raise sovereign immunity to a claim brought by another tribe,782 and 
(9) tribal sovereign immunity applies to individual employees acting in 
their official capacity.783 
2. In Rem Jurisdiction 
As noted in Section III, the U.S. Supreme Court has granted certiorari 
on a Washington State Supreme Court case regarding a tribe’s sovereign 
immunity defense in an in rem proceeding.784 In a 5–4 opinion, the 
Washington State Supreme Court held that a tribe’s sovereign immunity 
defense does not prevent litigation from going forward in an in rem 
proceeding because the state court has control over the property.785 After 
Lundgren was decided, the Wisconsin state courts came to the contrary 
conclusion in a case involving the imposition and collection of state taxes 
on tribally owned timber.786 
In Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources v. Timber & Wood 
Products, the Wisconsin’s Department of Natural Resources brought suit 
against Lac Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of 
Wisconsin to recover taxes owed under Wisconsin’s Forest Cropland 
                                                     
be resolved in Suffolk County, it does not require that such claim or controversy be resolved by a state 
court. Rather, under the clause, a party could bring a claim before a mediator, an arbitrator, a tribal 
court, a state court, or a federal court, as long as the selected forum was located in Suffolk County. 
Thus, unlike the cases involving arbitration clauses, this clause does not unequivocally express the 
defendant’s agreement to be sued in a state court.”) 
 778. Harper v. White Earth Human Res., No. 16-1797 (JRT/LIB), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25608, 
at *4 (D. Minn. Feb. 22, 2017). 
 779. Stillaguamish Tribe of Indians v. Washington, NO. 3:16-cv-05566-RJB, 2017 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 126381, at *21–22 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 9, 2017). 
 780. Quinault Indian Nation v. Pearson, 868 F.3d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 781. Forsythe v. Reno Sparks Indian Colony, No.: 2:16-cv-01867-GMN-VCF, 2017 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 140453, at *8–9 (D. Nev. Aug. 30, 2017). 
 782. Douglas Indian Ass’n v. Cent. Council of Tlingit, No. S-16235, No. 7198, 403 P.3d 1172, 
1179 (Alaska Sept. 8, 2017). 
 783. WD at the Canyon, LLC v. Honga, No. 1 CA-CV 16-0468, 2017 Ariz. App. Unpub. LEXIS 
1715 (Ariz. Ct. App. Nov. 14, 2017). 
 784. Lundgren v. Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, 389 P.3d 569 (Wash. 2017). 
 785. See supra Section III.B.2 
 786. Wis. Dep’t of Natural Res. v. Timber & Wood Prods., No. 2017AP181, 2017 Wisc. App. 
LEXIS 1053 (Wisc. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2017) (recommended for publication in official reporters). 
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Law.787 The Department also sued the property itself in rem.788 The lower 
court granted the tribe’s motion to dismiss on the basis of sovereign 
immunity.789 
The Wisconsin appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the 
Department’s action.790 First, the court concluded the tribe did not waive 
its immunity by agreeing to comply with Wisconsin’s Forest Crop law.791 
The court reasoned that the tribe’s agreement to comply with state law 
may have created ambiguity regarding the availability of the sovereign 
immunity defense but that any waiver of immunity must be clear and 
unambiguous.792 
The Wisconsin appellate court also rejected the Department’s 
attempt to proceed to collect the tax through asserting in rem jurisdiction 
over the timber itself. The court began by articulating a difference between 
a tribe’s ‘sovereign authority’ and its ‘sovereign immunity’ from suit, and 
it used the difference to help explain the various cases cited to it by both 
the tribe and the Department.793 After articulating that difference the court 
focused on the defense of sovereign immunity.794 It concluded that while 
the state may impose its tax against the tribe, it cannot sue the tribe to 
collect if the tribe does not pay;795 “In other words, while the Tribe’s 
property is not synonymous with Tribe for purposes of the imposition of 
the tax, the property at issue is synonymous with the Tribe for purposes of 
collection.”796 Accordingly it extended the tribe’s sovereign immunity 
from suit to the wood products and denied the Department’s attempt to 
proceed against them in rem.797 
                                                     
 787. Id. at *8. 
 788. Id. at *1. 
 789. Id. at *9. 
 790. Id. at *1. 
 791. Id. at *11 (“The law is clear, however, that ‘[t]here is a difference between the right to 
demand compliance with state laws and the means available to enforce them.’ Consistent with that 
principle, courts throughout the country have repeatedly held that a tribe’s mere agreement to comply 
with a particular law does not amount to an unequivocal waiver of the tribe’s sovereign immunity.”). 
 792. Id. at *11–12. 
 793. Id. at *23 (“‘Tribal sovereign authority and tribal sovereign immunity are distinct doctrines 
with different origins and purposes.’ A tribe’s sovereign authority ‘concerns the extent to which a tribe 
may exercise jurisdictional authority over lands the tribe owns to the exclusion of state jurisdiction.’ 
It is ‘inherently distinct from the notion of tribal sovereign immunity—the plenary right to be free 
from having to answer a suit.’”) (internal citations omitted). 
 794. Id. at *23–24. 
 795. Id. 
 796. Id. at *24. 
 797. Id. at *29. 
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3. Drug Patents 
In Allergan Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., Allergan filed a 
letter with the court notifying it that it had assigned its rights to the 
pharmaceutical patents contested in the litigation to the Saint Regis 
Mohawk Tribe and that the tribe had granted Allergan an exclusive license 
to the patents at issue.798 Allergan is paying $13.5 million up front and then 
$15 million a year to obtain the exclusive license.799 Defendants argued 
that the purpose of the assignment was to utilize the tribe’s sovereign 
immunity to cut off pending challenges to the validity of the patents with 
the Patent Office.800 The court recognized the defendant’s concerns noting 
that the tribe has already sought to enter a special appearance in litigation 
pending before the Patent and Trademark Office.801 The issue in this 
opinion was whether the tribe should be added as a plaintiff under rule 
25(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which relates to transfer of 
interest.802 
The court strongly rebuked the attempted legal strategy.803 The court 
even suggested that it might refuse to enforce the agreement between 
Allergan and the tribe on the basis of public policy.804 
                                                     
 798. Allergan Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA Inc., No. 2:15-cv-1455-WCB, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
170825, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2017). 
 799. Id. 
 800. Id. (“Allergan ‘has admitted in other forums that the intent is to employ Native American 
sovereign immunity and attempt to cut-off pending validity challenges with the Patent Office.’ Mylan 
argued that ‘Allergan is attempting to misuse Native American sovereignty to shield invalid patents 
from cancellation.’”). 
 801. Id. at *7. 
 802. See id. at *8. 
 803. See id. at *10–11 (“The Court has serious concerns about the legitimacy of the tactic that 
Allergan and the Tribe have employed. The essence of the matter is this: Allergan purports to have 
sold the patents to the Tribe, but in reality it has paid the Tribe to allow Allergan to purchase—or 
perhaps more precisely, to rent—the Tribe’s sovereign immunity in order to defeat the pending IPR 
proceedings in the PTO. This is not a situation in which the patentee was entitled to sovereign 
immunity in the first instance. Rather, Allergan, which does not enjoy sovereign immunity, has 
invoked the benefits of the patent system and has obtained valuable patent protection for its product, 
Restasis. But when faced with the possibility that the PTO would determine that those patents should 
not have been issued, Allergan has sought to prevent the PTO from reconsidering its original issuance 
decision. What Allergan seeks is the right to continue to enjoy the considerable benefits of the U.S. 
patent system without accepting the limits that Congress has placed on those benefits through the 
administrative mechanism for canceling invalid patents.”). 
 804. Id. at *12 (“Although sovereign immunity has been tempered over the years by statute and 
court decisions, it survives because there are sound reasons that sovereigns should be protected from 
at least some kinds of lawsuits. But sovereign immunity should not be treated as a monetizable 
commodity that can be purchased by private entities as part of a scheme to evade their legal 
responsibilities. It is not an inexhaustible asset that can be sold to any party that might find it 
convenient to purchase immunity from suit. Because that is in essence is what the agreement between 
Allergan and the Tribe does, the Court has serious reservations about whether the contract between 
Allergan and the Tribe should be recognized as valid, rather than being held void as being contrary to 
public policy.”). 
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Ultimately, the court allowed the tribe to be added as a co-plaintiff.805 
The court explained that the defendants did not show they would be 
prejudiced by the joinder of a co-plaintiff and given the current procedural 
posture of the case the tribe’s joinder will not cause a delay in the 
proceedings.806 The court was clear that it was not allowing the addition 
because the assignment of the patent rights in Restasis was valid.807 Rather, 
the court was allowing it as a precaution against future challenges in which 
the assignment might be upheld and, thus, any future decisions rendered 
by the court be voided for failure to join a necessary party.808 
4. Scope of Immunity (Alabama Cases) 
In 2017, the Alabama Supreme Court decided three notable cases in 
which it seemed to suggest that it was time to officially reexamine whether 
Indian tribes may assert sovereign immunity from suit, at least in the 
context of tort actions.809 In Harrison v. PCI Gaming Authority, plaintiffs 
brought suit against entities owned and controlled by the Poarch Band of 
Creek Indians for dram shop liability stemming from a drunk driver who 
caused an accident where plaintiff’s son was killed.810 The lower court had 
dismissed on the basis of tribal sovereign immunity.811 The Alabama 
Supreme Court reversed in a per curiam opinion, holding that the doctrine 
of tribal sovereign immunity should be revisited and reversed.812 The court 
remanded for consideration of subject matter jurisdiction after recognizing 
the parties disagreed about the application of subject matter jurisdiction.813 
The tribe claims the wrongful act was the serving of alcohol which 
occurred on tribal lands, but the plaintiff claims that the injury occurred 
                                                     
 805. Id. at *20. 
 806. Id. at *19–20 (“[I]n light of the fact that the trial and the post-trial briefing in the case has 
been completed, the presence of the Tribe as a co-plaintiff will not interfere with the prompt entry of 
the Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the Court’s the final judgment in this case. 
Allergan has represented that ‘the joinder will not otherwise impact the substantive issues in the 
litigation.’ And, as the successor-in-interest to Allergan, the Tribe would be bound by any judgment.”) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 807. Id. at *19. 
 808. Id. at *20 (“[T]he Court does not hold that the assignment of the patent rights to the Tribe 
is valid, but instead proceeds on the ground that the assignment may at some point be held valid, and 
that joining the Tribe as a party in this action is necessary to ensure that the judgment in this case is 
not rendered invalid because of the absence of a necessary party.”). 
 809. See Harrison v. PCI Gaming Auth., 1130168, 2017 Ala. LEXIS 98 (Ala. Sept. 29, 2017); 
Wilkes v. PCI Gaming Authority, 1151312e, 2017 Ala. LEXIS 105 (Ala. Sept. 29, 2017); Rape v. 
Poarch Band of Creek Indians, 1111250, 2017 Ala. LEXIS 103 (Ala. Sept. 29, 2017). 
 810. Harrison, 2017 Ala. LEXIS at *1–2. 
 811. Id. at *3. 
 812. Id. at *21 (“[T]his Court today in the case of Wilkes, supra, declines to extend the doctrine 
of tribal immunity to actions in tort, in which the plaintiff has no opportunity to bargain for a waiver 
and no other avenue for relief.”). 
 813. Id. at *21–22. 
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on the highway or was where the petitioner’s son died which were both in 
Alabama and not on the reservation.814 
In Wilkes v. PCI Gaming Authority, plaintiffs were injured in an 
automobile accident when their vehicle was hit by another vehicle driven 
by an intoxicated employee of the defendant, a gaming enterprise owned 
and operated by the Poarch Band of Indians.815 The trial court had 
dismissed on the basis of sovereign immunity,816 and the Alabama 
Supreme Court reversed.817 It refused to extend tribal sovereign immunity 
into the realm of tort cases.818 Citing Justice Stevens’ dissent in Kiowa, the 
Alabama Supreme Court concluded that sovereign immunity is improper 
in tort cases where the plaintiff lacked an opportunity to negotiate with the 
tribal defendant for a waiver of immunity.819 
In Rape v. Poarch Band of Creek Indians, a non-member alleged that 
he won a triple multiplier on a jackpot win of $459,000 resulting in a 
$1,377,015.30 prize during a ‘spin bet’ at a casino run by the Poarch Band 
of Creek Indians.820 When the defendant failed to pay, claiming instead 
that the machine had malfunctioned, the casino patron filed a claim in state 
court.821 The lower court dismissed on the basis of sovereign immunity.822 
The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal823 but refused to issue 
an opinion on the basis of immunity.824 Instead the court held that the 
plaintiff was in a “Catch-22.”825 The court reasoned that it is possible that 
under Carcieri the Poarch Band was not ‘under federal recognition’ in 
1934 and so its lands should not have been taken into trust, and therefore 
the gaming took place on state land.826 But if that is true—the gaming was 
unlawful as the county in which it took place does not permit bingo, and 
the Alabama Supreme Court will not assist a plaintiff to recover the 
                                                     
 814. Id. 
 815. Wilkes, 2017 Ala. LEXIS 105 at *1. 
 816. Id. at *4. 
 817. Id. at *10–11 (“In light of the fact that the Supreme Court of the United States has expressly 
acknowledged that it has never applied tribal sovereign immunity in a situation such as this, we decline 
to extend the doctrine beyond the circumstances to which that Court itself has applied it; accordingly, 
we hold that the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity affords the tribal defendants no protection from 
the claims asserted by Wilkes and Russell. As Justice Stevens aptly explained in his dissent in Kiowa, 
a contrary holding would be contrary to the interests of justice, especially inasmuch as the tort victims 
in this case had no opportunity to negotiate with the tribal defendants for a waiver of immunity.”). 
 818. Id. at *12. 
 819. Id. at *10–11. 
 820. Rape, 2017 Ala. LEXIS 103 at *2. 
 821. Id. at *4. 
 822. Id. 
 823. Id. at *38. 
 824. Id. at *26. 
 825. Id. at *27. 
 826. Id. at *27–28. 
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proceeds of illegal activity.827 On the other hand, it is possible that the land 
the Poarch Band’s casino operates on was properly taken into trust.828 In 
that case the proper forum to resolve the dispute is tribal court, and the 
state courts lack subject matter jurisdiction.829 Without deciding which of 
those possibilities exists, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the 
dismissal.830 
R. Taxation 
In 2017, there were about twenty cases decided by federal courts 
involving taxation. By far the most common procedural posture was the 
state attempting to tax conduct on the reservation.831 The Supreme Court 
has generally held that a state may not tax persons or activity on the 
reservation if the imposition of the tax would infringe upon the tribe’s right 
to govern itself or if it is preempted.832 Indian preemption is a little 
                                                     
 827. Id. (“The activity out of which Rape’s claim arose, however, was gambling. If it occurred 
on land within the regulatory and adjudicative jurisdiction of the State of Alabama, that activity was 
illegal. . . . It is well established that this Court will not aid a plaintiff seeking to recover under an 
illegal contract but, instead, will simply leave the parties where it finds them.”). 
 828. Id. at *22–23. 
 829. See id. at *37 (The Alabama Court reasoned “[o]n the one hand, if the dispute here arises 
from activity determined to be ‘permitted by Federal law’ and thus to be the subject of a congressional 
delegation of ‘regulatory authority’ to the Tribe, then disputes arising out of the same would, as noted, 
likewise be a legitimate adjudicative matter for the Tribe, and the circuit court’s dismissal of Rape’s 
claims would have been proper on that basis. But conversely, even if it were to be determined that the 
gaming at issue were illegal under the provisions of IGRA and therefore not the subject of an ‘express 
congressional delegation’ of regulatory authority to the Tribe, it would be that very illegality that 
would also prevent our state courts from providing relief to Rape under the principles discussed 
previously.”). 
 830. Id. at *38. 
 831. See Tulalip Tribes v. Washington, No. 2:15-cv-00940-BJR, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1646 
(W.D. Wash. Jan. 5, 2017); Seneca Nation of Indians v. Paterson, No. 1:10-CV-00687 (MAT), 2017 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9060 (W.D. NY January 23, 2017); Lake Cty. v. State, No. DV 16-206, 2017 Mont. 
Dist. LEXIS 14 (Mont. Dist. Jan. 27, 2017); Desert Water Agency v. United States DOI, 849 F.3d 
1250 (9th Cir. 2017); Cougar Den, Inc. v. Dep’t of Licensing, 392 P.3d 1014 (Wash. 2017); Smith v. 
Dep’t of Revenue, TC-MD 160383R, 2017 Ore. Tax LEXIS 39 (Ore. Tax Ct. Mar. 16, 2017); New 
York v. UPS, 253 F. Supp. 3d 583 (S.D.N.Y. May 25, 2017); New York v. UPS, 15-cv-1136 (KBF), 
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80907 (S.D.N.Y. May 25, 2017); Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Comm’r of 
Internal Revenue, Docket No. 28120-14, 148 T.C. No. 11 (U.S. Tax Ct. Apr. 5, 2017); Agua Caliente 
Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Riverside Cty, No.: ED CV 14-0007-DMG (DTBx), 2017 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 92592 (C.D. Cal. June 15, 2017); Keweenaw Bay Indian Cmty. v. Khouri, No: 2:16-cv-121, 
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101890 (W.D. Mich. June 30, 2017); Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe v. Gerlach, 
CIV 14-4171, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150037 (D.S.D. Sept. 15, 2017); People ex rel Becerra v. Rose, 
16 Cal. App. 5th 317 (Cal. App. 2017); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Biegalski, No. 16-62775-Civ-
Scola, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169009 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 12, 2017); Mitchell v. Tulalip Tribes of 
Washington, NO. C17-1279-JCC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182243 (W.D. Wash., Nov. 2, 2017); 
Comenout v. Pittman, NO. 3:16-cv-05464-RJB, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205941 (W.D. Wash., Dec. 
14, 2017). 
 832. See McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Oklahoma Tax Comm’n 
v. Sac and Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114 (1993); Mescalero Apache v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973); Warren 
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different than traditional constitutional preemption and looks more like 
interest balancing. When the interests of the state to levy its tax are weaker 
than the interests of the tribe and the United States to allow the tribe to be 
free from the tax, then the state’s authority to tax is preempted.833 This 
section cannot possibly highlight the detailed analysis of every tribal tax 
case and so presents a couple of the most detailed decisions and a brief 
summary of some of the others. 
In Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Riverside County , the 
tribe contested the authority of the county to impose a Possessory Interest 
Tax (PIT) on non-Indian lessees who occupied land on the Agua Caliente 
Band’s reservation.834 Both the tribe and the county sought summary 
judgment on three issues: (1) whether the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) 
preempts the state tax, (2) whether Bracker should result in preemption, 
and (3) whether the PIT infringes on the Tribe’s sovereignty.835 The court 
held that the county may assess the PIT.836 
The court recognized that the IRA does have a provision which 
prohibits state taxes from being levied on land taken into trust under the 
IRA, but the court concluded that the Band’s land was held for them since 
before the IRA was enacted, not through the IRA’s land into trust 
mechanism.837 Accordingly, the IRA’s prohibition of taxation does not 
apply to the Band’s land because it was not taken into trust pursuant to the 
statute.838 
The United States, as amicus, took the position that Bracker should 
preempt the state taxation of reservation lands leased to non-Indians.839 
The district court concluded that the federal interests were sufficient to 
preempt state taxation absent sufficient state interests;840 however, the 
                                                     
Trading Post v. Ariz. Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965); White Mountain Apache v. Bracker, 448 
U.S. 136 (1980). 
 833. White Mountain Apache v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 144–145 (1980). 
 834. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Riverside Cty, No.: ED CV 14-0007-DMG 
(DTBx), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92592, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 15, 2017). 
 835. Id. at *18. 
 836. Id. at *53. 
 837. Id. at *19–28 (“[T]wo executive orders that long predate the IRA and the 1955 Act 
established and expanded the Reservation, taking this case outside of section 465’s purview.”). 
 838. Id. at *28–29. 
 839. Id. at *32–33 (“The United States, as amicus curiae in this case, contends that the 
comprehensiveness of the federal and regulatory scheme governing the leasing of Indian land, coupled 
with the federal interest in tribal sovereignty, ‘weigh heavily against state and local taxation.’”). 
 840. Id. at *34–35 (“Given the Ninth Circuit’s pronouncements on the federal statutory and 
regulatory scheme of Indian leasing, the Secretary’s thorough and persuasive interpretation of the 
statutes and regulations it administers, and the federal policy of promoting Indian welfare and 
economic independence, the Court concludes that the federal interests here, like those at stake in 
Bracker and Ramah, are pervasive enough to preclude the burdens of a tax, absent sufficient state 
interests.”). 
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court concluded the state had asserted sufficient interests, ranging from 
“public road maintenance and animal and pest control services, to larger 
undertakings such as public safety, law enforcement, and education.”841 
Although, the court concluded that the PIT taxes give the state more than 
a mere interest in raising revenue; the PIT taxes were directly related to 
the services that the state provides to non-Indian lessees and therefore were 
sufficient to defeat the presumption of preemption based on the alleged 
federal interests.842 Therefore, the court held that the county’s tax was not 
preempted by Bracker’s interest balancing.843 
Finally, the court concluded that the County’s tax did not infringe on 
the right of the tribe to make its own laws and be governed by them.844 It 
pointed out that the tribe could assert its own taxes in addition to those 
imposed by the County.845 
In Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe v. Gerlach, the tribe sought a court 
order to prevent South Dakota from levying its taxes on purchases made 
by non-members on the reservation.846 South Dakota attempted to collect 
its use tax on the sale of goods and services to non-members at the tribe’s 
Royal River Casino & Hotel and First American Mart (the tribal store).847 
South Dakota also argued that it could condition the reissuance of a liquor 
license on the collection and remittance by the tribe of the state use tax.848 
The tribe sought summary judgment, arguing that the imposition of the 
state use tax was preempted by the IGRA and/or preempted in general 
because it infringes on tribal sovereignty and thus contradicts established 
tribal and federal interests.849 
After some lengthy discussion the court concluded that state taxation 
of all activity that is related to gaming was preempted by the IGRA.850 It 
                                                     
 841. Id. at *40. 
 842. Id. at *41–43 (“[T]he PIT and the allocation of its revenues appear to be based, at least in 
part, on the share of services and benefits that the lessees enjoy. . . . the state interest in raising revenues 
here is at its strongest because, by and large, ‘the taxpayer is the recipient of state services.’”). 
 843. See id. at *43. 
 844. Id. at *52–53. 
 845. Id. at *51 (“Agua Caliente has not provided this Court with evidence of the PIT’s actual 
obstruction of tribal governance. As explained above, the Tribe may impose its own tax concurrently 
with that of the County. Thus, this is not a case where the state has ‘tak[en] revenue that would 
otherwise go towards supporting the Tribe and its programs.’”). 
 846. Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe v. Gerlach, CIV 14-4171, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150037, at 
*2 (D.S.D. Sept. 15, 2017). 
 847. Id. at *2–3. 
 848. Id. at *5. 
 849. Id. at *6. 
 850. Id. at *34–35 (“[T]he Court holds that the slots, table games, food and beverage services, 
hotel, RV park, live entertainment events, and gift shop are directly related to class III gaming . . . 
regulation and taxation is, therefore, compactable between a tribe and a state. As the State and the 
Tribe did not include a provision providing for such taxation in the gaming compact, the application 
of the use tax to such amenities is preempted by IGRA and the Tribe’s motion for summary judgment 
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reasoned that the state could have asked to negotiate for the inclusion of 
the tax as part of the compacting process, but that the compact was silent 
on the collection of the use tax and so was preempted.851 However, the 
court concluded that state taxation of sales at the tribal store were not 
preempted by the IGRA as sales at the store were not sufficiently related 
to the gaming enterprise to fall within the preemptive scope of IGRA.852 
The court then proceeded to ask whether those sales not preempted 
by the IGRA may yet still be preempted by strong tribal and federal 
interests under Bracker.853 The court concluded that the value generated 
by the store was not value typically generated on the reservation and so 
had a weaker claim to preemption.854 Additionally, the court reasoned that 
the state has an interest in the uniform application of its tax code and in 
the provision of services to South Dakotans.855 Accordingly, the court 
concluded that the imposition of the use tax on the sale of goods by the 
tribal store to non-members was not preempted by tribal and federal 
interests.856 
Finally, the Tribe argued that the imposition of the state tax is 
discriminatory because South Dakota gives a tax credit to state residents 
who have paid sales or use taxes to other states when those states offer a 
reciprocal credit to its residents, but South Dakota provides no reciprocal 
credit for taxes paid to the tribe even though it offers a credit for taxes paid 
to South Dakota.857 The court disagreed, reasoning that tribes and states 
are differently situated and so it is not discriminatory to treat them 
differently.858 
                                                     
is granted to that extent. Even had the State negotiated for such a provision, though, the State would 
have to earmark those funds for services that are also directly related to the operation of gaming 
activities as well as offer meaningful concessions in return . . . . The remittance of those taxes into a 
general fund with unlimited potential uses, such as the State’s general fund here, would not satisfy 
Rincon and would be preempted by IGRA as an impermissible negotiation topic.”). 
 851. Id. at *33–35. 
 852. Id. at *35. 
 853. Id. (“[I]t is still necessary to determine if the use tax, where not preempted by plain 
implication of IGRA—in other words, the sale of goods and services at the Store—is not otherwise 
preempted under the Bracker balancing test.”). 
 854. Id. at *39. 
 855. Id. at *41. 
 856. Id. at *40–41 (“[T]he State does not interfere with the Tribes’ power to regulate tribal 
enterprises when it simply imposes its tax on [use by] nonmembers.’ ‘Nor would the imposition of 
[the] tax on these purchasers contravene the principle of tribal self-government, for the simple reason 
that nonmembers are not constituents of the governing tribe.’”) (internal citations omitted). 
 857. Id. at *41–42. 
 858. Id. at *46–47 (“Although the proceeds of the use tax enter the State’s general fund, which 
is not earmarked for any expenditures in particular, the Tribe does indeed benefit from off-reservation 
road maintenance and public safety services leading to the Store, the licensure of some food vendors, 
as well as other services. Further, nonmember consumer residents of South Dakota benefit from a wide 
range of general services offered by the State when off the reservation. Therefore, the State tax is not 
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In Cougar Den Inc. v. Department of Licensing, the plaintiff, a 
Yakima Nation corporation, asserted that the “right to travel” clause in 
Article III of the Treaty with the Yakima includes the right to import fuel 
without an importer’s license and without paying a state tax on the fuel. 859 
The majority of the Washington Supreme Court (7–2) held that the treaty’s 
right to travel preempted the state’s ability to tax.860 It began by 
emphasizing that Indian treaties should be interpreted as the Indians 
themselves understood them.861 The majority highlighted the importance 
of travel to the Yakima to support the conclusion that the right to travel 
would include the right to move goods.862 The opinion drew on Ninth 
Circuit precedent in relation to the Yakima that refused to draw a 
distinction between trade and travel.863 The court accordingly held that the 
imposition of a state tax on fuel imported unto the reservation was 
preempted by the treaty’s guarantee of a right to travel.864 
The dissent would have implied a difference between the right to 
travel and the right to trade: “The Yakima Nation’s treaty right to travel 
applies to trade only when it cannot be meaningfully separated from travel, 
not when travel is merely necessary for trade.”865 Because the imposition 
of a tax on imported fuel is a restriction of trade, and not travel, it would 
have upheld the power of the state to tax.866 
In 2017, courts decided many other issues related to Indian tribes and 
taxation. For example, courts held (1) that when the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs determines that land has been taken into trust that land should be 
                                                     
discriminatory, as the Tribe is not similarly situated to other states which have been granted a tax 
credit.”). 
 859. Cougar Den Inc. v. Dep’t of Licensing, 392 P.3d 1014 (Wash. 2017) (The treaty provides 
“the right of way, with free access from the same to the nearest public highway, is secured to them; as 
also the right, in common with citizens of the United States, to travel upon all public highway”). 
 860. Id. at 58. 
 861. Id. at 60–61 (“It is our responsibility to see that the terms of the treaty are carried out, so 
far as possible, in accordance with the meaning they were understood to have by the tribal 
representatives at the council, and in a spirit which generously recognizes the full obligation of this 
nation to protect the interests of a dependent people.”). 
 862. Id. at 62 (“Travel was woven into the fabric of Yakama life in that it was necessary for 
hunting, gathering, fishing, grazing, recreational, political, and kinship purposes . . . . At the time the 
treaty was drafted, agents of the United States knew of the Yakamas’ reliance on travel. During 
negotiations, the Yakamas’ right to travel off reservation had been repeatedly broached, and 
assurances were made that entering into the treaty would not infringe on or hinder their tribal 
practices.”). 
 863. Id. at 67 (“We hold that the right to travel provision in the treaty protects the Tribe’s 
historical practice of using the roads to engage in trade and commerce.”). 
 864. Id. 
 865. Id. at 74. 
 866. Id. at 70 (Citing Wagnon and Mescalero Apache Tribers it would have held that “[a]bsent 
express federal law to the contrary, Indians going beyond reservation boundaries have generally been 
held subject to nondiscriminatory state law. This includes state fuel excise taxes.”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
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removed from county tax rolls,867 (2) that Indian treaties may contain tax-
exemptions and should be read broadly,868 (3) that alternative dispute 
resolution with the United States on tax matters is not required when 
settlement with the United States is unlikely,869 (4) that a state agency 
could not challenge an Interior regulation that may remove its authority to 
levy taxes on water users on the reservation until one of those users refuses 
to pay the tax,870 (5) that income earned by a tribal member on the 
reservation is not subject to state income tax,871 (6) that UPS can be liable 
for knowingly shipping untaxed cigarettes from the reservation to other 
non-member purchasers,872 (7) that when goods are imported from outside 
the reservation and sold to non-members the state has legitimate interest 
in raising revenue to support off-reservation services which make on-
reservation commerce possible,873 and (8) that tribes selling cigarettes to 
non-members have an obligation to collect and remit cigarette taxes to the 
State of California.874 
S. Treaty Rights 
There are many cases discussed in this update that deal in some way 
with treaties and the rights conferred upon tribes. However, there is one 
dispute originating from Washington State that deserves special mention 
because the denial of a rehearing en banc in the Ninth Circuit drew a strong 
dissent. In United States v. Washington,875 a group of twenty-one 
                                                     
 867. Lake Cty. v. State, No. DV 16-206, 2017 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 14 at *6 (Mont. Dist. Jan. 27, 
2017). 
 868. Perkins v. United States, No. 16-CV-495(LJV), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123543 at *5 
(W.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2017). 
 869. Perkins v. United States, 16-CV-495V, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186169, at *16 (W.D.N.Y. 
Nov. 9, 2017) (“[T]he applicability of the Canandaigua Treaty and the 1842 Treaty is a binary 
proposition—those treaties either do exempt plaintiffs’ income, or do not. A settlement of the case for 
an amount less than what plaintiffs paid is theoretically possible but unlikely, since any such amount 
would not reflect where the parties would stand after a full resolution of the treaty issue. For these 
reasons, the Court will release the parties from the automatic referral to ADR . . . .”). 
 870. Desert Water Agency v. U.S. Dept’ of Interior, 849 F.3d 1250, 1258 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 871. Smith v. Dep’t of Revenue, TC-MD 160383R, 2017 Ore. Tax LEXIS 39 (Ore. Tax Ct. Mar. 
16, 2017). 
 872. New York v. UPS, 253 F. Supp. 3d 583 (S.D.N.Y. May 25, 2017). In a subsequent 
proceeding to determine damages the court imposed large fines. New York v. UPS, 15-cv-1136 (KBF), 
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80907, at *28 (S.D.N.Y. May 25, 2017) (The court ordered large damages to 
specifically send a message to UPS and others who would facilitate the transfer and sale of untaxed 
cigarettes to non-members living off the reservation. The court awarded New York 
State $165,817,479 and New York City was awarded $81,158,135.). 
 873. Tulalip Tribes v. Washington, No. 2:15-cv-00940-BJR, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1646, at 
*25 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 5, 2017). 
 874. People ex rel Becerra v. Rose, 16 Cal. App. 5th 317, 328 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017). 
 875. Since time of writing the article, the U.S. Supreme Court has granted certiorari, 
seeWashington v. United States, 199 L. Ed. 2d 602 (2018). 
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Washington tribes brought a claim under the Stevens treaties claiming that 
Washington had violated their off-reservation treaty rights to fish at their 
usual and accustomed places by building barrier culverts.876 The district 
court ordered Washington to remove its barrier culverts over a period of 
seventeen years in order to comply with the treaty.877 The Ninth Circuit 
agreed.878 
Washington argued that under the treaties it was permitted to block 
all of the streams because a treaty right to take fish does not guarantee that 
there will continue to be fish to harvest.879 The Ninth Circuit disagreed.880 
It held that Indian treaties are to be interpreted as the Indians would have 
understood them at the time the treaty was signed and the Indians would 
not have understood the treaties as preventing the flow of salmon up and 
down the rivers and streams.881 In describing the treaty negotiations the 
court reasoned; “[e]ven if Governor Stevens had not explicitly promised 
that ‘this paper secures your fish,’ and that there would be food ‘forever,’ 
we would infer such a promise.”882 The Ninth Circuit thus affirmed the 
decision of the district court.883 
The State of Washington appealed, asking the Ninth Circuit to hear 
the case en banc. In United States v. Washington, the Ninth Circuit issued 
a written opinion in which it refused to hear the case en banc.884 The 
rehearing was denied over the objection of nine judges on the Ninth 
Circuit.885 
                                                     
 876. United States v. Washington, 853 F.3d 946, 954 (9th Cir. 2017). When Washington builds 
roads or structures over streams it builds culverts to accommodate the passage of water underneath. 
When those structures prevent the flow of salmon fry down river or adult salmon back up the river 
they become barrier culverts. 
 877. Id. at 954. 
 878. Id. 
 879. Id. at 962 (“Washington concedes that the clause guarantees to the Tribes the right to take 
up to fifty percent of the fish available for harvest, but it contends that the clause imposes no obligation 
on the State to ensure that any fish will, in fact, be available.”). 
 880. Id. 
 881. Id. at 963–64 (“The Indians did not understand the Treaties to promise that they would have 
access to their usual and accustomed fishing places, but with a qualification that would allow the 
government to diminish or destroy the fish runs. Governor Stevens did not make, and the Indians did 
not understand him to make, such a cynical and disingenuous promise.”). 
 882. Id. at 964–65. 
 883. Id. at 980 (“The district court did not abuse its discretion in enjoining Washington to correct 
most of its high-priority barrier culverts within seventeen years, and to correct the remainder at the 
end of their natural life or in the course of a road construction project undertaken for independent 
reasons.”). 
 884. United States v. Washington, 864 F.3d 1017, 1018 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 885. Id. at 1023. Ninth Circuit Judges O’Scannlain, Kozinski, Tallman, Callahan, Bea, Ikuta, 
N.R. Smith, Bybee, and M. Smith all dissented from the decision not to order a rehearing en banc. 
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Judge O’Scannlain wrote for those dissenting from rehearing.886 He 
argued that while the litigation over salmon has been going on for fifty 
years, the parties only now found an obligation that the State of 
Washington expend as much as $1.88 billion to create additional salmon 
habitat by removing culverts under state maintained roads that impede 
salmon.887 The dissent alleged four errors. First, it reasoned that the treaties 
have been misread to require not just sharing of the salmon in common 
with the people of Washington but that the state has an affirmative duty to 
ensure there are enough salmon for the tribe to make a “moderate 
living.”888 
Second, the dissent reasoned the remedy of removing all of the 
culverts is too extreme.889 The dissenting opinion reasoned that many 
factors beyond the culverts could impact fish populations, and it cited 
shared concerns raised by Idaho and Montana that the ruling could be used 
to block development in other areas where natural resources are 
threatened.890 
Third, the dissent argued that the tribe’s claims are barred by 
laches.891 It would have held that the United States approved of many of 
the highway designs that include the barrier culverts that it is now 
demanding that Washington pay to remove, and that since the culverts 
were approved by the federal government, that same federal government 
could not now demand their removal.892 The dissent focuses on Sherrill 
where the Supreme Court suggested that laches is a defense which can be 
raised against the United States.893 
Finally, the dissent argued that the Ninth Circuit’s affirmation was 
overbroad.894 The dissent highlighted that many private barrier culverts 
                                                     
 886. Id. Judges Bybee and M. Smith joined all of Judge O’Scannlain’s opinion except for the 
part about laches and the application of Sherrill. 
 887. Id. at 1023–24 (See specific discussion of actual cost to replace all culverts at footnote 1). 
 888. Id. at 1026 (“[T]he Supreme Court in Fishing Vessel did not hold that the Tribes were 
entitled to any particular minimum allocation of fish. Instead, Fishing Vessel mandates an allocation 
of 50 percent of the fish to the Indians, subject to downward revision if moderate living needs can be 
met with less.”). 
 889. Id. at 1028 (“There seems little doubt that future litigants will argue that the population of 
various birds, deer, elk, bears, and similar animals, which were traditionally hunted by the Tribes, have 
been impacted by Western development.”). 
 890. Id. 
 891. Id. at 1030–31. 
 892. Id. at 1029 (“[I]t was the federal government, now bringing suit in its capacity as trustee for 
the Tribes, which ‘specified the design for virtually all of the culverts at issue.’”). 
 893. Id. at 1030–31 (“Presumably, the State’s alleged violation of the Treaties was complete 
when it constructed the culverts (and relevant highways) in the 1960s. The United States first brought 
suit to enforce the Tribes’ fishing rights in 1970. Yet, the United States found no problem with the 
culverts until 2001.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 894. Id. at 1031–33 (“Being forced to replace even a single barrier that will have no tangible 
impact on the salmon population is an unjustified burden.”). 
2018] The Year in Indian Law 2017 917 
exist that are not addressed by the order so the state will be required to 
remove culverts which will not increase salmon runs.895 
Judges Fletcher and Gould wrote a concurrence to support their 
original panel opinion.896 They argued that “there is nothing in the Court’s 
opinion that authorizes the State to diminish or eliminate the supply of 
salmon available for harvest.”897 The panel reasoned that it has not opened 
the floodgates to future suits because future claims against states by private 
parties or tribes seeking to block development would be blocked by the 
Eleventh Amendment.898 The concurrence distinguished Sherrill because 
the tribes in this instance were not attempting to reassert sovereignty over 
land, and no party was resting on its rights because the parties had been in 
conflict over the issue for a century.899 Finally, the concurrence concluded 
that the order was not overbroad because it did not require remediation of 
every culvert but instead required remediation of some, but not all, of the 
culverts within seventeen years.900 
T. Voting 
The year 2017 saw several court cases involving American Indians 
and voting rights, mostly concentrated around alleged disenfranchisement 
of Indian voters. This manifested either through access to the polls or 
through judicial districts that unconstitutionally pack American Indian 
voters into districts in order to diminish their potential representational 
strength. 
In Navajo Nation v. San Juan County, the Navajo Nation and several 
tribal members brought suit against Utah’s San Juan County alleging that 
both the county commission and school board districts violated the equal 
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifteenth 
Amendment, and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. 901 San Juan County 
is roughly evenly divided between White persons and American Indian 
persons.902 The court had previously found the districts unconstitutional 
because the county had packed American Indians into as few districts as 
possible in order to diminish the voting strength of tribal members and the 
                                                     
 895. Id. at 1032–33. 
 896. Id. at 1018–23. 
 897. Id. at 1020. 
 898. Id. (“Because of the Eleventh Amendment, a further suit against Washington State seeking 
enforcement of the Treaties cannot be brought by the Tribes.”). 
 899. Id. at 1021. 
 900. Id. at 1022–23. 
 901. Navajo Nation v. San Juan Cty., 266 F. Supp. 3d 1341, 1344 (D. Utah 2017). 
 902. Id. at 1360 (The County is roughly evenly divided between American Indian and non-
Hispanic Whites, with American Indians having a slight majority of both the overall population 
(52.17%) and the voting age populations (50.33%)). 
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districts did not contain roughly equal numbers of residents, thus violating 
the principle of one-person/one-vote.903 The county presented the court 
with new proposed districts which it submitted had cured the potential 
defects.904 The district court disagreed.905 It held that race was a 
predominate factor used by the county in developing the revised 
commission and school board maps and therefore the proposed districts 
remained unconstitutional.906 
In reviewing the proposed plan Judge Shelby began by recognizing 
that the submitted plans had ameliorated the previous problem of one-
person/one-vote with districts that are within acceptable population 
differentials.907 To comply with the Voting Rights Act the county 
attempted to achieve proportional representation where each racial group 
could have the opportunity to elect members in proportion to the county’s 
demographics.908 However, the court concluded that in doing so the county 
had drawn maps using race as the predominant factor.909 Because the 
Navajo Nation was able to prove that race was the primary criteria for 
creating some of the districts, the burden shifted to the county to prove that 
it narrowly tailored its decision to achieve a compelling government 
interest.910 The county was unable to identify any governmental interest 
                                                     
 903. Id. at 1346. 
 904. Id. at 1345. 
 905. Id. (“For the reasons below, San Juan County’s remedial plans fail to pass constitutional 
muster. Specifically, the court concludes race was the predominant factor in the development of 
District 3 of the School Board plan and Districts 1 and 2 of the County Commission plan. The County’s 
consideration of race requires strict scrutiny analysis of these districts. The court concludes the County 
has failed to satisfy strict scrutiny and, therefore, these districts are unconstitutional.”). 
 906. Id. at 1366 (“The record establishes that San Juan County predominated racial 
considerations over other traditional districting criteria when drawing its County Commission Districts 
1 and 2 and School Board District 3, and it did so without providing any reason to think it would 
violate the Voting Rights Act if it simply drew districts based on race-neutral factors. To the contrary, 
it did so even while maintaining there was no Section 2 issue that required it to take race into account 
in redistricting. This runs afoul of Supreme Court pronouncements against racial classifications in 
drawing voting districts.”). 
 907. Id. at 1353. 
 908. Id. at 1348–49 (“Proportional representation presented a challenge in San Juan County, 
which is roughly half Native American and half White but with an odd number of voting districts—
five for the School Board and three for the County Commission. [The County’s] goal, therefore, was 
to create two safe Native American School Board districts, two safe White School Board districts, and 
a district where the racial mix reflected the County’s overall demographics—approximately 52% 
Native American and 48% White. Similarly, his goal was to create one safe White County Commission 
district, one safe Native American County Commission district, and a third district that reflected the 
racial composition of the County generally.”). 
 909. Id. at 1361 (“Because the County’s attempt at compliance with Section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act entailed nothing more than proportionality (meaning the establishment of racial targets for 
the resulting districts); and because compliance with the Voting Rights Act was the County’s highest 
priority, save one-person, one-vote; the court concludes San Juan County adopted a countywide policy 
of prioritizing racial targets above all other traditional redistricting criteria.”). 
 910. Id. at 1364. 
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that would justify the primary use of race and so the court held the new 
maps submitted by the county were unconstitutional.911 
The court had previously indicated that if the county’s newly revised 
districts failed to pass constitutional muster it would approve districts 
submitted by the Navajo Nation.912 However, the court refused to comply 
with its previous order; “[i]n view of this reality, the court believes 
adopting Navajo Nation’s proposed redistricting plans—the product of an 
adversarial, litigation-driven process—could jeopardize, and possibly 
undermine confidence in, the legitimacy of the County’s new legislative 
districts.”913 Instead the court decided to appoint a special master to assist 
in the formulation of lawful remedial districts with input from all 
parties.914 
Later in 2017, the special master had completed the work of drawing 
newly proposed boundaries which complied with the mandates imposed 
by the constitution.915 In Navajo Nation v. San Juan County, the county 
objected to the new boundaries proposed by the special master.916 The 
federal district court approved the districts over the objections of the 
county because they now complied with all constitutional principles 
including one-person one-vote and did not use race as a predominant 
factor.917 It ordered the new maps be used during the 2018 election.918 The 
new maps are included in the opinion.919 
Courts also decided a pair of cases focused on the potential 
disenfranchisement of American Indian voters. In Navajo Nation Human 
Rights Commission v. San Juan County, the Navajo Nation Human Rights 
Commission brought suit against San Juan County alleging voting 
discrimination. 920 Before 2014 the county operated nine in-person polling 
                                                     
 911. See id. (“The County did not explicitly identify any governmental interest it contends it was 
trying to achieve, nor did it argue that its race-based considerations were narrowly tailored to achieve 
any specific interest. Because law places the burden to make this showing on the County, its failure to 
address the issue necessarily means the County’s redistricting fails strict scrutiny review.”). 
 912. Id. at 1366–67 (“The court previously stated it would evaluate Navajo Nation’s proposed 
redistricting plans if the County’s plans failed. The court indicated that if it reached the Navajo 
Nation’s plans, and if they were legally sound, the court likely would enter its plans as a final order. 
Having considered the issue more carefully in the time that has passed since its earlier Order, the court 
no longer believes such an approach would lead to a satisfactory result.”). 
 913. Id. at 1367. 
 914. Id. 
 915. See Navajo Nation v. San Juan Cty., No. 2:12-cv-00039, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 211230 at 
*1 (D. Utah, Dec. 21, 2017). 
 916. Id. 
 917. Id. at *2–23. 
 918. Id. at *51. 
 919. Id. 
 920. Navajo Nation Human Rights Comm’n v. San Juan Cty, No. 2:16-cv-00154-JNP-BCW, 
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145159, at *5 (D. Utah Sept. 7, 2017). 
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places with Navajo language assistance.921 For the 2014 election and 
subsequent elections the county moved to a mail-in voting system with a 
single in-person polling place located in the northern, white-majority part 
of the county.922 The plaintiffs filed suit alleging violations of the Voting 
Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause.923 In 2016, the county opened 
three additional in-person voting places all located on the Navajo 
reservation, provided Navajo language assistance at all four polling 
stations, and expressed its intention not to return to the 2014 procedures.924 
However in-person early voting was still located solely in the 
predominately white northern portion of the County.925 The court 
concluded that the plaintiff’s original complaint regarding the 2014 voting 
procedures was now moot and dismissed those claims.926 
The court then permitted the Commission to amend its complaint to 
allege that the 2016 procedures still violate section 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act.927 The Commission alleged that the early voting location solely in the 
white northern portion of the county gives those voters benefits denied to 
the Navajo-majority portion of the county.928 The plaintiffs also alleged a 
violation of section 203 of the Voting Rights Act.929 They claimed that the 
county has no formal training for Navajo interpreters, that there is 
inadequate publicity to voters, that the publicity that did exist was 
confusing, and that some voters that needed assistance did not receive it.930 
The county replied that its actions substantially complied with the Voting 
                                                     
 921. Id. at *4. 
 922. Id. 
 923. Id. at *5. 
 924. Id. at *6. 
 925. Id. at *54. 
 926. Id. at *9–10 (“Here, the court concludes that the County’s abandonment of the 2014 
procedures has mooted Plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory relief regarding those procedures. The County 
has not used the 2014 procedures for an entire election cycle, choosing instead to implement entirely 
different procedures for both the primary and general elections in 2016. Moreover, neither the current 
County Clerk nor the County government has openly expressed any intention to reinstitute the 2014 
procedures.”). 
 927. Id. at *22–26. 
 928. Id. at *55 (“First, they assert that the provision of early in-person voting only in Monticello 
means that the average white voter, who lives closer to Monticello, has proportionately more days in 
which to vote than the average Navajo voter, who is more likely to live further from Monticello. 
Second, Plaintiffs assert that the provision of early in-person voting only in Monticello provides the 
average white voter with ‘additional benefits, including the ability to request a [new] ballot (if, for 
instance, the ballot was lost in the mail) or receive troubleshooting help if a [voting] problem arises.’ 
Plaintiffs also argue that the option of mail-in voting does not alleviate this inequity, because, among 
other barriers, the average Navajo lives more distant from post office locations than the average white 
voter and certain majority-Navajo precincts lack sufficient post office boxes to accommodate 
demand.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 929. Id. at *22. 
 930. Id. at *64. 
2018] The Year in Indian Law 2017 921 
Rights Act’s requirements.931 After reviewing the evidence the court 
denied both parties summary judgment motions concluding that there 
remains a genuine issue of material fact about whether the 2016 voting 
procedures violate the VRA.932 Litigation on San Juan County’s alleged 
disenfranchisement of Native voters continues. 
The second case involving voter disenfranchisement arose in South 
Dakota. In Poor Bear v. County of Jackson the petitioners originally sued 
the state of South Dakota seeking to establish a satellite office on the 
reservation for purposes of voter registration and in-person absentee 
voting.933 The South Dakota Secretary of State’s Office and Jackson 
County arranged to support a satellite office during all federal elections 
through 2023, and the case was then dismissed for ripeness in 2016.934 
Petitioners then filed an action seeking reimbursement of attorney’s fees 
under the Voting Rights Act.935 
The federal district court dismissed the petition because Poor Bear 
and others were not prevailing parties in the original action.936 There are 
two requirements to be considered a prevailing party when a claim is 
dismissed for ripeness: (1) a material alteration of the legal relationship 
between the parties, and (2) the relief is judicially sanctioned.937 The court 
reasoned that there was not a material alteration of the legal relationship 
between the parties because the county voluntarily changed its position to 
open the satellite office.938 Moreover, the court reasoned that the result was 
not judicially sanctioned.939 Because neither requirement was met, the 
court denied the motion for attorney’s fees.940 
Finally, Michigan appellate courts addressed an interesting quirk in 
the state constitution’s limits on the eligibility for elected office. In Paquin 
v. City of St. Ignace, the petitioning tribal member brought suit against the 
city after it found him ineligible to run for city council because he was a 
convicted felon.941 While serving as chief of police and as an elected 
member on the Board of Directors of the Sault Tribe of Chippewa Indians, 
                                                     
 931. Id. at *64–65. 
 932. Id. at *72. 
 933. Bear v. Cty. of Jackson, 5:14-CV-05059-KES, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 590, *2–3 (D. S.D. 
Jan. 4, 2017). 
 934. Id. at *3. 
 935. Id. at *2. 
 936. Id. at *14. 
 937. Id. at *4. 
 938. Id. at *8–9. 
 939. Id. at *12–13 (“A court mediated agreement is not the same as a judgment on the merits, a 
consent decree, or a preliminary injunction—all of which involve a measure of court action and 
potential continued court oversight.”). 
 940. Id. at *14. 
 941. Paquin v. City of St. Ignace, No. 334350, 2017 Mich. App. LEXIS 1696, *2-4 (Mich. App., 
Oct. 19, 2017). 
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the petitioner was convicted (plead guilty) of conspiracy to defraud the 
United States related to the misuse of federal funds granted to tribal police 
departments and was sentenced to serve one year and one day in prison (a 
felony).942 The Michigan Constitution makes a person ineligible for 
elected or appointed office if, in the last twenty years, they have been 
convicted of a felony involving dishonesty while holding elected office or 
a position of employment in local, state, or federal government.943 The 
district court ruled that under this provision the plaintiff was ineligible.944 
The plaintiff appealed the decision of the district court; “The 
issue . . . is whether plaintiff’s employment with a federally recognized 
sovereign Indian tribe constituted employment in ‘local, state, or federal 
government,’ for purposes of Const 1963, art 11, § 8. This is an issue of 
first impression involving the interpretation of a constitutional 
provision.”945 The Michigan appellate court upheld the lower court’s 
determination of ineligibility.946 It reasoned that the Tribe is a ‘local 
government’ under the plain meaning of the phrase at the time of the 
Constitutional provision.947 
U. Water 
In 1908, the Supreme Court decided Winters v. United States and 
held that Indians were entitled to reasonable use of water in order to 
irrigate their lands.948 The Winters doctrine has sparked costly and ongoing 
litigation between competing water uses for decades and has spurred large 
settlements between tribes and the United States in recent years.949 Indian 
water rights continue to be litigated regularly in both state and federal 
courts. 
The Ninth Circuit held for the first time that Winters rights extend to 
groundwater in Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella 
Valley Water District.950 The court reasoned that the United States 
reserved for the tribe rights to groundwater when it created the 
                                                     
 942. Id. at *1–2. 
 943. Id. at *2–3. 
 944. Id. at *5. 
 945. Id. 
 946. Id. at *12–13. 
 947. Id. at *8–9 (“‘Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (2007), p 730, defines ‘local 
government’ as: ‘1. the government of a specific local area constituting a major political unit (as a 
nation or a state).’’”). 
 948. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908). 
 949. For discussion of just one of these settlements see Erin B. Agee, In the Federal Government 
We Trust? Federal Funding for Tribal Water Rights Settlements and the Taos Pueblo Indian Water 
Rights Settlement Act, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 201 (2011). 
 950. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., 849 F.3d 1262, 
1270 (9th Cir. 2017). 
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reservation.951 The Winters doctrine only reserves water to the extent 
necessary to accomplish the purposes of creating the reservation, but once 
Winters rights are established they vest “on the date of the reservation and 
[are] superior to the rights of future appropriators.”952 The court then 
determined that the primary purpose of the creation of the Agua Caliente 
reservation envisioned continual water use953 and that groundwater was 
appurtenant to the reservation.954 Finally, the court held that it does not 
matter that the tribe has not historically tapped groundwater because state 
water rights are preempted by federal reserved rights, the lack of historical 
use does not prevent usage of groundwater now, and the right to water 
does not depend on the tribes need for the water but rather on whether the 
right to the water was intended to be reserved by Congress.955 
Unlike the application of Winters rights to groundwater, claims to the 
waters that feed Pyramid Lake have been in the federal courts for several 
decades. In 2017, the Ninth Circuit issued another opinion in this long 
running contest of water rights. In United States v. Board of Directors of 
the Truckee-Carson Irrigation District, the court revisited a set of claims 
by the United States and the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe against the 
irrigation district to recover for water that was willfully diverted in 
violation of federal law. 956 In this iteration of the proceedings, the lower 
court denied any recoupment by the tribe for water illegally diverted 
during 1985–1986.957 The Ninth Circuit reversed.958 It reasoned that the 
lower court misread judicial orders from 1985 and 1986, and that those 
orders did not prevent the Irrigation District from complying with federal 
rules and procedures and so the District could not be excused from non-
                                                     
 951. Id. at 1268 (“The creation of these rights stems from the belief that the United States, when 
establishing reservations, ‘intended to deal fairly with the Indians by reserving for them the waters 
without which their lands would have been useless.’”). 
 952. Id. 
 953. Id. at 1270 (“Water is inherently tied to the Tribe’s ability to live permanently on the 
reservation. Without water, the underlying purpose—to establish a home and support an agrarian 
society—would be entirely defeated. Put differently, the primary purpose underlying the establishment 
of the reservation was to create a home for the Tribe, and water was necessarily implicated in that 
purpose.”). 
 954. Id. at 1271 (“Appurtenance, however, simply limits the reserved right to those waters which 
are attached to the reservation. It does not limit the right to surface water 
only. . . . The Winters doctrine was developed in part to provide sustainable land for Indian tribes 
whose reservations were established in the arid parts of the country. And in many cases, those 
reservations lacked access to, or were unable to effectively capture, a regular supply of surface water. 
Given these realities. . . . [W]e hold that the Winters doctrine encompasses both surface water and 
groundwater appurtenant to reserved land.”). 
 955. Id. at 1272. 
 956. United States v. Bd. of Dirs. of the Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist., No. 16-15507, 2017 
U.S. App. LEXIS 17876, at *3 (9th Cir. Sept. 13, 2017). 
 957. Id. at *3. 
 958. Id. 
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compliance by judicial orders.959 The lower court had also refused to 
consider the calculations of recoupment submitted by the Tribe and the 
United States on the basis that they were calculated on a monthly instead 
of an annualized basis which had been the methodology at trial.960 The 
Ninth Circuit reasoned that while that decision would ordinarily be within 
the broad discretion of the district court, in this case such a decision would 
prevent an equitable result and therefore ordered those calculations 
admitted.961 The Ninth Circuit proceeded to fashion its own equitable 
remedy. It awarded the United States and the Tribe 8,300 acre feet of water 
and remanded for an entry of that order with all costs assessed to the 
Irrigation District.962 
However not all Indian reservations come with Winters rights. In 
United States v. Abousleman, the federal district court entered the 
recommendation of a magistrate that Pueblos lack Winters rights to their 
lands. 963 The court recognized that the Pueblos actually and exclusively 
used the water before the arrival of the Spanish, and that to extinguish 
aboriginal water rights the act of the sovereign must be ‘clear and 
unambiguous,’ but held that Spanish actions toward the Pueblos met that 
standard.964 
Other water rights cases involved the (1) Havasupai Tribe965 and (2) 
the Ak-Chin Community966 having claims dismissed for failure to join the 
United States as an indispensable party, (3) a challenge by the Crow Creek 
Sioux was dismissed because even though the United States built a pair of 
                                                     
 959. Id. at *5. 
 960. Id. at *6. 
 961. Id. at *7–8 (“Permitting TCID to escape liability for its repeated violations of federal law 
because the case is now in a posture that requires the United States and the Tribe to base any request 
for recoupment on historical—and apparently uncontroverted—data that was admitted for a different 
purpose at trial plainly contravenes the spirit of Bell II.”). 
 962. Id. at *9. 
 963. United States v. Abousleman, 83cv01041 MV/WPL, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164733 at *4 
(D.N.M. Sept. 30, 2017). 
 964. Id. at *11–12 (“Prior to the arrival of the Spanish, the Pueblos were able to increase their 
use of public waters without restriction. After its arrival, the Spanish crown insisted on its exclusive 
right and power to determine the rights to public shared waters. Spanish law plainly provided that the 
waters were to be common to both the Spaniards and the Pueblos, and that the Pueblos did not have 
the right to expand their use of water if it were to the detriment of others. Although Spain allowed the 
Pueblos to continue their use of water, and did not take any affirmative act to decrease the amount of 
water the Pueblos were using, the circumstances cited by the expert for the United States and Pueblos 
plainly and unambiguously indicate Spain’s intent to extinguish the Pueblos’ right to increase their 
use of public waters without restriction and that Spain exercised complete dominion over the 
determination of the right to use public waters adverse to the Pueblos’ pre-Spanish aboriginal right to 
use water.”). 
 965. Havasupai Tribe v. Anasazi Water Co., 321 F.R.D. 351 (D. Ariz. Apr. 18, 2017). 
 966. Ak-Chin Indian Cmty. v. Cent. Ariz. Water Conservation Dist., No. CV-17-00918-PHX-
DGC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117846 (D. Ariz. July 27, 2017). 
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dams on the Missouri River the tribe was still able to draw all the water it 
needed,967 and (4) a court rejected Freeport Minerals Corporation’s 
attempt to change where it was drawing its water from the Gila River.968 
Also in 2017, (5) Nevada tribes lost an appeal seeking to overturn the 
Bureau of Land Management’s approval of the first phase of a plan to 
divert water from northern part of the state down toward Clark County,969 
(6) the Montana Supreme Court held that non-Indian land owners who 
bought an allotment that used to be in trust had until 2019 to seek a 
declaration of water rights to run with that property,970 and (7) the Ninth 
Circuit rejected a challenge from the Navajo Nation to the Department of 
the Interior’s guidelines on rights to water from the Colorado River during 
surplus and shortage years but permitted the tribe’s breach of trust claim 
to move forward. 971 
V. Other Developments 
There were a number of one-off Indian law decisions that did not 
lend themselves into the development of larger themes covered by section 
IV but which an annual survey would be remiss if it ignored entirely. This 
section is intended to capture those one-off themes and provide brief 
discussion—but thorough and complete citation—for readers who are 
interested in reading more. 
638 Contracting: The District of Montana decided a pair of opinions 
on the eligibility of the Northern Arapaho Tribe to qualify for 638 
contracting for its tribal court. 972 The court emphasized the situation is 
                                                     
 967. Crow Creek Sioux Tribe v. United States, 132 Fed. Cl. 408 (Ct. Fed. Claims June 1, 2017). 
 968. United States v. Gila Valley Irrigation District, 859 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 969. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Bureau of Land Management, No. 2:14-cv-00226-
APG-VCF, 2017 U.S Dist. LEXIS 137089, at *53–56 (D. Nev. Aug. 23, 2017) (The Goshute tribe 
argued that BLM had failed to comply with this consultation process in relation to the water diversion. 
The district court disagreed; it held that the record showed that BLM’s field manager, Nevada State 
Director, BLM’s project manager, ethnographer, and associate field manager all had meetings with 
the tribe over a period of five years. This included at least six meetings on the reservation and resulted 
in a 137-page cultural resources inventory and a 147-page ethnographic assessment which altogether 
is a much more detailed consultation process than courts have approved on other projects for 
compliance with NHPA and shows BLM’s good faith effort to include the tribe in its decision making 
process. The court did not block the first phase of the water diversion project.). 
 970. Scott Ranch LLC., 402 P.2d 1207, 1211–12 (Mont. 2017). 
 971. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 876 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 972. Northern Arapaho Tribe v. LaCounte, CV-16-11-BLGS-BMM; CV-16-60-BLGS-BMM 
(Consolidated), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32350 (D. Mont. Mar. 7, 2017) (While negotiations are still 
ongoing the issues raised by the Northern Arapaho were not ripe for review); Northern Arapaho Tribe 
v. LaCounte, CV-16-11-BLG-BMM; CV-16-60-BLG-BMM, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97525 (D. Mont. 
June 22, 2017) (The Northern Arapaho argued that a 638 court operated only by the NAT could still 
serve Eastern Shoshone by asserting criminal jurisdiction over them and opening its court’s 
jurisdiction to civil actions filed by Eastern Shoshone members. The federal court remanded to Interior 
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particularly complicated because while the Wind River Reservation is 
treated as one reservation, there are two different tribes that maintain 
separate tribal governments and services (Eastern Shoshone & Northern 
Arapaho).973 The Eastern Shoshone ended their support for a unified court 
and asked Interior to reinstate a CFR court while the Northern Arapaho 
sought to continue to operate its tribal court under a 638 contract.974 
§ 1983 Claims: In Morales-Alfonso v. Francisco Enterprises, the 
District of Arizona clarified that the scope of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not 
extend to parties acting under the color of tribal law.975 The plaintiff 
brought several claims against Tohono O’odham officials alleging he was 
treated poorly and forced to leave while attempting to trade at a swap 
meet.976 His complaint alleged that his poor treatment was because of 
“racial/ethnic troubles with the staff” and that he was told “in Indian 
territory you have no rights.”977 The Court dismissed his 1983 claims 
because the statute does not apply to a defendant acting under color of 
tribal law.978 
Attorney Qualifications: In Rose v. Office of Professional Conduct 
the Utah Supreme Court upheld the disbarment of plaintiff Susan Rose for 
violations of Utah’s Rules of Professional Conduct which occurred in 
federal and tribal (Navajo) courts.979 Plaintiff objected, arguing that the 
state should not be able to sanction her for activity that occurred outside 
of state courts.980 The Utah Supreme Court held that it has jurisdiction over 
all lawyers licensed by the state regardless of where they practice; “[t]he 
question of whether we have jurisdiction over Rose’s discipline case is 
different from whether we would have had jurisdiction to hear the 
underlying case. We do not have jurisdiction to hear an Alaskan divorce 
case; we do, however, have jurisdiction over a Utah attorney who commits 
a breach of the rules of professional conduct while practicing in 
                                                     
to consider these arguments when determining NAT’s eligibility for a 638 contract for judicial 
services). 
 973. Northern Arapaho Tribe v. LaCounte, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32350, at *3–4; Northern 
Arapaho Tribe v. LaCounte, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97525m at *3–4. 
 974. Id. at *4–5. Both decisions discuss the problems that emerge when two different federally 
recognized tribes, that maintain two separate tribal governments, share a single reservation. 
 975. Morales-Alfonso v. Francisco Enters., CV 15-0200-TUC-JAS (LAB), 2017 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 69058 (D. Ariz. May 4, 2017). 
 976. Id. at *2. 
 977. Id. 
 978. Id. at *5. 
 979. Rose v. Office of Prof’l Conduct, 2017 UT 50 (Utah 2017). 
 980. Id. ¶ 68 (“Rose seems to believe that because she practiced in federal and Navajo courts, 
the State of Utah has no business basing sanctions upon violations of the Utah Rules of Professional 
Conduct that are alleged to have occurred there. She calls our jurisdiction in this case an invasion of 
‘US and [Navajo Nation] sovereignty.’”). 
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Alaska.”981 The Court accordingly affirmed petitioner’s disbarment for 
violating its rules of professional conduct while practicing in federal and 
Navajo courts.982 
Bad Men Among the Whites: The Treaty of Fort Laramie has an 
interesting provision in it which makes the United States liable for actions 
committed by ‘bad men among the whites.’983 This provision has been 
cited in more than forty cases over the years and had a substantial impact 
in one important case decided by the Federal Circuit in 2017. In Jones v. 
United States Utah state police attempted to stop a car near but not on the 
reservation.984 The car turned onto the reservation and stopped about 25 
miles inside the reservation borders.985 The driver and passenger split up 
and the driver was apprehended without incident.986 State police officers 
testified that after being cornered, and after shots had been exchanged, the 
passenger turned his gun on himself and fired.987 State officers handcuffed 
the passenger but provided no medical assistance.988 The passenger was 
still alive thirty minutes later when an ambulance arrived, but was 
pronounced dead upon arriving at a medical center.989 The medical 
examiner found a bullet had entered from the back of the head and found 
no soot on the passenger’s hands, but declared it a suicide; although the 
medical examiner later testified that he could not rule out an execution 
style shot.990 No autopsy was performed and an illegal gun found near the 
body was destroyed by the FBI.991 Plaintiffs filed suit alleging the United 
States was responsible for the actions of federal and local officials in the 
murder and subsequent cover up of the Indian passenger under the Treaty 
of 1868.992 
The Federal Circuit vacated the Court of Federal Claims order 
dismissing the claims, concluding that the plaintiff’s complaint alleged a 
                                                     
 981. Id. ¶ 70. 
 982. Id. ¶ 104. 
 983. Jones v. United States, 846 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (In the 1868 Treaty the United 
States agreed that no persons but those authorized by the government “shall ever be permitted to pass 
over, settle upon, or reside in the Territory described in this article” and that “[i]f bad men among the 
whites or among other people, subject to the authority of the United States, shall commit any wrong 
upon the person or property of the Indians, the United States will . . . proceed at once to cause the 
offender to be arrested and punished according to the laws of the United States, and also reimburse 
the injured person for the loss sustained.”). 
 984. Id. at 1346. 
 985. Id. 
 986. Id. 
 987. Id. 
 988. Id. 
 989. Id. 
 990. Id. at 1347. 
 991. Id. 
 992. Id. at 1350. 
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plausible case for recovery.993 It held that the treaty’s provision applies 
only to criminal wrongs because the United States was to “arrest” the 
alleged wrongdoers.994 The Court remanded to the Court of Federal Claims 
to determine whether the wrongs alleged by the plaintiff would subject the 
accused members of law enforcement to arrest under “the law of the 
United States.”995 It clarified that those “wrongs” need not necessarily be 
affirmative acts, but that omissions could constitute wrongs if failing to 
act could have necessitated violent retaliation and asked the lower court to 
conduct a more thorough review.996 Finally, the Court went on to discuss 
the geographic scope of the treaty provision and concluded that wrongs 
begun on the reservation but continuing elsewhere (like at the medical 
center) fall within the scope of the treaty provision.997 
Cultural Property: There were several cases decided involving tribal 
cultural property in 2017. In Round Valley Indian Tribes of California v. 
United States Department of Transportation tribal plaintiffs sued the 
Department for failure to consult under NHPA and NEPA before 
commencing a highway project which could destroy ancestral, cultural, 
and archeological resources.998 The district court allowed litigation to 
continue holding that the plaintiffs had stated a demand for relief sufficient 
to survive a motion to dismiss.999 In Roskelly v. Washington State Parks & 
Recreation Commission a divided state appellate court allowed 279 acres 
of Mount Spokane State Park to be opened for recreational skiing despite 
its central importance to the religion of local tribes.1000 The dissent would 
have found the Commission’s decision arbitrary and capricious because 
the Department of Archeology and Historic Preservation had classified 
Mount Spokane as traditional cultural property.1001 Finally, in Caddo 
                                                     
 993. Id. at 1359. 
 994. Id. at 1355–56. 
 995. Id. at 1357. 
 996. Id. at 1357–59. 
 997. Id. at 1359–61 (“[Plaintiff] does not argue that the bad men provision is unlimited in 
geographic scope, but argues that a wrong committed on reservation land and continuing off-
reservation land is cognizable. We agree with this general principle.”). 
 998. Round Valley Indian Tribes of Cal. v. United States DOT, No. 15-cv-04987-JSW, 2017 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34923, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2017). 
 999. Id. at *21–22. 
 1000. Roskelly v. Wash. State Parks & Rec. Comm’n, No. 48423-4-II, 2017 Wash. App. LEXIS 
747, at *1–2 (Wash. App. Mar. 28, 2017). 
 1001. Id. at *38–43 (“As a singular peak, Mount Spokane is a significant landscape feature for 
Native American tribes. Mount Spokane was and is used by tribal elders and others for gathering 
traditional plants, including bear grass, huckleberries and serviceberries. Tribal elders report that some 
berries taste sweeter on the higher elevations of the mountain. Western red-cedar, which grows within 
the PASEA, is sacred to the tribes; its bark and bows are used for ceremonies and in medicine. The 
Spokane Tribe has been intimately connected to Mount Spokane for as long as oral history recounts. 
For the Spokane Tribe, the significance of Mount Spokane includes: the location of a creation myth; 
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Nation of Oklahoma v. Wichita & Affiliated Tribes the Caddo Nation 
challenged the construction of a tribal history center on the basis that it 
may disrupt the remains of Caddo children who had attended a nearby 
Indian school.1002 The Tenth Circuit ultimately dismissed the challenge as 
moot because the tribal history center had completed its construction and 
so there was no further danger of disruption of tribal burial grounds.1003 
Divorce: In Horning v. Horning, the Alaska Supreme Court reversed 
a decision of the superior court that did not value or assign health care 
benefits between the parties in a divorce.1004 Instead the superior court 
equated the wife’s eligibility for healthcare from the Indian Health Service 
to the husbands earned benefits through the military’s TRICARE 
program.1005 The wife appealed, arguing that her IHS benefit is separate 
property but her husband’s military benefits are marital property subject 
to equitable distribution.1006 The Supreme Court of Alaska agreed.1007 It 
held that healthcare benefits, including TRICARE, are martial property to 
the extent the benefits are earned during marriage but that the wife’s 
“eligibility to receive IHS healthcare was [ ] acquired before marriage and 
is separate property.”1008 The court remanded for proper distribution of 
marital property.1009 
Equal Protection: In Cole v. Oravec, a Crow tribal member was shot 
and killed by a non-Indian on the reservation.1010 The FBI investigated and 
declared it a non-crime, which foreclosed some statutory benefits for the 
victim’s family.1011 The family of the deceased brought suit against the 
government alleging a violation of their equal protection rights.1012 The 
district court dismissed the claim for lack of standing.1013 The Ninth 
Circuit reversed; “[W]hen the government imposes a discriminatory 
barrier making it more difficult for members of a group to obtain a 
                                                     
a vision quest and prayer site; an important hunting and gathering location for first foods and medicinal 
plants; and a territorial marker.”). 
 1002. Caddo Nation v. Wichita & Affiliated Tribes, 877 F.3d 1171, 1775 (10th Cir. 2017). 
 1003. Id. at 1177 (“We thus constrain our analysis to the relief Caddo Nation sought below: a 
temporary restraining order on construction of the History Center.”). 
 1004. Horning v. Horning, 389 P.3d 61 (Alaska 2017). 
 1005. Id. at 63. 
 1006. Id. 
 1007. Id. at 64. 
 1008. Id. 
 1009. Id. at 65. 
 1010. Cole v. Oravec, No. 14-35664, 700 Fed. Appx. 602, 603–04 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 1011. Id. at 604. 
 1012. Id. (“[t]he Bearcrane Family Members alleged that Defendants’ conduct has caused them 
to suffer several distinct injuries. They claimed that they receive fewer and less-adequate law 
enforcement services and are therefore less secure than other citizens, which has severely impacted 
them, both emotionally and economically.”). 
 1013. Id. 
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benefit . . . , the injury of unequal opportunity to compete confers 
standing.”1014 The court went on to determine that the complaint alleged a 
plausible violation of equal protection rights because it showed a higher 
rate of crime committed against Native Americans than non-Native 
Americans, alleged that the FBI has abdicated its responsibility to 
investigate crimes involving Indian victims, found that the FBI regularly 
destroys relevant evidence involving reservation crime, and concluded 
that the Montana field office regularly closes cases involving Indian 
victims without investigating.1015 It remanded the case for further 
proceedings.1016 
Federal Courts are not Tribal Appellate Courts: There were a series 
of cases in 2017 in which petitioners in federal actions tried to use federal 
courts to review the merits of tribal court decisions interpreting tribal law. 
None of these attempts were successful as federal courts are not tribal 
appellate courts. In Eagleman v. Rocky Boy Chippewa-Cree Tribal 
Business Committee or Council three tribal members originally filed 
common law claims in tribal court against the tribal housing authority.1017 
The tribal court dismissed the claims on the basis of sovereign 
immunity.1018 The plaintiffs then filed suit in federal court seeking a 
declaratory judgment that the tribal court erred in dismissing their 
claims.1019 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff’s 
petition.1020 The Ninth Circuit went on to discuss the relationship between 
tribal and federal courts. 
The Eaglemans essentially ask the district court to sit as a general 
appellate body to review the decision of the tribal court. This 
miscomprehends the relationship between the federal government 
and Indian tribes. Tribal courts are not vertically aligned under the 
federal judicial hierarchy. They are institutions within coordinate 
sovereign entities vested with the power to regulate internal tribal 
affairs. Asserting jurisdiction here would effectively expand this 
court’s authority to superintend matters of tribal self-governance. 
                                                     
 1014. Id. at 604–05. 
 1015. Id. at 605–06. 
 1016. Id. at 606. 
 1017. Eagleman v. Rocky Boy Chippewa-Cree Tribal Bus. Comm. or Council, 699 Fed. Appx. 
599 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 1018. Id. at 600. 
 1019. Id. 
 1020. Id. at 601 (The Court used the well-pled complaint rule to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim. 
“Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, a claim must actually arise under federal law to trigger 
jurisdiction under § 1331. A litigant may not plead his way into federal court by asserting an opposing 
party’s federal defense. Here, tribal sovereign immunity arose as a defense in tribal court, and the 
allegation that the tribal court erred in applying the defense is not a question ‘arising under’ federal 
law for purposes of § 1331.”) (internal citations omitted). 
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And because we lack general appellate power over the tribal court, 
we would be unable to afford effective relief to the Eaglemans even 
if we determined that the tribal court erred.1021 
The Ninth Circuit’s summary is a concise description of the 
interaction between federal and tribal courts. Two other federal district 
courts also had to dismiss appeals from tribal courts, clarifying that the 
same principle articulated in Eagleman that federal courts cannot 
reinterpret tribal law.1022 
Indian Health Service: While 2017 brought with it many claims that 
involved the Indian Health Service (IHS), one case stood out for its 
importance in discussing the interaction between the Affordable Care Act 
and the provision of health care in Indian Country. In Redding Rancheria 
v. Hargan plaintiff Redding Rancheria, a federally recognized Indian tribe, 
brought a claim against the Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS) seeking reimbursement for health services provided under a 
compact with HHS under the Indian Self-Determination and Education 
Assistance Act (ISDEAA). 1023 The defendants have consistently refused 
reimbursement because they dispute the legitimacy of the tribe’s 
coordination of a tribal insurance scheme with IHS benefits and the federal 
agency is prohibited from making the reimbursements under the Indian 
Health Care Improvement Act as amended by the Affordable Care Act.1024 
The federal district court concluded that HHS’s interpretation of the 
IHCIA was inconsistent with the plain meaning of the statute and 
remanded back to IHS administrative courts for further proceedings 
consistent with the opinion.1025 
Labor & Employment: Indian employment law cases often involve 
whether the tribe is bound by state or federal labor rules. In County of 
Riverside v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board the county appealed 
                                                     
 1021. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 1022. Lesperance v. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians, 259 F. Supp. 3d 713, 719 (W.D. 
Mich., 2017) (“When a tribe enacts a waiver of sovereign immunity, does the federal court have 
jurisdiction to interpret it, either in an original action, or on review from a tribal court decision? The 
Court believes the answer is ‘no,’ at least in this case. There is no diversity of citizenship. Neither is 
there a general federal question presented by the scope and application of a tribal sovereign immunity 
ordinance . . . . Finally, even if some basis for original subject matter jurisdiction existed, there would 
still be no basis for this Court to exercise what would amount to appellate review of a tribal court 
decision.”); Wilson v. Umpqua Indian Dev. Corp., No. 6:17-cv-00123-AA, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
101808, at *8 (D. Or. June 29, 2017) (“But ‘jurisdiction’ is not a magic word that automatically creates 
a federal question in the Indian law context. Rather, whether a dispute about the extent of a tribal 
court’s jurisdiction raises a federal question depends on the source of the limitation on jurisdiction. 
Here, the Tribal Court dismissed based on a jurisdictional limitation imposed by tribal law.”). 
 1023. Redding Rancheria v. Hargan, No. 14-2035 (RMC), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184061 at *2 
(D.D.C., Nov. 7, 2017). 
 1024. Id. at *2–3. 
 1025. Id. at *36–37. 
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from a determination that it was liable for a former employee’s injury.1026 
The state appellate court affirmed, reasoning that the county was liable 
because the employee’s last employer was the Pauma Band of Luiseno 
Indians.1027 Therefore, under state law, the last employer with workers’ 
compensation coverage becomes liable and since the tribe was not 
obligated to carry coverage, the county was left with the obligation.1028 
In Unite Here International Union v. Shingle Springs Band of Miwok 
Indians, the Union brought suit to compel arbitration with the tribe over a 
claim that the tribe interfered with labor organization activity at the 
casino.1029 The court determined that it was appropriate for the parties to 
arbitrate about whether their dispute was subject to arbitration.1030 At the 
same time the federal court declined to proceed with a separate claim 
brought by the Tribe under the Declaratory Judgment Act, deferring 
instead to arbitration.1031 
Lay Advocates: Many tribes permit persons without a law degree, 
but trained as lay advocates, to appear before them to represent clients. 
This can cause confusion in the state and federal court systems. The issue 
of tribal lay-advocates was at the center of United States v. Sanchez.1032 In 
Sanchez, the defendant was charged with a first degree murder that 
occurred on the Crow reservation.1033 After being arrested, the defendant 
asked for an attorney and then specifically asked by name for a tribal 
advocate.1034 The BIA Agents clarified that the advocate was not an 
attorney and confirmed that the advocate was who the defendant wanted 
to represent him.1035 The defendant subsequently moved to suppress the 
                                                     
 1026. County of Riverside v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 10 Cal. App. 5th 119, 122 (Cal. 
App. 2017). 
 1027. Id. at 128 (“[T]he fact that the Pauma Police Department is not subject to the WCAB’s 
jurisdiction means the department was not ‘insured for workers’ compensation coverage or an 
approved alternative thereof.’”). 
 1028. Id. 
 1029. Unite Here Int’l Union v. Shingle Springs Band of Miwok Indians, No. 2:16-cv-00384-
TLN-EFB, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108179 at *1 (E.D. Cal. July 12, 2017). 
 1030. Id. at *5–6 (“At bottom, ‘a broad arbitration clause—even one that does not specifically 
mention who decides arbitrability—is sufficient to grant the arbitrator authority to decide his or her 
own jurisdiction.’ . . . Thus, the parties have reserved for the arbitrator the question of arbitrability. 
The Court is ‘divested of [its] authority and [the] arbitrator will decide in the first instance whether 
[this] dispute is arbitrable.’”). 
 1031. Shingle Springs Band of Miwok Indians v. Unite Here Int’l Union, No. 2:16-cv-01057-
TLN-EFB, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108152 at *3–4 (E.D. Cal. July 12, 2017). 
 1032. United States v. Sanchez, CR 16-82-BLG-SPW-1, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1553 (D. Mont. 
Jan. 5, 2017). 
 1033. Id. at *1. 
 1034. Id. at *2–5. 
 1035. Id. at *3. 
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statements he made to law enforcement as a violation of his Fifth and Sixth 
Amendment rights.1036 
The court concluded that the statements were admissible.1037 
Specifically the court held that the defendant’s request for the advocate 
was not “an unambiguous request for an attorney because [the defendant] 
maintained he wanted to speak with [the tribal advocate] after the agents 
clarified that [the tribal advocate was] not an attorney.”1038 Accordingly, 
the court reasoned, a reasonable agent would not have understood the 
defendant’s request to be for a lawyer because the defendant clarified that 
he wanted the advocate after being informed that the advocate was not an 
attorney.1039 
Navajo-Hopi Settlement Act: In 2017, federal courts decided four 
challenges to the denial of relocation benefits by the Office of Navajo & 
Hopi Indian Relocation. In Laughter v. Office of Navajo & Hopi Indian 
Relocation and Bahe v. Office of Navajo & Hopi Indian Relocation, the 
court affirmed the denial because there was documented evidence which 
contradicted family testimony about the dates and times of settlement.1040 
In Burnside v. Office of Navajo & Hopi Indian Relocation, the court 
affirmed the denial of benefits to three separate claimants who had waited 
between five and ten years to appeal even after the Office had issued 
Policy Memorandum 9 permitting appeals from previous denials.1041 In 
Begay v. Office of Navajo & Hopi Indian Relocation, the court reversed 
the denial of benefits and remanded.1042 It reasoned that the evidence 
suggested that the claimant may have been a resident on the partitioned 
lands on December 22, 1974, as required by law1043 and may have earned 
enough money to qualify as head of household.1044 It remanded with 
instructions to verify the claimant’s income in 1984 and ensure it was at 
least $1,300 in order to qualify under the law.1045 
Rights-of-Way: Courts decided many cases dealing with access to 
and across tribal lands in 2017, from oil and gas companies to utilities. The 
                                                     
 1036. Id. at *1. 
 1037. Id. at *6–10. 
 1038. Id. at *6. 
 1039. Id. at *7–8. 
 1040. Laughter v. Office of Navajo & Hopi Indian Relocation, No. CV-16-08196-PCT-DLR, 
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101116 (D. Ariz. June 29, 2017); Bahe v. Office of Navajo & Hopi Indian 
Relocation, No. CV-17-08016-PCT-DLR, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 212562 (D. Ariz. Dec. 28, 2017). 
 1041. Burnside v. Office of Navajo & Hopi Indian Relocation, No. CV-15-08233-PCT-PGR, 
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158804 (D. Ariz. Sept. 27, 2017). 
 1042. Begay v. Office of Navajo & Hopi Indian Relocation, No. CV-16-08221-PCT-DGC, 2017 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159648 (D. Ariz. Sept. 28, 2017). 
 1043. Id. at *11–12. 
 1044. Id. at *7–9. 
 1045. See id. at *11. 
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most notable case came from the Tenth Circuit. In Public Service Co. of 
New Mexico v. Barboan, the public utility sought to condemn a right-of-
way for electrical lines against five parcels owned by the Navajo Nation 
and its members after they withheld consent.1046 The district court held that 
on two of the parcels the Navajo Nation itself now holds an interest and 
that 25 U.S.C. § 357 does not permit condemnation of an interest held by 
the tribal sovereign.1047 The Tenth Circuit affirmed.1048 The Tenth Circuit 
pointed to the difference between 25 U.S.C. § 357 which allows for 
condemnation against Indian allotments and 25 U.S.C. § 319 which allows 
the Secretary to grant rights-of-way across reservations for the limited 
purpose of telephone and telegraph lines.1049 The utility argued that once 
land was allotted it remained always allotted even if the tribe were to 
obtain the entirety of the interest.1050 The Tenth Circuit disagreed: 
“Congress has neither enacted nor amended § 357 to establish that ever-
allotted status would permanently trump any later tribal acquisitions.”1051 
The Court reasoned that the amount of interest owned by the tribe does not 
matter, any tribal interest is enough to prevent condemnation 
proceedings.1052 
Tobacco: In Ho-Chunk Inc. v. Sessions, the plaintiff, a corporation 
organized by the Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska, challenged the 
application of the recordkeeping requirements of the Contraband Cigarette 
Trafficking Act (CCTA) to tribal businesses.1053 It filed a claim in federal 
court seeking a declaratory judgment that the recordkeeping requirements 
of CCTA do not apply in ‘Indian country’ and alternatively that tribal 
businesses, as instrumentalities of tribal government, are not ‘persons’ 
covered by the Act.1054 The court rejected both arguments.1055 It concluded 
that 2006 amendments to CCTA that specifically exclude imposing new 
reporting requirements on tribes were not retroactive and that the original 
                                                     
 1046. Public Serv. Co. of N.M. v. Barboan, 857 F.3d 1101, 1104 (10th Cir. 2017). 
 1047. Id. at 1107. 
 1048. Id. at 1104. 
 1049. Id. at 1105–07 (The Tenth Circuit made clear “‘a plain and clear distinction’ exists 
‘between the granting of rights-of-way over and across reservations or tribal lands and those allotted 
in severalty to restricted Indians.’”). 
 1050. Id. at 1109. 
 1051. Id. 
 1052. Id. at 1110–11 (“When all or part of a parcel of allotted land owned by one or more 
individuals is transferred to the United States in trust for a tribe; that land becomes ‘tribal land’ not 
subject to condemnation under § 357.”). 
 1053. Ho-Chunk Inc. v. Sessions, 253 F. Supp. 3d 303, 304 (D.D.C., 2017). 
 1054. Id. at 306–07. 
 1055. Id. at 307–10. 
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recordkeeping requirements under CCTA do still apply in Indian 
country.1056 
Treaty Abrogation: In Swinomish Indian Tribe Cmty. v. BNSF 
Railway. Co., the Court was asked to determine whether the Swinomish 
Tribe’s right to exclusive use of its reservation guaranteed in the Treaty of 
Point Elliott of 1855 (and thus the right to exclude a railroad from 
operating a rail line crossing the reservation without its consent) had been 
abrogated by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act of 
1995 (ICCTA).1057 The federal court reiterated the Supreme Court’s 
requirement for preemption that abrogation can only be found if there is 
clear evidence of Congress’ intent to abrogate.1058 The court concluded 
that “[t]here is no such evidence in this case.”1059 The court reasoned that 
Congress had acted to specifically protect Indian authority over railroads 
in the Indian Right of Way Act (IRWA) and that ICCTA and IRWA act in 
different spheres and are not mutually exclusive.1060 The Court recognized 
that it is unclear whether Congress considered the conflict between the 
statutes, but that even if it did “[i]t most certainly did not make clear an 
intention to resolve potential conflicts by abrogating the treaty right of 
‘exclusive use’ or repealing the IRWA.”1061 The Court reaffirmed this 
conclusion in relation to the Treaty of Point Elliott explicitly in a 
subsequent order from June 2017.1062 
                                                     
 1056. Id. at 308–09 (The CCTA amendments “clarif[y] that ‘[n]othing in this chapter shall be 
deemed to abrogate or constitute a waiver of any sovereign immunity of a State or local government, 
or an Indian tribe against any unconsented lawsuit under this chapter.’ Plaintiffs argue that reading 
‘State’ to include Indian country under the recordkeeping regulations somehow violates this latter 
provision, because it encroaches on ‘tribal sovereignty.’ But ‘sovereign immunity’ is a term of art, and 
in this context it is clearly a reference to tribes’ general immunity from suit, not a broader policy 
statement regarding the autonomy of Indian government and lands.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 1057. Swinomish Indian Tribe Cmty. v. BNSF Ry. Co., 228 F. Supp.3d 1171 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 
13, 2017). Additional discussion of this case is available under the “Trespass” section of this annual 
update. 
 1058. Id. at 1181 (“What is essential is clear evidence that Congress actually considered the 
conflict between its intended action on the one hand and Indian treaty rights on the other, and chose 
to resolve that conflict by abrogating the treaty.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 1059. Id. 
 1060. Id. at 1181–82. 
 1061. Id. at 1181. 
 1062. Swinomish Indian Tribe Cmty. v. BNSF Ry. Co., No. C15-0543RSL, 2017 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 88449 (W.D. Wash. June 8, 2017) (“The Treaty of Point Elliott is not mentioned in the ICCTA, 
nor is any treaty or agreement with Indian nations. The fact that rail lines cross tribal lands throughout 
the United States was known at the time the ICCTA was passed, as were the tribe’s treaty rights to 
exclusive use of those lands. Yet Congress expressly addressed the intersection of railroad rights of 
way and tribal lands only through the IRWA, a statute which pre-dated the ICCTA by almost half a 
century. Under the IRWA, if an individual or entity uses tribal lands without obtaining the necessary 
permissions, the unauthorized use is a trespass and the Tribe ‘may pursue any available remedies under 
applicable law. . . .’ 25 C.F.R. § 169.413. Thus, the congressional pronouncement that specifically 
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Trespass: In Davilla v. Enable Midstream Partners, plaintiffs were 
38 individual Indians and the Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma who own 
undivided interests in an allotment under which the defendant has a gas 
pipeline.1063 The easement agreement expired in 2000 and the defendant 
has been unable to obtain consent for a renewal but has continued to use 
the pipeline.1064 Plaintiffs brought an action for trespass, seeking damages 
and an injunction preventing its future use. The court, relying in part on 
25 U.S.C. § 324 held that although the defendant was able to obtain 
consent from five of the individual Indian landowners, their collective 
interest was less than 10% of the whole and so there was no consent to the 
trespass.1065 The court granted the tribe’s motion for partial summary 
judgment as to liability for the trespass, issued an injunction immediately 
enjoining the defendant from using the pipeline, and ordered its removal 
within six months.1066 
CONCLUSION 
The year 2017 was an interesting one for Indian law. As the year 
ends, we have three cases pending this term in front of the Supreme Court 
and several others awaiting a decision on certiorari.1067 The Court 
delivered its newest pronouncement on sovereign immunity, encouraging 
the development of a canon of Indian law which will now look more 
closely to determine the real party in interest in a lot of litigation involving 
tribal officials.1068 Justice Thomas issued a lone dissent on the scope of the 
Indian Commerce Clause.1069 
It is my hope that the reader takes something away from this 
summary of the year in Indian law. Whether you have stumbled across this 
article in 2018 or 2028 there is certainly something important about trying 
to collect and synthesize the year’s developments. I note that while this 
piece contains a discussion of, and citation to, many of the cases decided 
this year – many others have been omitted at the author’s discretion and 
for the sake of space. I welcome any comments on how this project could 
be improved or be made more useful for future iterations. 
                                                     
addresses tribal rights vis-a-vis a railroad right of way leaves intact the Tribe’s right to pursue a treaty-
based trespass action under federal law.”). 
 1063. Davilla v. Enable Midstream Partners, 247 F. Supp. 3d 1233, 1235 (W.D. Okla., 2017). 
 1064. Id. 
 1065. Davilla, 247 F. Supp. 3d at 1237–38. 
 1066. Id. at 1238–39. 
 1067. See supra Section III. 
 1068. See Lewis v. Clarke, 137 S. Ct. 1285 (2017). 
 1069. See Upstate Citizens for Equality v. United States, 199 L. Ed. 2d 372 (2017). 
